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THE

## CHRISTIAN REVIEW.

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## ART. I.—SCHAFF'S APOSTOLIC HISTORY.

*History of the Apostolic Church; with a General Introduction to Church History.* By PHILIP SCHAFF, Professor in the Theological Seminary at Mercersburg, Pa. Translated by EDWARD D. YEOMANS. New York: Charles Scribner, 145 Nassau Street. 1853.

*Die christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte.* Vorlesungen von Dr. K. R. HAGENBACH, Prof. der Theologie in Basel. 1853. (The Christian Church of the First Three Centuries. Lectures by Dr. K. R. HAGENBACH, Prof. of Theology in Basel. 1853.)

OF the two works, of which the titles are here transcribed, our principal concern is with the former. Of the lectures of Dr. Hagenbach, it is enough to say, that they are predominantly of a somewhat popular cast, and such as might be heard with interest by any intelligent mixed audience, desiring to be made acquainted with the state of the church in the first centuries. They are such lectures as we should be glad to have delivered every year in all our large cities, in place of most of the matters which are talked of in our lyceums. They are characterized by learning, sobriety, and a healthful Christian spirit. Their author is otherwise advantageously known by his published contributions to the science of church history, particularly to the history of

the Protestant Reformation. His two volumes on the History of Doctrines (Dogmengeschichte) have already been translated into our language, and are doubtless familiar to most of our readers. With this brief notice, we dismiss for the present these valuable lectures on the church of the first three centuries, though we may hereafter refer to the views of the author on one or two points.

Our principal business now is with the volume of Professor Schaff. We do not, indeed, expect to lay before our readers anything which may fitly be called a *review* of his work. A volume of nearly seven hundred well filled pages can not be adequately examined and appreciated within the compass of an article of moderate length in a literary periodical. Not a tithe of the important subjects embraced in this history can be even referred to within the limits at our disposal. And yet we feel it due to the author and to our readers to take something more than a passing notice of this important production. We believe it to be the most thorough and complete work on the church of the first century which has ever been published in the English language. We do not except from this remark Neander's celebrated "History of the Planting and Framing of the Christian Church by the Apostles," of which we have an English translation, though there are points in which we can not hesitate to place Neander above our present author. Neander, with all his diligence and research, may not have possessed himself more fully of the learning belonging to this period than Schaff appears to have done, but his spirit and principles are somewhat freer and larger, or at any rate, they command more of our sympathy on the whole. The volume of Schaff has, however, the advantage of being later by a number of years, and of embodying, in consequence, the results of the critical studies and special discoveries of the best German scholars since the publication of Neander's apostolic history. On several of the points concerning which Schaff differs from his honored predecessor in this field, and assigns the reasons of his difference in his text and notes, we think he is undoubtedly correct. He owes, however, as he candidly and largely acknowledges, very much to this "father of modern church history," and it is probably not too much to say, that in the absence of such a work as Neander's his own could not have been written. But let none suppose that we utter this for the unworthy purpose of disparaging the work of Professor Schaff. If Neander, not to speak of other German scholars, has aided him to prepare a history in some respects more valuable than

Neander's history of this period, the merit of Schaff is not thereby lessened. Rather is the later writer entitled to commendation for the diligence and the judgment which have enabled him to achieve so noble a triumph.

This work of Schaff, to speak of it without any comparison with other works, deserves high praise. We have intimated that it is marked by thorough and exact erudition, and a mastery of the original and other sources which belong to the illustration of its great and interesting subject. It is a sufficiently full and symmetrical presentation of this subject, a many-sided and nearly exhaustive view of it, in the different aspects in which it invites the attention of the scholar and the Christian. The rich and various materials of the history are arranged with much skill and discrimination, under their natural heads, and presented with perfect clearness. We can hardly name a point connected with the relations of Christianity to Judaism and Heathenism, with the propagation of this religion in the face of persecutions from the day of Pentecost onward to the end of the century, with Christian life, and with the government, worship, theology and heresies of the primitive church, on which this work may not be consulted, always with profit, and for the most part with high satisfaction. All this we deem to be but fair and duly measured commendation.

We further think this work characterized by conscientious calmness and impartiality. We do not mean to say that the author is certainly right in all of his views, but he aims to be right. If he takes a position in relation to the church itself and to its government which many may think unwarranted, it is not for the purpose of coming forward as a partisan, as the defender and champion of any particular religious body, but because he believes that the facts of history and a comprehensive survey of the nature of man and of religion, lead him to his position. Every competent and candid reader will, we think, agree with us that Prof. Schaff has written this volume in the interest of no sect nor party. It is plain to ourselves that he aims to present his subject as it lies open before him; to paint to us the church of Christ, and especially the church which sprang up under the labors and care of the apostles, just as he thinks he finds it, intentionally distorting nothing and suppressing nothing. He simply seeks to do justice to a theme surpassing in dignity all others, the introduction into humanity of that divine spiritual life which is communicated through Christ, and which is destined to quicken the nations, to create wherever it goes a new civilization, and to bring an ever increasing

number of men into fellowship with God and with his Son. As a proof of his intentional independence and fairness we may refer to his position in relation to Catholicism and Protestantism. It may be true that comparatively few Catholics or few Protestants will altogether approve of his attitude toward these antagonistic portions of the church, for it is his design to make himself the historian of neither party exclusively, but of the whole church, which in his view includes them both. We need not here say that we have no sympathy with the governing spirit of the Catholic church in our time, and with many of its pretensions in past ages, nor do we understand Prof. Schaff to have any. But without at all vindicating the position of Schaff and without inquiring even how far it *can* be vindicated with success, we simply say that he appears to us to have taken it honestly and independently, in the true spirit of the historian, because on a wide, commanding, and *designedly* impartial survey of the whole ground, he thought it right. Whether he mistakes or not is another inquiry on which we do not yet enter. But he believes that there was much of the truly good in the Catholic church of the middle ages, and that the real church of Christ maintained in this body with whatever diminution of power, a portion of life through all this period. When the Reformation broke out in the sixteenth century, he does not suppose that all truth and right were on the side of the reformers, and that there was nothing but error and wrong on the side of the Catholics; though he rejoices in this reformation, and in the development of the independent spirit of the gospel seen in it, seeks only to check the excesses and the false speculative tendencies of this spirit, and looks forward to an ideal church of the future in which the oppositions of Catholicism and Protestantism shall be reconciled. Now we can not withhold from the author the expression of our unfeigned pleasure, that he takes with dignified independence this position, after convincing himself that it is the correct one. He has composed his work in no narrow polemical spirit. We say this because we think it ought to be said, and that we should fail to call attention to one important feature of this history if we omitted it; and we do not mean to unsay it in any critical remarks which we may hereafter make on particular opinions advanced in the work. We may believe that he sometimes errs, and errs in relation to ourselves as Baptists, but we do not call in question his impartiality.

This history of Schaff is further pervaded by a deep and earnest religious spirit. We see evidences, on almost every

page, that the mind of the writer has communed long and intimately with the mind of the Saviour, as it appears in his wonderful life and teachings, and in the spirit which he infused into the apostles, and which prompted their labors. His piety is conspicuous in his manner of apprehending the religion of Christ, as a central, life-creating power, which takes possession of the soul, and working within, progressively enlightens its faculties, and sanctifies its activity. In this respect he continually reminds us of his favorite Neander; for thus far both agree in their mode of conceiving and representing Christianity; and both differ widely from such writers as Mosheim and Gieseler. Schaff, however, unlike Neander, too much fetters and circumscribes the divine power of the Gospel, by exhibiting it in too close connection with external rites and a fixed organization. But this results from his theoretical views, not from any apparent deficiency in his religious spirit. In the depth and freshness of his religious life, he ranks with the best writers of church history. In this we find another recommendation of this work.

Passing to the form, or the more distinctively literary character of the volume, we must pronounce it a happy specimen, almost a model, of a perspicuous and pure English style. In this view, it far surpasses anything which we have seen in the shape of a translation from the theological literature of Germany. While the English dress in which most of these translations appear, is exceedingly awkward and ill-fitting, to such an extent even that we are sometimes unable to determine the form of the thought, except from an actual inspection, or a fortunate conjecture of the original language, and are driven to conclude that many must be left in hopeless perplexity as to the real meaning, this volume, on the contrary, comes to us in a perfectly intelligible and uniformly transparent diction. We hardly ever find ourselves arrested in the reading by a failure to grasp the exact sense of any expression. In order to account for this excellence, we are led to conclude that the author writes in a more lucid German style, than many of the eminent scholars in his fatherland, and also that he has been singularly happy in the choice of a translator. Foreign residence, and familiarity with English or French literature, we have heard it said, are wont to exert a favorable influence on the style of German authors; and perhaps Professor Schaff has, in this way, reaped some profit from the time which he has spent in this country. At any rate, this history, in its English garb, may be compared, without disadvantage, with most original works in our own language. The sentences are not involved and

lumbering, but easy and graceful, without lacking strength and terseness. The style often rises into elegance and beauty, and takes the colors of the writer's active and picturesque fancy. There may be sometimes too great a multiplication of metaphors, and too free an accumulation of varying, but substantially synonymous clauses; though the effect of this is not to retard unpleasantly the progress of the thoughts. The portion of the work which is least attractive in style, is the first book, in which he treats of the "founding, spread and persecution of the church;" where we miss something of his usual freedom and power of language; but this we attribute to his close following of the accounts in the New Testament, instead of weaving his materials, as elsewhere he must, into an independent narrative.

From these general remarks on the characteristic merits of this history, we proceed to a more special notice of single parts and details.

We must not pass in silence the preliminary essay, or "General Introduction to Church History," filling the first one hundred and thirty-four pages of the volume. Every Christian scholar who reads this, will thank the author for what he has done. We have not elsewhere met with anything near so full and satisfactory on the subject. He here gives us his conception and definition, first of history in general, next of the Church, and then, combining these two, of church history. We quote here a few passages from the beginning of his third chapter.

"We are now prepared to define *church history*. It is simply the progressive execution of the scheme of the divine kingdom in the actual life of humanity; the outward and inward development of Christianity; the extension of the church over the whole earth, and the infusion of the spirit of Christ into all the spheres of human existence, the family, the state, science, art, and morality, making them all organs and expressions of this spirit, for the glory of God, and for the elevation of man to his proper perfection and happiness. It is the sum of all the utterances and deeds, experiences and fortunes, all the sufferings, the conflicts, and the victories, of Christianity, as well as of all the divine manifestations in and through it.

"As we have distinguished two factors, a divine and a human, in general history; so we must view church history as the joint product of Christ and of his people, or regenerate humanity. On the part of Christ, it may be called the evolution of his own life in the world, a perpetual repetition,

or unbroken continuation, as it were, of his incarnation, his words and deeds, his death, and his resurrection, in the hearts of individuals and of nations. On the part of men, church history is the external and internal unfolding of the life of believers collectively, who live and move and have their being in Christ. But as these are not perfect saints this side of the grave, as they will remain more or less under the influence of sin and error, and as, moreover, the church militant is associated with the ungodly world, which intrudes into it in manifold ways, there appear, of course, in church history all kinds of sinful passions, perversions and caricatures of divine truth, heresies and schisms. We find all these in fact even in the age of the New Testament. For in proportion as the kingdom of light asserts itself, the kingdom of darkness also rouses to greater activity, and whets its weapons on Christianity itself. Judas not only stood in the sacred circle of the apostles, but wanders, like Ahasuerus, through the ecclesiastical sanctuary of all centuries. It is in opposition to the highest manifestations of the Spirit of God, that the most dangerous and hateful forms of human and diabolical perversion arise."

A very interesting and valuable part of this "General Introduction," is the fourth chapter, in which we have an enumeration and a critical estimate of all the most important church historians, both Catholic and Protestant, from Eusebius down to the present day. He distributes Protestant Historiography into five periods: "The *orthodox-polemical*, the *unchurchly-pietistic*, the *pragmatic-supranaturalistic*, the *negative-rationalistic*, and the *evangelical-catholic*," and then mentions and characterizes the leading writers belonging to and representing each of these periods. We have not space to follow him through these epochs, and will simply say, that the terms which he applies to them, sufficiently indicate his judgment of the spirit in which the authors wrote. They are all except the last, *evangelical-catholic*, terms expressive of censure, in some particular respect, and imply a belief that the true way of apprehending and presenting church history had not been found and entered on by the writers in these different periods. They are allowed to have considerable merit, in certain respects: but they wrote their histories, either to prop the cause of the Protestant church; or to defend the sects which had before appeared in opposition to Rome; or to find, chiefly in human passions and interests, the cause of the changes in the life and state of the church; or, finally, to serve the interests of a rationalistic spirit, which denies any quickening agency of God on the mind.

These classifications already reveal, in some degree, the opinions of Professor Schaff concerning the church, as an organized community, and standing opposed not only to sects, but also to any single large branch of the church, either Catholic or Protestant. But he further develops these opinions in his view of the last of the above mentioned periods, the *evangelical catholic*.

This began in a reaction against the rationalism of the previous period. Among the many men, who, in literature, philosophy and theology, contributed to give a better direction to religious thinking and life among the Germans at this time, Professor Schaff names with particular honor Schleiermacher; and he finds in Neander the noblest representative of this period of church history. He speaks of the German historiography of this period as distinguished by "its *scientific* structure and that *spirited, lifelike* mode of representation, which springs from the idea of an *organic developement*," and by "the spirit of *impartiality* and *Protestant catholicity*." He names here, however, two distinct schools of historians; the one starting from Schleiermacher and Neander, the other from the philosopher Hegel; and this latter he divides again into an "*unchurchly and destructive branch*," which he calls "the *Tübingen* school, represented by Dr. Baur, and into "a *conservative* branch, devoted to the *Christian faith*," whose leaders are Drs. Rothe and Dörner. But we leave these two divisions of the Hegelian school, and call attention to what he says of Neander, and particularly of his deficiencies.

After dwelling, cheerfully and even lovingly, on the great merits of Neander, as a writer of church history, and honoring him with a just eulogium, which we should be glad to transcribe, would our space allow, he proceeds to say, that he misses, in this distinguished author, "the *churchly* element." He finds in him a lack of "decided *orthodoxy*," and complains of "his comparative disregard for the *objective* and *realistic* character of Christianity and the church, and his disposition, throughout his writings, to resolve the whole mystery into something purely inward and ideal." "True," he says, "he is neither a Gnostic, nor a Baptist, nor a Quaker; though many of his expressions, sundered from their connection, sound very favorable to these hyper-spiritualistic sects." "The freedom, for which Neander so zealously contends, is of quite a latitudinarian sort, running, at times, into indefiniteness and arbitrariness, and covering Sabellian, Semi-Arian, Anabaptist, Quakerish, and other dangerous errors with the mantle of charity." It is also said of him, that "he views

Christianity and the church, not indeed as necessarily opposed to each other, yet as two separate and more or less mutually exclusive spheres.”\*

The object for which we reproduce these passages, is not to undertake the defense of Neander, but to bring out clearly the views of Professor Schaff. They are views which he, without doubt, honestly holds; and we do not blame him in the least for avowing them. They enter into his conception of the way in which church history ought to be written. They form a part of his theory of what a history of the church should be. The church and Christianity are in his view inseparable. This is what we understand him to assert, page 104; though the form of his expression, as opposed to the doctrine of Neander, is modest and cautious; and this is plainly the import of some of his language just quoted, in which he criticises and objects to Neander's views. Now we must dissent from this theory. We maintain that the church, in the sense in which Prof. Schaff uses this term, and Christianity, are not commensurate. Christianity may exist *out of the church* as he regards it; and it is by no means coextensive with the boundaries of the church. Men may be in the church, according to his notion of it, without being in any way pervaded and governed by the spirit of Christianity. The fact seems to us to be, that Professor Schaff is led into error here, and even into self-contradictory statements in different parts of his work, by the definition which he gives of the church. This definition consists of two parts, the *form* of the church, and its *essence*. In the first, he calls it “an objective, organized, visible society, a kingdom of Christ on earth,—a pedagogic institution to train men for heaven, and as such destined to pass away in its present form when the salvation shall be completed.” In this view, he makes it “embrace all who are baptized, whether in the Greek, or Roman, or Protestant communion;” and “it contains,” he says, “many hypocrites and many unbelievers.” But in its *essence*, it “consists only of the regenerate and converted, who are united by a living faith with Christ the head.”† Now nothing is more easy than to slip insensibly from one of these senses into the other. When Professor Schaff complains of Neander's “unchurchliness,” of “his comparative disregard for the objective and realistic character of Christianity and the

\* See for these quotations, pages 101, 102 and 103 of the author's General Introduction.

† See General Introduction, chap. ii., pp. 7, 8.

church," and of his want of "a just appreciation of the import of law and authority," he leads us to think of the first part of his definition, or that relating to the *form* of the church; and he apparently fails to see, that his own distinction between the form and the essence implies a full justification of Neander. At any rate, all who account the essence of more worth than the form, will be apt to think Professor Schaff's criticisms here of small importance.

But Professor Schaff will perhaps say, (he does in effect say,) that we have no right to look for the essence in the absence of the form; that the spirit of true piety must not be sought for out of the visible church, or the company of the baptized. He says, speaking of the church: "In her womb must we be born again of incorruptible seed; from her breast must we be nourished into spiritual life. For she is the Lamb's bride, the dwelling of the Holy Ghost, the temple of the living God, 'the pillar and ground of the truth.' Those ancient maxims, *Qui ecclesiam non habet matrem, Deum non habet patrem*, and *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, though perverted by the church of Rome, and applied in a carnal and contracted sense to herself as *the* church, are yet perfectly correct, when we refer them not simply to a particular denomination, but the holy catholic church, the mystical body of Christ, the spiritual Jerusalem, 'which is the mother of us all.' (Gal. 4: 26.) For since Christ, as Redeemer, is to be found neither in Heathenism, nor in Judaism, nor in Islamism, but only in the church, the fundamental proposition, 'Out of Christ no salvation,' necessarily includes the other, 'No salvation out of the church.' This, of course, does not imply, that mere external connection with it is of itself sufficient for salvation, but simply, that salvation is not divinely guaranteed out of the Christian church. There are thousands of church members, who are not vitally united to Christ and who will, therefore, be finally lost; but there are no real Christians anywhere, who are not, at the same time, members of Christ's mystical body, and as such connected with some branch of his visible kingdom on earth. Church membership is not the *principle* of salvation—which is Christ alone—but the necessary *condition* of it; because it is the divinely appointed means of bringing the man into contact with Christ and all his benefits." (General Introduction, p. 9.)

Here then we have the unqualified declaration, "Church-membership is the necessary *condition* of salvation;" and, this leads us fully into Schaff's theory of the church, as a visible organization. This theory might not be so objectionable, were not the term church, in this sense, plainly enough

restricted to the larger bodies to which the name is applied, and denied to the parties which have dissented from them. That Schaff deems it inapplicable to these latter, at least in its full significance, is evident from the fact that he uniformly speaks of them as "sects." It is certain, for instance, that he does not consider the Baptists as forming, fairly and properly, a part of the church; though whether he would altogether refuse this name to them, we do not know. Now without any reference to ourselves, and without a particle of personal feeling on the subject, we say to Schaff, that broad and candid as his position, in some respects, is, it is yet not broad enough. It is not as comprehensive as Christianity; it is not as large and free as the divine grace. It will not enable him, in any age of the Christian religion, to take a full account of the spiritual power and benefit which have flowed from it. If it has worked beneficially, as we do not deny, in the large and old Christian organizations, in the Greek and Latin, and modern national churches, in despite of all the tendencies to formalism, it has also stirred powerfully the minds of vast multitudes, who have been unconnected with these bodies, or who have seceded from them. The philosophic church historian, who would do justice to this subject, must be suspicious of all narrow theories. We do not say that he must not write under the guidance of great governing principles; but he must take care that these principles are identical with the very nature of spiritual Christianity, instead of being such as to cramp and compress it. That would be a very defective history of Christianity in England since the time of the Reformation, which should occupy itself chiefly, either with the established church, on the one hand, or with the growth and labors of the dissenters and Wesleyans, on the other. Whoever would write a good historical work on this subject, and one adequately illustrating what Christianity within this period has done for the inhabitants of this island, must look abroad over the whole field, and take account of Christians of all classes, without excepting either "Quakers," or "Baptists," or any other "hyper-spiritualistic sects." So in a general history of the religion of Christ in the world, through the period of eighteen centuries, the writer who rises to the level of his subject, and aspires to present it worthily, must, whatever his predilections for a particular form of the church, and his regard for external church union, put his mind in sympathy with every pure and right religious movement, in whatever quarter it appears. He may disapprove of wildness and excess; but he must be ready to honor piety, in spite of the aberrations with which it is sometimes connected.

Christianity is older than the church ;\* it is especially older than most particular churches ; for many of these are of comparatively recent origin. Not improbably also it may *outlive* many of the churches now existing. It may, for anything we know, outlive the present Greek and Roman churches. We are acquainted with no church whatever, of which it could be said, that its extinction to-day in its present form, would involve the extinction of Christianity. If there are any Christians of any denomination, whether Catholics, Episcopalians or Baptists, who imagine that the destinies of the religion of Christ are linked indissolubly to their particular church, we shall not stop to reason them out of the idea, but are content that they should hug the precious illusion, as long as their bigotry may allow. For us, Christianity exists, first of all, in the Bible and in Christ. This Biblical Christianity, working through Christ and through his Spirit, is the creator of the church. Christ was the creator of the apostles, in their spiritual character; and Christ in them, his truth and his Spirit, founded and created the church. We can put no good and consistent sense on the language of Schaff, before quoted, that "we must be born again in the womb of the church." In our view, regeneration, which we never think of confounding with baptism, brings men who were before out of the church, into it, so far as spiritual character is concerned, and thus fits them for visible membership. The church, or some of its teachers, or members, may be the bringers of the quickening and saving truth, through which God works ; or, as in the case of Luther, reading his Latin Bible in the convent, this human intervention may be wholly wanting ; but in either case, the source of the regenerating power is divine. The church is continued as it began ; and if we go back to the beginning, certainly we do not find the intervention of the church as a mother, between Christ and the apostles. The idea is even absurd ; for it supposes the existence of the church before it began to exist.

In saying this, we do not undervalue the agency of the church and of its ministry, as an appointed organ for teaching men the religion of Christ: but we hold that the church will generally best perform its duty in this respect, when disclaiming any power to communicate grace by means of sacraments, or as the result of an external connection with

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\* This is only saying that God is before the world ; that Christ and his truth are before his people ; or that all causes are unavoidably conceived of as prior to their effects.

itself, it shall direct all persons to look immediately to Christ, and to his revealed word and promised Spirit. There may be in this country an undue disposition to disparage all great national churches, which have an ancient faith, and are replenished chiefly in the way of hereditary membership, and to speak of them as lifeless and almost useless establishments, but when we consider the tendency of at least some of these churches to substitute themselves in the place of Christ and of scriptural Christianity, and to claim to be the inheritors and depositaries of nearly all truth and saving power, we do not greatly wonder at the unfavorable feeling toward them. We do not, however, write with a view to foster prejudices in any persons; but would rather remove them.

If we differ from Schaff on the question of the church, which he often speaks of as the great question of our own and the immediately coming time, we partially concur with him on the subject of the *development* of Christianity, both as received into the individual mind, and as apprehended generally by the church. We regret that we have not had the opportunity of reading his special work on this topic, to which he several times refers us, as embodying a fuller illustration of his views, and a defense of them against objections; but so far as we now understand him, he says nothing to which, with suitable modifications, we can object. The religion of Christ is primarily spirit and life. As such it enters into the mind, and mixes itself with the mind's proper life. It awakens all the faculties into new activity, and thus extends its influence over the whole man, and all his spheres of action. It enlightens him more and more on all questions of duty, and thus purifies his practical life. At the same time it quickens his thinking, and thus guides him to a progressively clearer and juster appropriation of the Christian truth. In the process of freeing himself from crude and erroneous notions, he will be greatly aided by a generous literary and scientific culture; because this culture stimulates and strengthens the faculties, and enables him to see the harmony of religion with all other truth. But as Professor Schaff pertinently remarks, he can not "transcend" the revealed word of Christ. "The doctrine of an improvement on Biblical Christianity, of an advance on the part of men beyond revelation, or beyond Christ himself, is entirely rationalistic and unchristian."

But the individual, in this work of clearly developing to his own mind the system of Christian truth, can never go far beyond his age; for he will be arrested by the prevalent

manner of thinking characteristic of his age, by its philosophy and its general culture. But what can not be done by the individual in his time, may be accomplished in a succession of ages, as a result of the progress of mankind, and of the corresponding progress of the church, in its ability to apprehend and exhibit, in an ever improving scientific form, the doctrinal system of Christianity. Hence the doctrinal definitions and statements of the theologians of one age can never be allowed to be a binding authority for the Christian thinkers and teachers of any later age. They may always appeal from these to the Scriptures, and to the better advantages which their own position and training give them for interpreting the Scriptures, and exhibiting their exact meaning. Christian Theology we hold to be a progressive science; and though the declaration that it is such, may startle the ignorant and bigoted in all schools and in all churches, yet we do not see how any one, who has followed historically the course of this science from the times of Clement of Alexandria and Origen, onward through the later Latin and Greek fathers, the scholastic divines of the middle ages, and the theologians of the Reformation, down to our own day, can think of calling in question the statement. We feel prompted to say thus much, not in the interest of any latitudinarian tendencies, or from a wish to sever the theology of our time from the Scriptures, but from a desire to see the vital spiritual Christianity of the New Testament earnestly and independently seized, as the imperative wants of our age require. We need as our theological teachers profoundly studious, pious and free-minded men, richly stored with the learning of the past, and with the science of the present; and who, while bowing most reverently and submissively to the authority of the Christian Revelation, have yet so much faith in themselves, and in the progressive spirit of humanity and of the church, that their teaching shall be in no way fettered and hampered by the doctrinal formulas and definitions of previous ages.

This doctrine of "development" may doubtless be carried too far and abused. We have not now time to state the limits within which we would confine it. But we may say that Neander pushed it, in our judgment, to an unwarranted length when he employed it to justify the introduction of infant baptism. We judge also from some hints in different parts of his volume, that Professor Schaff may be inclined in a like way to extend shelter to the Episcopal constitution of church government. But on this point we shall doubtless learn his views more fully in his next volume.

We content ourselves here with the general statement, that nothing can be developed out of Christianity which is not homogeneous with itself, with its own nature and principles. But that its proper spirit and principles can be, and to some extent have been progressively better seized and unfolded, both in individuals and in the church, we have no doubt. Coming times may be expected to advance beyond ourselves, though not beyond the Scriptures.\*

Passing over Professor Schaff's "special introduction" to

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\* In the paragraphs above we have rather sketched the brief outline of our own views of "development," as applied to Christianity and the church, than attempted any analysis of those of Dr. Schaff, though we had supposed our own to be substantially the views of Schaff also as contained in this history. But we have since read in the Princeton Review for January, 1854, an article on this subject, in which the writer quotes largely from Dr. Schaff's earlier works for the purpose of showing that his theory of development is built on the basis, in part, of the Hegelian pantheism. We coincide with the reviewer in regarding much of the language which he reproduces from these previous works of Dr. Schaff as having something of the pantheistic tinge. Had we before had the means of comparing these passages from Schaff with his language in this history, we should have modified somewhat the expressions above used, since Dr. Schaff is pleased to refer us to these previous publications for a fuller statement of his views, and it is therefore right to interpret his later language, where it is somewhat indeterminate, by his earlier on the same subject. We must therefore withdraw, in part, our indorsement of what he says on this matter. At the same time we can not refrain from remarking, that the ideas of the Princeton reviewer are now and then a little more cramped and rigid than we like. Christianity, as given us in the New Testament, is doubtless unchangeable. Still it is there laid before us essentially as a manifestation of the life and character of Christ. Even the teachings of Christ flow directly from the Spirit which was in Him, and our conception and appropriation of these teachings, as of the spirit and life of Christ, admit of being indefinitely raised and improved. We must certainly regard scientific theology rather as something to be evolved by study and Christian thought from the Scriptures, than as formally and explicitly contained in them. If this were not so it would be possible to give all statements and definitions of Christian doctrines in Scriptural phraseology, and there would be no occasion for any other dogmatic theology than the Bible. While we hold then that objective Christianity is given us unchangeably in the Bible and in Christ, we hold also, in opposition to the Princeton reviewer, that this Christianity is presented to us fully as much as "a life," as "a new principle or law introduced into the center of humanity," as it is as "a doctrine," "a system of truth divinely revealed." These two conceptions do not need to be put in antagonism to each other. Both may be accepted, and both, as received into the individual mind and into the mind of the church, allow of a "development." Dr. Schaff, however, makes quite too free and unwarranted a use of his favorite notion, that the church is an *organism*, and that its development is *organic*. We do not object to the use of these terms for the purpose of illustration, but when made the basis of a theory of the church and of its history, they lead to inextricable mysticism and confusion, not to say error. Whatever is common, connected and mutually dependent in the life of the church in different countries and ages, can generally be quite as well presented without as with these designations. But we have already expressed our views on this point in another place, when examining one of Schaff's arguments for infant baptism. We only add, in closing this long note, that Dr. Schaff must not be thought of as a pantheist. The Princeton reviewer does not so represent him, but rather takes pains to bring out his opposition to the most objectionable principle of the Hegelian philosophy, that "history is a self-evolution of the absolute spirit."

his history, in which he considers the preparation for Christianity and the state of the world at the time of its appearance, and presents the whole subject very much as Neander has done in his introduction to his "General History of the Christian Religion and Church," we wish, before taking leave of the author, to call attention to a few matters in the main body of his work.

He begins his proper history of the Apostolic Age with the effusion of the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost. This he repeatedly calls "the birth-day of the church." We find no fault with this language, but as showing the difficulty attending any attempt to mark precisely the time when the Christian church was founded, we will here translate a few sentences from the first of Dr. Hagenbach's Lectures, noticed at the beginning of this article.

"As all beginnings are difficult, so is the beginning of church history, because it is one of the hardest things to determine the beginning of the church. Where did the church begin its existence? Some say the church is as old as the world, for the first covenant of God with men is the first stone in the foundation of the church, and they accordingly speak of a church of the Old Testament, of a church of the patriarchs, of the prophets, and so on. Others, on the contrary, say, and with reason, the religious constitution of the old covenant may well be viewed as the vestibule of the church; but first Christ, the founder of the new covenant, is also the founder of the church, and aside from the Christian church, this appellation belongs to no other religious society. But here also arises the further inquiry: Did the church actually come with Christ into the world? Did He not already carry it, at least in idea, in Himself—[so that it was] prophesying in His Spirit, loving in His heart, working creatively and taking form in His will? May we not indeed call the intimate communion in which He lived with His disciples, already the beginning of the real, the actual church? We can hinder no one from doing this, but when we remember how the Lord in His discourses so clearly distinguishes His presence with His disciples from the time when He will be no longer with them, and how He points them to the Comforter whom He will send them, and who shall guide them into all truth, we must regard the outpouring of the Spirit on the Pentecost as that act of God which is to be hailed as the proper creation of the church."

But afterward, having distinguished the apostolic from the post-apostolic period of church history, he adds:

"The limit can not be sharply defined, and therefore every one who seeks to present the history of the church in a living and intelligible way, will be forced to reach back into the apostolic period, and still further back into the life of Jesus Himself, for without having set distinctly before our mind the image of the Lord who is the Creator of the church, how could we comprehend His church, how its history? Just because the church is not a contrivance and work of men, not anything introduced by the caprice of a man, but a living product which is born of the Spirit and has come to unfold itself gradually according to the law of growth, just for this reason can no determinate date be given with which its history should begin. It is hence

even hazardous to speak of a *founding* of the church, because there is apt to be associated with this word the idea that the church may be a voluntary union of persons with like views, who with deliberate purpose on such and such a day, formed themselves into a religious society, with such and such statutes, as is the case in the founding of other human societies.\*

There can, we think, be no doubt that this is the true way of viewing this matter, and it is not essentially different from the manner in which Schaff himself has presented it in another part of this volume.

We commend to our readers, as worthy of special attention, Schaff's presentation of the difficult matter concerning the speaking with tongues. He does not, like Neander, explain the account in the second chapter of the Acts, by a reference to what took place in the church at Corinth, but thinks there was something peculiar in the former instance. In his chapter on "Spiritual Gifts," however, page 476, he sagaciously hints at a mode of conciliating the account of Luke with the account of Paul, which, could it be established, would make the appearances on the day of Pentecost not much different from those in the Corinthian church.

We ought further to say, that this volume is rendered exceedingly valuable by its careful treatment, especially in its notes, of all matters connected with the chronology of the authors and writings of the New Testament. This remark applies emphatically to Paul. Schaff opposes, we think successfully, the opinion that this apostle suffered a second imprisonment in Rome.

Here we would willingly take our leave of this work, for we have no taste whatever for the apparently endless discussions on the one remaining subject which it seems necessary for us to notice, that of infant baptism. Schaff, however, is a firm believer in infant baptism, as a New Testament institution, and thinks that Neander has quite too hastily conceded, that it was not introduced till the second century. We shall give his arguments, especially so far as they contain anything new.

We do not include under this head what he says on the baptisms of households, mentioned in the New Testament, and shall not therefore occupy ourselves with the value of that argument, which has been so often urged and answered. The readers of this Review would not be likely to thank us for a fresh examination of it.

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\* The reader of Dr. Hagenbach's Lectures will find a fuller expression of these and similar views in his third lecture, pp. 39-49.

The following, however, is at least in the form and spirit in which it is urged, somewhat new. We take it from the section on "Infant Baptism," p. 572.

"The ultimate authority for infant baptism in the bosom of a regular Christian community and under a sufficient guarantee of pious education—for only on these terms do we advocate it—lies in the *universal import of Christ's person and work*, which extends as far as humanity itself. Christ is not only able but willing to save mankind of all classes, in all circumstances, of both sexes, and at all stages of life, and consequently to provide for all these the necessary means of grace. (Comp. Gal. 3 : 28.) A Christ able and willing to save none but adults would be no such Christ as the Gospel presents. The exclusion of a part of our race from the blessings of the kingdom of heaven on account of age has not the slightest warrant in the Holy Scriptures, and our noblest impulses, our deepest religious feelings, rise against such a particularism. In the significant parallel, Rom. 5 : 12, *seq.*, the apostle earnestly presses the point, that the reign of righteousness and life is in its divine intent and intrinsic efficacy fully as comprehensive as the reign of sin and death, to which children among the rest are subject, nay, far more comprehensive and availing, and that the blessing and gain by the second Adam far outweigh the curse and loss by the first."

We have not space for extended quotations: but the reader will find much more like the above in Prof. Schaff's treatment of this subject. He refers us to the parable of the leaven, to the command to make disciples of all nations, and to the passage of Irenæus, which represents Christ as passing through all the ages of human life, for the salvation of persons of each age. "The Baptist view," he says, "robs the Saviour's *infancy* of its profound and cheering significance." He admits however, that faith, on the part of the individual, is "necessary as the indispensable condition of salvation," and, as we understand him, of baptism; but contends that "faith in its incipient form and slumbering germ, may be found in the child, purer than even in the adult," and that "the child may be actually regenerated." He adds, "If a man deny this, he must, to be consistent, condemn all children without exception to perdition." "When Baptist, and some other theologians, admit infants into heaven without regeneration or faith, they either deny original sin and guilt after the manner of Pelagianism, or open a way of salvation unknown, nay, directly opposed, to the gospel." Because Christ requires men "to become as little children," he infers "that *every baptism, even in the case of adults, is really an infant baptism*." And finally, (for we pass over his argument from circumcision,) he refers us to the "organic connection between Christian parents and their children."

Some of the topics here introduced by Schaff are of great interest; and the cause of truth would be much benefited by a thorough and full discussion of them. But we must compress all we can now say into a few brief paragraphs.

We believe "in the universal import of Christ's person and work," with respect to all persons who have the means of gaining any knowledge of his "person and work." But as to the relation of his "person and work," to the generations which lived and died, especially out of the circle of the Old Testament revelations, before Christ came; to the untaught heathen world since that time; and to the infants and children in Christian lands, who die before they become capable of direct instruction, we have to confess ourselves, after much inquiry on the subject, greatly in the dark. We will thankfully accept, either from Professor Schaff, or anybody else, any *real positive* information, which can be given us on this subject. But we can not take conjectures, assertions, vague popular opinions, or doubtful interpretations of obscure and uncertain passages of Scripture, as knowledge.

We further believe, that all persons under the gospel, who are old enough to sin, with a knowledge of the claims of duty and law, may become the subjects of a renewing spiritual influence, and give such evidence of the fact, as to make it proper to baptize them. Baptists never advocate the restriction of Christian baptism to *adults*. They not unfrequently baptize *children*; and they may, in our view, properly baptize them, whenever they give evidence that they possess the Christian temper. Professor Schaff's use of the words "child" and "children," in several passages in this discussion, is, unintentionally no doubt, ambiguous and illusory. We hold that *children*, but not *infants*, may exercise a genuine, intelligent faith in Christ; though we should never think of calling this faith "purer" than that of "adults." Schaff here confounds, apparently, the natural qualities of early childhood, its simplicity and its trustfulness, with faith as a moral virtue. There is doubtless a resemblance between the two, as the language of our Saviour implies; but they differ. The question which Schaff should answer is this: *Do infants exercise faith in Christ?* To say that the germs of a religious constitution exist in them is nothing to the purpose, for all human beings have a religious constitution, or a capacity of being taught the true religion. We may call this constitution grace, or nature; but it is generally the same in the infant, as in the adult; and it is as good a rea-

son for baptizing heathen before teaching them the Gospel, as it is for baptizing infants.

The unavoidable consequence of Professor Schaff's doctrine is that all unbaptized infants, dying in infancy, must be lost. We do not find him saying this directly; but his reasoning implies it; and we doubt not that he holds it. He alleges, that "the exclusion of a part of our race from the blessings of the kingdom of heaven on account of age has not the slightest warrant in the Holy Scriptures;" and in this we fully agree with him. But who does not see that this, as an argument against the deniers of infant baptism, assumes that infants, unless baptized before they die, must be excluded from the kingdom of heaven? Again when he says that Baptists, in admitting "infants into heaven without regeneration\* or faith, either deny original sin and guilt after the manner of Pelagianism, or open a way of salvation unknown, nay, directly opposed, to the gospel," he plainly signifies his belief that those infants to whom "baptism as the sacrament of regeneration" has not been applied before death, must be lost; for he gives us to understand that he is no Pelagian, and doubtless he does not hold that they are saved in "a way opposed to the gospel." Hence the ground on which he advocates infant baptism is really this: *baptism is essential to salvation*. We hope this will be understood, and that none will quote him as authority for infant baptism, who may not be willing to avow their coincidence of opinion with him on this point.

Having thus reduced his reasoning, in the principal passages before quoted, to its simplest expression and sense, we leave it for the present; for we have neither time nor room to enter on an examination of the dogma of baptismal regeneration. But should there be occasion for it, we shall be ready to state the grounds of our rejection of this doctrine at a future time.

Schaff's remark, that "the Baptist view robs the Saviour's *infancy* of its profound and cheering significance," may justify a slight notice. In what this "profound and cheering significance" lies, he does not precisely explain; but if, as we suppose, he adopts what he calls "the beautiful idea" of Irenæus, that Christ "became for infants an infant, in order to sanctify infants,"† and that they could have been sanctified

\* Do all Baptists admit infants into heaven without regeneration?

† *Infantibus infans factus, sanctificans infantes, etc.* For a view of the passage, and particularly for the import of the words "renascuntur in Deum," misapplied by Schaff, as by so many others, to infant baptism, see an able article by the Rev. Dr. Chase, in the Ch. Rev. for April, 1854.

in no other way, (which, however, Irenæus hardly means to say;) if this is his meaning, then we must tell him, that it is an idea wholly foreign to the Scriptures, and of no more authority for us than any legendary narrative in the apocryphal Gospels of the Childhood of Jesus. We say this to mark strongly our disapproval of this conceit, and not for the purpose of lowering the respectable Irenæus to the level of the compilers or inventors of these silly accounts. The incarnation of Christ is a fact of immense meaning, as lying at the foundation of what he subsequently accomplished, but his mere "*infancy*," standing apart from other views of him, has as little to do, we apprehend, with the salvation of infants, as the fact that Joseph, his reputed father, was a carpenter, has to do with the salvation of carpenters.

We advert finally to the argument for infant baptism from the (so called) "*organic connection between Christian parents and their children*." The language, in itself, appears to us highly objectionable. It is even worse than unmeaning; for it suggests a very wrong meaning. It supposes the soul and moral character of the child to be derived from the parents, in just the same way as the body is derived from them. It is thus a revival of the ancient traducianism. It is a gross, physical conception applied to explain the origin of the soul and of its moral state. We believe it wholly unwarranted, wholly destitute of proof and of plausibility. Bodies are formed from bodies in a living way; but instead of reasoning analogically from their formation to that of the soul, we choose to confess our total ignorance of this latter question. It seems to us that all such crudities ought to be banished from theological, as they generally are from metaphysical and ethical science. The moral relations of children to their parents can never be explained or stated by the word "*organic*." This word has no just application to mind and moral character. We think that many German writers, besides Schaff, make a very improper, and alike confused and confusing use of this term.\*

But leaving the language, what does Schaff himself mean by it? Simply this, that "by virtue of their birth from believing parents, the children are already included in the covenant of grace." He quotes Paul, 1 Cor. 7:14, in illustration and support of his view, putting, of course, the same construction on the words unclean (*ἀνάθαγτα*) and holy (*ἅγια*) as

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\* We would apply the above remarks to the expression sometimes used in this country, "*organic sins*."

pedobaptists in this country usually put upon them. Now we have not the slightest inclination to deny that a healthful moral influence comes to the children from the instruction, example and spirit of their Christian parents; though we doubt very much whether this is what Paul here has in mind. But allowing this to be ever so certain, it is plain that Paul says nothing of the baptism of children in this connection, and on this ground. If the words "holy" and "unclean" are to be taken in this *moral sense*, as applied to the children, then the term "sanctified," twice used in this verse, and applied to each of the unbelieving parents, must plainly be taken in the *same sense*; and then we have, so far as this passage goes, as good an authority for applying baptism to the unbelieving husband, and the unbelieving wife, where the other partner is pious, as we have for applying this ordinance to their children. It has always struck us as an inconsistency on the part of pedobaptists, when arguing from this passage as a justification of infant baptism, that they have taken no account of the case of the unbelieving parent, and attempted no explanation whatever of the difficulty, which certainly meets them, when they give baptism in the one case, but refuse it in the other. If "the relative holiness" (for this is the very questionable and rather mongrel expression which has been used) is a reason for baptizing the children, it is certainly just as good a reason for baptizing the unbelieving husband or wife.

With the exceptions which we have briefly stated, we commend cordially to all our readers this able volume. Christian ministers can not afford to be without it.

In concluding this article, we advert with pleasure to the signs in this country of a growing interest in the history of the Christian church. Such an interest is becoming more apparent every year. We have read with much satisfaction the able inaugural addresses of Professors Shedd of Andover, and Hovey of Newton on this subject. In some of our views we differ slightly from both professors, but we fully concur with them in the importance which they attach to this department of Christian learning and of theological instruction. We should welcome from either or both of them a complete history of the Christian church, or if this is too much to expect from any one person, such a contribution toward it as their earnest and indefatigable toils may enable them to offer.

But let us have from no quarter whatever, a history of the church of Christ on earth, written in the interest of any particular denomination or party. We have sometimes heard

the wish expressed by individuals among ourselves for a *Baptist* church history. By this we have understood them to mean, not a history of the Baptist church, which might be well enough and of value in its place, as would be for a like reason, a history of the Congregationalist church, or a history of the Methodist church, or of any other particular church, but a general history of the whole church from the days of the apostles down to our time, for the purpose of illustrating and defending Baptist views. We hope never to see any such history. Baptist, Methodist and Congregationalist, and we might add many other distinctive names to the list, as applied to particular parts of the church, are all modern appellations, though doubtless in most cases embracing views which are as old as Christianity, because found in the teachings of Christ and of His apostles. We want no church history written from the stand-point of any existing Christian denomination. Though Baptists, and attached for the time in which we live to this division of our Lord's followers, we must yet say that we know of no assumption more arrogant and more destitute of proper historic support, than that which claims to be able to trace the distinct and unbroken existence of a church substantially Baptist from the time of the apostles down to our own. We rest the vindication of the Baptist body, as it now exists, on no such ground. In our view no church whatever needs to be able to vindicate itself on any such ground. It would be enough to authorize the existence of any church, though it should spring into being in its proper form and name to-day, that it could establish the substantial identity of its doctrines, spirit and worship with the Christianity and the church of the New Testament. We are heartily sick of the allegation that a historically vouched derivation and uninterrupted descent from the apostles down through eighteen centuries are essential to the validity of a church. The Greek and Roman churches are palpably the only bodies which can lay any specious claim to this apostolic pedigree, and it would seem that any one, who compares carefully the present state of either of these bodies with the churches of the New Testament, as they were when the apostles addressed their letters to them, must be satisfied that the claim is intrinsically of very little worth.

## ART. II.—MODERN LYRICAL POETRY.

*Poems and Ballads.* By GERALD MASSEY. Containing the Ballad of Babe Christabel. Printed from the Third London Edition, with several new poems never before published. Revised and corrected by the Author. New York: J. C. Derby, 119 Nassau Street. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. Cincinnati: H. W. Derby. 1854.

*Poems.* By THOMAS WILLIAMS PARSONS. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1854.

*Hours of Life and other Poems.* By SARAH HELEN WHITMAN. Providence: George H. Whitney. 1853.

WE doubt if ever an age were more prolific in writers of verse than our own. Every month witnesses the emergence of some new orb of song above the horizon. Writers, too barren in thought to find admission to the prose columns of a village newspaper, are welcomed to its poet's corner, where, multiplying their progeny, they soon court the eye of the public in a more ambitious form. Nor is this unexampled increase the most astonishing feature of the phenomenon. Men in all ages have been tempted by the vanity of authorship to write; the difficulty hitherto has been to find some sufficient motive, of vanity or otherwise, to tempt their fellow-men to read. But it would seem poetry now has a value in the market as well as in the opinion of its author. The supply, says the political economist, is always equal to the demand; and, regarding this rule in its application to quality, no less than quantity, we plead guilty to some degree of alarm at the future prospects of our country. There is an old notion, that your poet is rather an idle, visionary, vagabond sort of a character, with little fitness for practical life. Now, if this be true, we might with reason ask, what is to become of our vast material interests, amid so many demands for the exercise of talent in an unpractical direction? But all apprehensions on this score appear to be somewhat gratuitous. The old notion originated in an earlier age, when success in poetry required a more exclusive devotion to its pursuit, and is now entertained only by people of old-fashioned ideas. In our time the spirit of song descends upon the cobbler at his last; upon the mechanic in his shop. The merchant, keep-

ing his accounts upon one page of his day-book, indites tender stanzas on the other to "Edith" or Matilda;" the lawyer intersperses his brief with fanciful snatches of song amidst crabbed citations from Coke and Comyn; the doctor suffers not the ink to dry upon his pen which prescribes a dose of physic for his patient, until he has likewise prescribed a dose of poetry for the public. The shrines of the Muses have been set up in the temples of Mammon, and the frenzy of poetic inspiration is found to be reconcilable with the drudgery of business. But our fears are allayed at this point only to return upon us from another. Poetry is supposed to have a sort of inherent immortality. Indeed, much of that which we now possess has come down to us from a remote period. Now suppose a continuous increase at the present ratio, how long will it be before its voluminous enormity shall appall the reader with such an incubus-like sense of vastness and oppression, that his mind shall shrink aghast at the thought of reading at all, when the most diligent reading can accomplish so little, compared with the colossal mass which must still be left unread? We know there was an era in the history of the Roman civil law when the multitude of treatises, reports, commentaries, and edicts, designed to remove its obscurities, had increased to such an extent, that it was impossible to ascertain with certainty, what the law really was upon any one question, and Justinian, to relieve it of this embarrassment, ordered a digest to be made of its elementary rules and principles, made this digest alone of authority in his courts and so abolished the whole body of the civil law besides. Is it not to be apprehended that poetry may one day suffer from a similar fatality, and that future generations shall know nothing of Homer and Milton, of Sophocles and Shakespeare, of Horace and Tennyson, except what survives in a condensed digest of their most excellent sayings and most brilliant passages? But here again, perhaps, our bodings are based upon an old-fashioned supposition; and, in fact, from what we have remarked of the sudden apparition and evanescence of some of our poetic celebrities, we are led to hope that even in this respect our fears are unfounded.

In these particulars then our mind is relieved. But, as suggested, quality no less than quantity is influenced by the laws of supply and demand. Now does not that very *fugitiveness*, to which we have just alluded, indicate a deterioration in quality? If it be true that "a thing of beauty is a joy forever," then that is no "thing of beauty" which ceases to be a "joy" within any definite period, and the

taste which craves and the mind which creates it, as such, are alike perverted. Here then is a more serious ground of alarm; for so long as the public taste fosters and approves a low standard of poetic excellence, we can not reasonably look for improvement. That taste itself must first be regenerated, and, before that can be done, convinced of its depravation. Now one of the most noticeable characteristics of modern poetry is, that it is almost entirely lyrical. The critics have attempted to account for the decline of the drama and the epic upon philosophical principles. Art, it is said, is but the idealization of nature, and modern history and society do not furnish the types of incident and character, which are appropriate to these two species of composition. In other words, an advanced civilization is unfavorable to the highest efforts of poetic genius. In reply to this theory we deem it sufficient to say, that the noblest models of the Greek drama and the Roman epic are each the product of the palmiest epochs of those two nations, and that neither Italian, French or German literature furnishes the slightest support to such a hypothesis. The predominance of lyrical poetry is traceable to another cause. In the first place, it hardly requires so much thought or genius to write a song as to write an epic; and in the second, Shakespeare and Milton have already fixed the standard of dramatic and epic poetry for both writers and readers. No elegant mediocrity, no barbarous compound of extravagance and affectation, can long abide the test of such a criterion. There are heights of assumption to which even a poet's vanity is unequal; and few men, of even great powers, dare venture in a line of composition which exposes them to a test like this. In lyrical poetry we have, indeed, individual specimens of inimitable beauty, but no single poet, whose works are models of art for the treatment of an entire circle of lyrical subjects. On the contrary, with the exception of Milton, whose lyrics are scarcely inferior to his other poems, our greatest poets have thrown off countless hasty effusions, over which no poetic amateur need hang in despairing admiration of a beauty which defies emulation. Now take these two facts, that the lyric does not demand a sustained power of thought and fertility of invention, and that we have no universally recognized standard of lyrical excellence, and it is not difficult to account for the fluctuations of the public taste, for the uncertain tenure of the most brilliant popularity, and for the prevalence of lyrical amid such a dearth of the other forms of poetry. Horace gives us reason to believe that, in his day, the race of minor poets was almost as numerous as in

our own : but, after he had left them his felicitous portraiture of the life and character, the religion and philosophy, the passions and manners, the sport and the earnest, the civic and the martial glory of the Augustan age, we do not hear even an echo of their existence. He had formed in the Roman mind a taste which exacted a degree of excellence beyond their reach, and they were struck dumb in despair of writing up to the required standard. Now, it may be asked if inferior poetry be a source of enjoyment, what will be gained by such an elevation of the popular taste as to lessen the number of those who contribute to it? Much, we think, is gained, when only that which is truly good can afford genuine delight. A man may regret the loss of his boyish pleasures ; but no wise man will regret this superiority to them. The taste of which we speak, is not the fastidious effeminacy of the literary Sybarite, but the appreciative discrimination of a mind filled with the types of a beauty which baffles any merely ordinary powers of expression ; and a taste like this, though more rarely gratified, is still a higher joy to its possessor than that which rests content with inferior delights. It is the bracing atmosphere of genius, and is fatal only to the puny efforts of conceited debility, or the rank and vicious product of a distempered imagination.

If there be truth in what we have said, then nothing is more desirable than a purer taste. This, if it will not ensure us good poets, will at least starve out the bad. Now, perhaps the best thing a man can do to improve his taste is conscientiously to exercise that which he has. We are inclined to believe that much which passes for false taste is, in fact, falseness of another character, an unconscious dishonesty toward ourselves, a want of loyalty to our own convictions and of veracity in reporting them. In a mind subject to alien influences, even the impressions of sense become distorted ; how much more so then the subtler discriminations of sensibility and judgment. We have no doubt that many men are misled in their opinion of poetry by the mere fact that it is written in verse. From the prose writer they demand pleasure, instruction, new ideas or an intenser vivification of the old. True, a mere cloud of gorgeous verbiage may excite pleasurable sensations for a moment, but not in the mind hungering for nutriment. Men of sense do not disguise their contempt for mere fine writing, when in prose, but if in verse, though they may feel at bottom the same contempt, they are not so well convinced that they ought to feel it. The simple jingle of words shakes their confidence in themselves. They do not know

how far the poet's prerogatives may extend, nor how far he is amenable to the laws of criticism which govern prose composition, and, by such doubts, their real feeling of disgust becomes neutralized, if not changed to admiration. Now this is all wrong. What is nonsense, absurdity or extravagance in prose, is none the less so in verse. The poet can make out no prescriptive right to be bombastic, affected, obscure, puerile or stupid. No triumph of metrical construction, however brilliant, is an apology for him, if he be open to such impeachment. From him, as from the prose writer, we ask living thought; from him more than from the prose writer, we ask that our mind shall be exalted, exhilarated and brought to unison with itself in the harmonious play of its faculties. Let all readers feel themselves justified in making these demands and hesitate not to condemn the poetry which does not answer them, and they will soon have a taste healthy at least, and easily susceptible of refinement.

But not only does the public taste lack cultivation, it has also been misguided by a mistaken criticism. Modern criticism of a poem is little more than a comment upon its separate parts. Extracts are made and the salient lines and phrases italicised; mere verbal felicities and striking images are culled out for admiration, as if poetry were to be enjoyed only here and there in its finer passages. In their rejoicings over these, our critics resemble Jack Horner of the story-book, who having subjected his Christmas pie to a similar critical inquisition, pulled out a plum and exclaimed, "What a bright boy am I!" There is no identification of the critic with the author in the conception of the poem, yet no true poem can be rightly read without this identification. The consequences of such a criticism are obvious. If poetry be valued for its verbal prettinesses, it will abound with them; it will be profusely decorated with fanciful conceits and quaint or far fetched images; but it will not be the fitting incarnation of vital thought. The germ of life, contained in the acorn, unfolds into the oak alone, not into the multiform vegetation of a whole forest. If it should, it would be a monstrosity abhorrent to nature. Now the vital processes of the spiritual world are as truly homogeneous as those of the natural; and the seminal thought of a poem, like the germ of a plant, embodies itself in form only by the assimilation of congruous elements. Poetry, or what passes by that name, may doubtless be manufactured of the excerpts and shreds of thought, and, if the object of poetry were simply to please the ear with musical expression, to tickle the fancy with pleasing images, and fill the memory with quotable phrases,

we could ask no more. But if it has a higher aim, which is to restore to man the freedom of his entire nature through the perception of beauty, this can be attained only by conducting the mind along such gradations of thought and emotion, as shall conduce to the harmonious reconciliation of his faculties, so as to leave each in its freest activity. It must bring serenity to the distracted, hope to the despondent, comfort to the afflicted, inspiration to the disheartened, and repose to the weary. Aims like these can be fulfilled only by the harmonious impressions of true poetic beauty, not by any incongruous jumble of conceits. He who would write in pursuance of such aims must feel the one animating principle of his poem in its every part, conscientiously rejecting all which is not in keeping with it, and thus transfuse the integrity of his poetic mood unbroken through all the details. Sincere feeling, naturally expressed, always observes this rule, even though unconscious of it; and art, which is the pupil of nature, must, to reach its highest effects, either consciously or unconsciously, do the same. In the one case the state of mind experienced, and in the other the state simulated, must keep the expression true to itself throughout. The imagination may suggest much beautiful in itself, but imperfectly suited to this purpose, but the temptation of splendid writing should always yield to a conscientious adherence to the truth of the design. If one could watch the mental processes of a poet, like Gray, in the construction of his *Elegy*, he would probably perceive that what was instinctively or designedly rejected, as the mere refuse and scaffolding of the poem, unpermeable by its primitive idea, would more than furnish the substance of a production, like Alexander Smith's "*Life Drama*," in which the chaos of indigestible materials still await the shaping thought of the artist.

We have thus far spoken of poetry rather as regards its form than its substance. But the poet stands related to his age no less as thinker than as artist, and therefore the matter as well as the form of his productions challenges criticism. Now, we admit, that in many of the subtler graces of verse, in sweetness of sentiment, in delicacy of imagery, in refinement of fancy, in exquisite nicety of thought and expression, we have authors who can not easily be surpassed; but they lack depth, robustness, originality and comprehensiveness of reflection. Writing for an enlightened and cultivated age, if they would influence it, they should share its profoundest intellectual movements; if they would elevate it, they should master its loftiest thought; if they would paint its distinctive aspects, they should become so imbued with its spirit,

that its passion and character, its wisdom and morality should unconsciously touch and tinge the slightest fibre in the texture of their imagining with hues peculiar to itself. But beauty of form is an inexorable exigency of poetry; and in a scientific age, much of the deepest thought is not susceptible of an esthetic expression. How then shall the poet comply with these incompatible claims upon him, as artist to write always conformably to the law of beauty, as thinker to mirror in his writings the features of an age, many of which have no affinity with beauty? Religion in its dogmas and creed, science in its formulas, philosophy in its terminology and logical inductions, indeed, all knowledge, in so far as it tends to abstraction, is essentially unpoetical. Yet the poet can not ignore the existence of these things, for they are at the centre of thought toward which gravitates the highest intelligence of the age. A consciousness of the difficulty here suggested has led many to think that poetry is only natural to the simplicity of an earlier age. Yet strange would it be, if the life of man, increasing in nobleness, in wisdom, in virtue, and in happiness, should, at the same time, gradually lose or outgrow its most precious embellishments. Nor is this the case. The poet can not, of course, assume the office of instructor and teach the abstract principles of science; but science, philosophy and religion do not forever remain mere bodiless abstraction: they become elements of life and character, the centers of expanding thought, the motives of aspiring activities; they clothe themselves with living interest, with traditional glories, with the consecrations of affectionate faith and pious veneration; they are loved, they are hated, they sow the seed of new delights and new sorrows; around them thickly cluster the growing hopes and fears of humanity; and thus are they incarnated in the most vital forms of poetry. The poet embodies the wisdom of his time, not as he reads it in its syllogistic statement by the philosopher, but as he witnesses it, in its impassioned transmutation into life. It is thus that we discern in the poetry of Goethe, and Schiller, and Wordsworth, the features of the age in which they lived. Nay more; practice follows profession, life follows thought with halting steps and imperfect obedience; the poet, therefore, must anticipate his age and represent it, as prefigured in its conceptions, no less than as realized in its experience, and thus, out of its unactualized elements, fashion for it an ideal model for imitation. To do this the mind of the poet must have fed upon and assimilated the highest forms of thought. Under all his Protean shapes he can only give his own individ-

uality. Until he has developed, cultivated and ennobled this to its highest, richest, maturest point, all his productions will partake of the defects of his character. When therefore, we demand from the poet greater elevation, maturity and comprehensiveness of thought in his poems, we point him to a fuller cultivation of himself.

From what we have said, it follows, that the reader of poetry may justly demand, first, good sense, as an indispensable element no less of verse than of prose; second, unity of development, preserving all the parts of the poem in perfect keeping with the idea in which it originates; third, intrinsic excellence of thought and sentiment. No one, probably, will dispute the reasonableness of these demands, yet, if pressed with uncompromising stringency, there are few who would not shrink from the criticism, and we shall be glad to find them even partially fulfilled by the poets, whose names we have placed at the head of this article.

The poems of Gerald Massey are a reprint of the third English edition. From a biographic sketch prefixed to this volume, we learn that the author was born in May, 1828, near Tring, in Herts, in a little stone hut, the roof of which was so low that a man could not stand upright in it. Both his parents were entirely illiterate. His father, a canal-boatman, labored for the wretched pittance of ten shillings a week, and could not always find work at that. At eight years of age, our poet was put at work in a silk manufactory, rising at five o'clock in the morning, and toiling till half-past six in the evening, and earning, at different periods of his service, 9d., 1s., and 1s. 3d. per week. The mill was afterward burned down, and Gerald went to straw-plaiting in a marshy district, where he was attacked with an ague, which lasted him three years and terminated in a tertian ague. "Sometimes," says the sketch, "four of the family, and the mother, lay ill at one time, all crying with thirst, with no one to give them drink, and each too weak to help the other." At the age of fifteen he went to London, as an errand boy. He had learned to read at a penny school, but up to this time he had had access to no books except the Bible, Bunyan, Robinson Crusoe, and a few Wesleyan tracts. But a thirst for knowledge had been awakened, and, in London, he found plenty of books, and read all that came in his way, "Lloyd's Penny Times," Cobbett's books, English, Roman and Grecian history. "I used to read," he says, "at all possible times and in all possible places; up in bed till two or three in the morning; nothing daunted by once getting the bed on fire. Greatly indebted was I also

to the book-stalls, where I have read a great deal, often folding a leaf in a book and returning the next day to continue the subject; but sometimes the book was gone, and then great was my grief. I have often gone without a meal to purchase a book." An active mind like his could not fail to draw comparisons between his own lot in life and that of the more favored ranks of society; these reflections he nourished by the writings of Paine, Volney, Howitt, Louis Blanc, &c., and enthusiastically welcomed the French Revolution of 1848, as the long promised solution of many a dark problem of social and political life. He says of it, "It was scarred and blood-burnt into the very core of my being. This little volume of mine is the fruit thereof." In April, 1849, he commenced editing a journal, written entirely by working men, entitled "The Spirit of Freedom," which "cost him five situations during the period of eleven months,—twice because he was detected burning candle far on into the night, and three times because of the tone of opinions to which it gave utterance." Recently he has espoused with great zeal the movement in favor of Association, with a view to advance the condition of the working-man to that of capitalist as well as laborer. In his modest but manly preface he disclaims the title of poet, but writes, he says, with the hope that he may compose "some songs that may become dear to the hearts of the people, cheering them in their sorrows, voicing their aspirations, lighting them on the way up which they are groping darkly after better things, and saluting their triumphs with hymns of victory."

It is easy to trace, in the life and education of Gerald Massey, the influences which have shaped and colored his opinions, as a man; but we are unenlightened as to the particular studies which have moulded his poetical tastes. He tells us, he never had the least predilection for poetry, but, on the contrary, eschewed it and instantly skipped over such as he met with, until he fell in love, and, as a matter of consequence, began to rhyme. The fountain of his song is, in fact, in his own heart; in his domestic affections and love for woman; in his sympathy with the sufferings of the poor; in his hatred of the wrongs by which they are crushed; in his scorn of their oppressors, and in his prophetic yearnings for a dawn of better things. But the expression of these feelings has evidently been not a little affected by the later school of English poetry. He evinces, indeed, none of that simulated reverence, under cover of which Bailey so profanely trifles with the symbols of religious faith, confounds together the gross appetites of sense and the divinest

hopes of the soul, and patronizes the majesty of heaven with a swaggering familiarity ; nor does he, like Alexander Smith, freely take the name of God to point an epigram, balance an antithesis, or cap a climax of extravagant hyperboles. From this desecration of holy things to unholy uses, from this rhetorical blasphemy—this more diffusive form of profane swearing, which is hardly less vulgar in point of taste and more questionable in morals, than “the big mouth-filling oaths” of a former generation—he is in a great measure free, though not entirely uncontaminated. But this is only one more obnoxious form of a radical defect of this school of poets. Their profanity is used chiefly by way of emphasis ; only clench the expression with an image drawn from heaven or hell, and, in their opinion, meanness becomes sublimity and feebleness of thought starts into gigantic strength. But a constant resort to this source of poetic power, would in time get to be monotonous ; the mind craves variety ; and so all the grander and more beautiful aspects of earth, sea and sky, are laid under contribution for metaphors, similes and allusions, to trick out trite and trivial thoughts with new ornaments, and to translate commonplace into poetry. It is a rule in gunnery, we believe, that the force of the discharge is not proportioned to the amount of powder used, but to the amount which can be thoroughly ignited ; the remainder is not only a waste but an impediment ; and, in writing, it is not the multitude of words, but the just number best fitted to be vivified by the idea, which gives energy to expression. It is also a rule, that it is unnecessary to load a cannon to shoot a hummingbird, and, in speech, often more depends on precision, than force of language. The poets, to whom we allude, overlook these rules. The welkin must ring and be darkened with noise and smoke, that men may think that a great battle is raging, and yet the upshot of the whole is the mangled body of a rabbit or a woodchuck. They dare not trust the naked simplicity of truth. Perhaps they are self-deceived, in that they over-estimate their thought, and adapt the expression rather to its fancied than its real importance. Often their meaning is indefinite to themselves, or, when clearly defined in the separate sentences, it stands so loosely related to what precedes and what follows, that the poem is united rather by outward juxtaposition of words than by interior affinities of thought, and has neither depth nor clearness as a whole.

To this criticism Gerald Massey is obnoxious only in so far as he partakes of their faults, which is to but a limited extent. Writing often under the influence of deep feeling,

the very earnestness and sincerity of his convictions impel him to an unaffected expression. The productions of this class seem to have sprung like glowing impromptus from his heart. They are rather wild and impassioned declamations, than poems, and have all the imperfections of extemporaneous oratory,—untrimmed luxuriance of verbiage, vague and indefinite phrases, which would, doubtless, be vivid with startling effects if filled with the thrilling tones of the poet's voice, but which suggest no determined significance, as perused in the closet—and a versification often rude and inharmonious. They should be read rather as the fervent appeals of an orator, stirring the blood like a trumpet, than as the symmetrical effusions of a poet, winning the soul by the magical enchantments of beauty. But even in his poems of fancy and description, which can not plead the same excuse, we frequently meet the same defects, as also entire passages and stanzas having but an incidental relation to the subject treated. From the prominence given it in the title-page, we infer that the poem, entitled "Babe Christabel," is a favorite with him. And it certainly does abound with much exquisite poetry and touching pathos. It describes the birth of a poor man's child; her brief life; the beautiful promise of her infancy; the growth and ripening of tenderness, love and joy in the hearts of her parents; her death; and a patient sorrow mourning over her grave, consecrated by faith and brightening with the hope of a celestial reunion. The picture is touchingly delineated, but the tranquil flow of emotion is far too often interrupted by verbal affectations, forced conceits, and by descriptions and thoughts which do not grow naturally out of the theme. The poem is short, yet the ten opening stanzas are devoted to a fanciful description of the month of May, in which month we are informed, the "Babe Christabel" was born. This is hardly needed to attune the mind to what follows, and is, therefore, so much thought diverted from the channel in which it ought to flow. In the body of the poem, we meet such stanzas as the following, standing like a mysterious sphinx in our way:

"Midnight was tranced solemnly  
Thinking of dawn. Her star-thoughts burned !  
The trees like burdened prophets yearned,  
Rapt in a wind of prophecy."

"Babe Christabel" is said to have come

—"like music in the night,  
Floating as heaven in the brain,  
A moment opened, and shut again,  
And all is dark where all was light."

We have many such fanciful expressions as, "reeling ringlets," "gorgeous gloom," "stars of glory" swimming "down aching silences of space," and "eyes" which are represented as "wide worlds of worship." But we have said enough about the style of these poems. Mr. Massey is young, and his faults are those of a youth betrayed by false but much admired models. Even as it is, he has written much which would be unexceptionable to the present taste, and we should deem our strictures uncalled for, were it not that we have known poetry to be admired for exactly the defects here censured.

Gerald Massey is peculiarly the poet of the English laboring classes. Springing from their ranks, he has tasted, in his own experience, all the bitterness of their lot, and learned from penury, hunger, disease, friendlessness, and the tyranny of exacting task-masters, to sympathize in all its miseries. A burning sense of their wrongs and sufferings lies, like a living coal, in the very core of his being, and smoulders with a sullen ire, or blazes into rebellious wrath, in much too large a portion of his poetry. It is, probably, to his sincerity, his personal conviction of the truth of his utterances, more than to any literary merit, that he is indebted for his popularity. In the actual state of English society, he discerns no earthly compensation for the hardships of poverty, except in the tenderness of household affections and in the attachments of mutual love. Hence nearly all his poems are of two classes. In the one he lavishes the glory and the consecrations of song over the fidelity of the wife, the self-sacrifice of the mother, the endearing attractiveness of the bride, the kindly confidences and charities of friendships and family, which do not forsake even the poor man's home. In the other, he paints the wretchedness of the laborer, hurls defiance at the rich and the powerful, or breathes encouragement and comfort in poetic vaticinations of a better time. In so far as his poems are designed to develope and adorn the domestic and social affections, as the common heritage and the common blessing of rich and poor alike, their influence is unquestionably salutary; but, in so far as they serve to cherish a spirit of repining or mutinous discontent, we are constrained to doubt the wisdom of their lesson. Genuine poetry is liberal and catholic, and embraces all classes of men in the bonds of human charity. It may be prodigal of its favors, but not of its curses. Gerald Massey too often forgets the poet in the partisan; he is a Red Republican of the deepest dye, and his songs are steeped in the gall of political bitterness. In

his creed, rulers are tyrants, the rich are robbers, and the priests a set of knavish hypocrites, mainly bent upon fleecing their flocks. For them all, he predicts a day of fearful reckoning, when the people, stung by multiplied afflictions, shall arise in their power and exact a bloody retribution for long arrears of iniquity. This picture may be only too true; but the truths of poetry are profounder than those of politics. There is the same human nature for the rich and the poor, the noble and the serf; the politician may espouse the interests of a class or a party, but the poet recognizes a common humanity underlying all social distinctions, and, by those simple touches of nature which make the whole world kin, seeks to restore the ruptured ties of human fellowship. In this, poetry is the handmaid of religion; both set a value upon man simply as man and merge the attributes of caste in the more essential attributes of character. The office of both is to allay, not to inflame, the irritations of society; to be the almoner of charity, not the pander of hate; to promote the equality of human conditions, by opening the heart to wider and more fraternal sympathies, not to stimulate it to envy and uncharitableness. The heart will melt in pity over the homely narrative of obscure suffering, which would be as flint to the maledictions of intemperate philanthropy. Distress is more efficiently succored by touching man's better nature in its behalf, than by violently assailing his selfish passions. Sir Walter Scott, tory as he was, was a truer friend to the poor, in investing the vicissitudes of their lives and the traits of their character with the attractions of his genius, than many a radical declaimer against political abuses; and Hood's "Song of the Shirt" and "Bridge of Sighs" are more powerful pleas for the dependent and the outcast than whole volumes of virulent denunciation. Gerald Massey has been an eye-witness of the life of the poor; let him, as poet, delineate it in the severity of truth; let him paint all its forbidding aspects after the sombre colorings of nature; let him make the relations of laborer and capitalist palpable to the heart by lifelike illustration; let him do equal justice to both sides of the picture; let him describe poverty in its heroism and degradation, its virtues and its vices, and trace, in fitting exemplars, the steps which lead from servitude to independence; let him but do this with conscientious candor, and the truths, so embodied, shall instruct the rich and the poor, and live on with ameliorating effect for ages after the partisan invectives of both verse and prose have been gathered to oblivion.

In taking our leave of this poet, it is but fair that we should present the reader some specimen of his powers ; and, in so doing, we pass over his political lyrics, to select one in which joy and beauty, in their loveliest form, are described as blossoming by the poet's fireside.

**LITTLE LILYBELL.**

“ When unseen fingers part the leaves,  
And show us Beauty’s face ;  
And Earth her breast of glory heaves  
And glows from Spring’s embrace ;  
When flowers on green and golden wings  
Float up,—life’s sea doth swell,—  
And flush a world of vernal things,—  
Came little Lilybell.

“ And like a blessed bird of calm  
Our love’s sweet wants she stilled,  
Made passion’s fiery wine run balm,  
Life’s glory half fulfilled !  
From dappled dawn to twinkling dark,  
This witching Ariel  
Fills all our heaven ; or like a lark,  
Sings little Lilybell.

“ And she is fair, O very fair !  
Has eyes so like the dove !  
And lightly leans her world of care  
Upon our arms of love !  
It can not be that ye will break  
The promise-tale ye tell,  
Ye will not make such fond hearts ache,  
O little Lilybell !

“ As on Life’s stream her leaflets spread  
And tremble in its flow,  
We shudder, lest the awful Dead  
Pluck at her from below !  
Breathe softly low, ye Winds that start :  
O Stream but faintly swell ;  
Your every motion smites the heart,  
For little Lilybell.

“ We tremble : lest the angel Death,  
Who comes to gather flowers  
For Paradise—at her sweet breath,  
Should fall in love with ours !  
O many a year may come and go,  
Ere from Life’s mystic well  
Such stream shall flow, such flowers shall blow,  
As our sweet Lilybell.

“ Oh when thy dear heart fills with tears,  
 And aches with Love’s sweet pain,  
 And pale cheeks burn through happy tears  
 Like red rose in the rain ;  
 I marvel, Sweet ! if we shall see  
 The sight and say ‘tis well,  
 When the Beloved calls for thee,  
 Our dainty Lilybell ?

“ How rich Love made the lowly sod  
 Where such a flower hath blown !  
 O Love, we love and think that God  
 Is such a love full-grown !  
 Dear God, that gave the blessed trust,  
 Be near, that all be well,  
 And morn and eve bedew our dust,  
 For love of Lilybell.”

(Pp. 188-190.)

It is scarcely possible to conceive a greater contrast to Gerald Massey than Thomas Williams Parsons, the new Boston poet. Of his antecedents we know nothing except what is revealed in his poetry ; from which, we gather that he is a man of some pretensions to liberal culture, well read in English and classical literature and history and in the Italian poets, and still fresh from his European travels. He evinces a more than ordinary mastery of the mechanism of verse in its more popular measures, and shows his scholarship no less in the ease and propriety of his diction, than in his themes, his modes of thought, and his facility of learned allusion. In Gerald Massey everything has the flavor of native feeling and enthusiasm ; in Parsons all is but an echo of other minds. He has skimmed the floating thought from the superficies of general literature and current opinion, versified it, and christened the result “poetry.” We read the first half of his book with diligent attention, hoping to find something which would justify its title, but without success ; we read the second half with like diligence, hoping to find some strikingly faulty passage or poem upon which we might revenge ourselves for the disappointment, and equally without success. His productions are, it is true, of varying merit, but they vary only through the different degrees of the same faultless mediocrity. He is the author of the prize address, delivered at the opening of the new theatre in Boston, and perhaps we could not better indicate the character of his poetry than to say that it is of that description, which, in a poetical competition for prizes, is always successful. It has about that amount of inspiration which is to be found in the complimentary odes of a poet-

laureate. We are by no means inclined to criticise him severely; we simply deny that he is a poet; but we doubt not that any one who can overlook his claim to that title, might while away a summer's afternoon very agreeably in his company, without finding it exciting enough to interfere with the indulgence of an occasional nap. He seems to be a man of genial social qualities, of a pleasant humor and playful fancy, who tells some not unentertaining anecdotes, which are not entirely spoiled by his rhymes, and makes some just observations on men and things, perhaps neither very profound nor very novel, but with which one does not dislike to renew an old acquaintance under his auspices. The most veteran conservative need not avoid him, for though living among a people somewhat noted for their new-fangled *isms* of every sort, he seems to be perfectly uncontaminated by the contagion. Upon the whole, barring his preferences of theatres over churches, to which we do not exactly subscribe, we can cordially recommend him as a very innocuous person, one who is neither likely to pervert the taste of his reader by faults of style, nor to corrupt his heart by any immorality of sentiment or error of opinion, and we are convinced that he may be safely left to pursue his poetical vocation, without any special molestation from criticism.

The poems of Sarah Helen Whitman, whose name stands last upon our list, are an earlier publication than either of the two preceding, but they do not seem to have become so familiar to the public, that we need apologize for speaking of them even at this late date. Besides, in an age when the influence of female writers has become so considerable both in prose and verse, we should make ourselves fully amenable to the censures of the next "Woman's Rights Convention," if we should conclude our article without a passing tribute to some one of the fairer dwellers on the slopes of Parnassus. In view of that august assembly, we are but too happy that our selection should have fallen upon one so deserving of liberal commendation as the accomplished authoress we have named.

Mrs. Whitman is a native and a resident of Providence, Rhode Island. Woman though she be, we think we may say without offense that she has already attained the meridian of her powers. While yet young she became a widow, since which time she has lived very much secluded from general society and devoted to intellectual pursuits. She is widely learned in the languages and literatures of modern

Europe, not only in their popular forms, but also in the abstruser speculations of metaphysical philosophy, being especially enamored of the poets and thinkers of Germany. As might be expected, her mind has taken somewhat of a transcendental coloring from her studies, and loves to shape its thoughts in a hazy atmosphere of mysticism, which, though it sometimes lends an exaggerating effect, not unfrequently obscures their fair proportions. She is a warm admirer of Emerson, and we remember to have read, some years ago, in the Democratic Review, a glowing eulogy upon his merits, attributed to her pen. She was, shortly before his death, betrothed for a brief period to the late Edgar A. Poe, and traces of the influence of that wayward son of genius, who, like a fire-robed enchanter, seems to have striven by demoniacal incantations to evoke the form of poetic beauty out of the regions of terror and superstition, are discernible in many of her poems. She has latterly interested herself much in the so-called "Spirit Rappings," and firmly believes in the coming of a time when these ambiguous communications between heaven and earth shall give place to more indubitable manifestations, and herald the dawn of an accelerated spiritual development of humanity.

The more purely intellectual attributes of Mrs. Whitman's genius are best reflected in her poem entitled "Hours of Life." It is divided into three parts, morning, noon, and evening, typical of youth, middle and mature age, and probably shadows forth, with more or less truth, her own spiritual existence. In the morning of life, smiling with joy and hope, youth rejoices in an innocent but sensuous happiness, chases with credulous and eager zest the seductive phantoms of pleasure, and drains the chalice of love, whose rapturous inebriation transforms earth into a heaven: but in its clearer noon the illusion ends in disappointment; the promises of childhood drop from the tree of life; the love-forsaken heart crumbles into ashes; death beckons friendships and kindred away into its pale, phantasmal realm, mocking at the yearnings of the soul; doubts and misgivings thicken around it; and the mind, seeking "some central truth to span these wide extremes of good and ill,"—this mystery of life and death,—consults physical science, the lore of pagan idolatries, Hebrew traditions and antique philosophy, or turns, with baffled quest, from earth to the midnight heavens:

I sought, on fancy's wing, to roam  
 That glorious galaxy of light,  
 Where mingling stars, like drifting foam,  
 Melt on the solemn shores of night;

But still the surging glory chased  
The dark through night's chaotic waste,  
And still, within its deepening voids,  
Crumbled the burning asteroids."

Nature wooes the fevered heart to serene communion with herself, but has no voice to tell if life, love and beauty survive the grave. And so passes the noon of life, and when its evening comes, the spirit, weary with a vain hope to *know*, seeks contentment by *doing* the will of God through loving obedience. But love prepares it for the reception of revealed truth, and thus again that heaven, so confidently trusted by the instincts of the child, becomes as confidently trusted by the reason of man, and an enlightened faith restores to him all the lost records of his spiritual being.

We do not claim for this poem a very marked originality of conception. With the great majority of people, doubtless, the instinctive faith of the child glides almost imperceptibly into the rational faith of the man; but there are those, on whom the burden and the mystery of life weigh more heavily, for whom the gradations of belief are beset with torturing doubts, and it is the experience of such that is here portrayed. History abounds with instances of a similar experience; and one need be neither a sage nor a saint to recognize its counterpart in his own life.

It is Mrs. Whitman's merit to have presented an old truth in new combinations, wedded to the exquisite music and imagery of her verse. The poem traverses lofty regions of thought, and is instinct with meaning in every line; but it presupposes on the part of the reader, a familiarity with many abstruse trains of reflection, which shall serve him as a sort of running commentary upon the somewhat allegorical expression of the text. For this reason, with all its beauty, it is a failure. She has failed as Schiller failed in "The Artists" and "The Ideal and the Actual," and as every writer will fail, who attempts to express in the flexuous forms of poetry, what can only be expounded with the rigid precision of prose; and, we might also add, she has failed in a way, in which there are few who would not be proud to fail.

Her minor poems are much better adapted for popular effect. In sweetness of rhythm, in verbal grace and finish, they all deserve high praise. Any one, who would convince himself of her pre-eminence in these particulars, need only compare her versions of some German poems in this volume, with versions of the same poems by other translators. But, as some qualification of these remarks, we must censure her use

of certain pet words, such as "sovran," "aidenn," "aureole," "hyaline," which seem to have been chosen for their prettiness rather than their fitness, and which are probably Greek to nine readers out of ten; as also her practice of quoting lines and parts of lines from other poems, in her own, which can seldom be done with happy effect. Her poetry betokens refinement rather than opulence of fancy, niceness rather than comprehensiveness of thought. In her descriptions of nature, these qualities betray themselves in a microscopic minuteness of touch; but she can not by bold strokes paint its grander and more gorgeous aspects. To her, nature has been a coy and blushing maiden, whom she has wooed in sheltered nooks, by grove and stream, where the arbutus clammers along the hill-side or the gentian nods in sequestered glades, until she has won from her shyness and reserve, the revelation of her most secret charms, and these she describes with a Tennysonian picturesqueness of tint and pencilling. Nor is she less happy in delineating some special moods of her own thought and feeling; and of love she sings with an impassioned intensity, but it is of a love peculiarly her own. Her tastes are too exclusive; she has refined so much upon her emotions that they have become attenuated, and elude the appreciation of ordinary minds; there is too little of warm, genial, and sympathetic life in her poetry; the fastidiousness of the scholar has checked the impulsive cordiality of the woman, and the thoughts and passions, of which she speaks, are too visionary and abstracted to move deeply the popular heart. We would gladly authenticate this criticism by quotations, but our article has already extended so far that we must bring it to an abrupt conclusion. We can, however, recommend the reader, who is desirous of her farther acquaintance, to her volume, with the assurance that he will find it much above the ordinary level of modern lyrical poetry.

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## ART. III.—MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

*The Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.* By FRANCIS WAYLAND, President of Brown University, and Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy. 18mo, pp. 426. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1854.

*Empirical Psychology, or the Human Mind as given in Consciousness.* By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D. D., Union College. 18mo, pp. 400. Schenectady: G. T. Van Deborgert. 1854.

*Rational Psychology, or the Subjective Idea, and the Objective Law of all Intelligence.* By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D. D. 12mo, pp. 717. Auburn: Derby, Miller & Co. 1849.

*Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.* By THOMAS REID, D. D. Abridged, with Notes and Illustrations from Sir William Hamilton and others. Edited by James Walker, D. D., Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy, in Harvard College. 3d edition. 18mo, pp. 492. Cambridge: John Bartlett. 1852.

*A System of Intellectual Philosophy.* By Rev. ASA MAHAN, first President of Cleveland University. Revised and enlarged from the second edition. 18mo, pp. 476. New York: Barnes & Co. 1854.

THE appearance of these works, as well as the recent republication, in this country, of the Discussions of Sir William Hamilton, the translation of Cousin's Lectures, and the Philosophical Writings of David Hume, are satisfactory proof that the study of mental science and consequently of metaphysics, is by no means extinct among us. It is refreshing, amid the flood of trash issuing from the press, to meet with productions freighted, as these are, with rich and elaborate thought, and likely to exert an influence upon the thinking of the educated and influential portion of the community. The last two works at the head of this article, have been before the public for some time. Mr. Mahan's work, based mainly upon the investigations of Kant, Coleridge and Cousin, as the author acknowledges in his preface, appears in a revised and enlarged form. Dr. Walker's abridged and annotated edition of Reid on the Intellectual Powers, is a

scholarly production. It deserves high praise for the ample references to works of similar character, as well as the judicious and discriminating notes. We are glad to see so competent a judge doing honor to the two leading Scottish metaphysicians, Reid and Hamilton, whose investigations are exerting great influence in all the spheres of philosophical thought. The works of Drs. Wayland and Hickok have just issued from the press; and, so far as we are competent to judge, are the most important contributions to mental science, which have appeared in this country. We have read and reread them with as much avidity and pleasure as a school-girl reads the last new novel. Both are written with great freshness and vigor of style, and contain as admirable specimens of mental analysis and philosophical discrimination as can be found in any productions of similar import. Dr. Wayland's work has all the characteristic excellences of this able thinker. It is written in a clear, idiomatic, masculine English style. In this respect it reminds us more of the works of Locke and Reid, than of those formed on the model of the more recent German school. Its arrangement of topics is simple and comprehensive. Its views generally are sound and practical. Many questions, indeed, naturally suggested by the subject, are left untouched, or simply alluded to. Some points of special difficulty are passed over without a word. It is possible, however, that in this respect Dr. W. has acted not unwisely, as his lectures are intended chiefly for academic use, and will doubtless pass into the hands of many young persons just commencing the study of mental analysis. More advanced students, or persons somewhat familiar with metaphysical studies, will, doubtless, read the lectures with satisfaction and profit, but will regret the absence of certain distinctions and discussions essential to a just and comprehensive view of mental philosophy. Dr. Wayland occasionally repeats himself, but this too, is doubtless incidental to the original form and design of his lectures, as delivered before his classes. He dwells, at considerable length, upon points of minor importance, and expends upon them an amount of argument and illustration, which might well have been given to matters of greater difficulty. His illustrations are remarkably clear and pertinent, though prolonged, now and then, to too great length. This, however, may be a real benefit to youthful students, who in metaphysical questions may need "line upon line, precept upon precept, here a little and there a little." The work is everywhere pervaded by good sense and excellent taste. Never weak or irrelevant, the whole dis-

cussion strikes us as manly and satisfactory. In this respect it is decidedly one of the best books of the kind for general or popular use. It abounds in wise counsels and practical suggestions for the improvement of the mind. In these particulars it is decidedly in advance of the shallow though popular works of Watts and Abercrombie, excellent men both, but with the slightest tincture of philosophical genius. It is generally free from the use of unusual and technical forms of expression, in which respect it is somewhat superior to the able and acute work of Dr. Hickok, who has a passion, perhaps we ought to say a genius, for technical language. Moreover, it is exempt, in a remarkable degree, from dogmatism of any kind, which, in a man of such mental vigor as Dr. Wayland, must be regarded as a great excellence. Everywhere modest and judicious, he expresses himself with sufficient freedom and energy, but with great deference and caution. In this particular he frequently reminds us of the spirit and style of Bishop Butler, whose immortal works Dr. Wayland has studied with great care.

Dr. Hickok, after the style of the great German thinkers, whom he has profoundly studied, is more assured and dogmatic, seldom hesitating at a difficulty, or failing, at least in his own view, of giving some solution of it. Dr. Hickok is indeed a thorough metaphysician, well read, and thoroughly versed in all subjects of philosophical inquiry, a good scholar in other branches, and withal possessed of an acute and comprehensive mind; and thus perhaps entitled to give his judgments in a somewhat decisive and oracular form. His manner has the charm of boldness, vigor and consistency. Yet it may be questioned, whether in the present state of metaphysical inquiry, the style of Reid, Hamilton and Wayland, is not preferable. Certainly, to those long and deeply familiar with the aberrations of the human intellect, in this the most difficult of all fields of inquiry, it seems more appropriate and becoming. All absolute existence has relations to the infinite. Abstracted from attributes and conditions, it is, to say the least, difficult of comprehension, and easily eludes the grasp of the strongest intellects. At any rate it gives rise to inquiries transcending all finite powers; and such men as Hamilton and Wayland may well be pardoned when they counsel, and above all when they practice, humility in these high concerns. Dr. Hickok's objurgation in which he speaks of such a temper as impertinent, seems to us somewhat harsh and misplaced, and therefore, though not quite agreeing either with Sir W. Hamilton or Dr.

Wayland, in all their views, we are gratified with this feature in the work of the latter. It indicates a wise self-control which is one of the most decisive marks of true greatness. There are statements in Dr. Wayland's work to which we demur. We are not quite sure that he is not self-contradictory in one or two things of vital importance. He has not sounded all the depths of certain great questions; at least there is no indication in his book that he has done so. He has slurred over some things with which, in the present state of mental philosophy, he ought to have grappled. He has ignored, apparently, the contributions to mental science, of the entire German school, and but slightly appreciated those of France. He has employed a couple of his youthful pupils to supply references to authors, at the close of each lecture or chapter, of the most meagre character;\* yet, take it all in all, his work is an admirable one—indeed, one of the very best for its purpose, and does equal honor to his head and heart. It is not properly an original production, and certainly betrays no uncommon depth and subtlety, but is clear, sound, well reasoned and practical. Several topics are treated with great ability, good sense and discrimination. The chapters on "Evidence" are exceedingly valuable. The process of reasoning is well handled. The subject of first truths, also, is presented with marked ability, though perhaps, not brought into perfect coherence with other parts of his system. There is a certain easy force and majesty in the style which constantly reminds us of Daniel Webster. Indeed, we should be justified, from this work alone, in adopting the sentiment of a literary friend, who, in speaking of Dr. Wayland, said, with some enthusiasm, "Sir, Dr. W. is a great man. His mind is decidedly Websterian." This feature frequently appears in the scope and style of the book before us. There is in reality not a weak or superficial thing in it. On the other hand it contains numerous specimens of clear analysis, solid reasoning and eloquent expression. In a word, it is the production of a practical Christian phi-

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\* It is not our purpose to find fault with the young gentlemen who have prepared the references to topics and authors. They have doubtless performed their task with industry and good taste, under the direction of Dr. W. But the list of authors, to whom they appear to have been limited, is altogether inadequate. It gives the impression that beyond Locke, Reid, Abercrombie, and one or two others, there are no authors in mental philosophy worth referring to. Let any one compare the references in this respect, with those in Walker's edition of Reid's Intellectual Powers, and he will be struck with the difference. Surely the Library of Brown University contains the works of Cudworth, Berkeley, Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, Jacobi, Jouffroy and a host of others, much more worthy of citation than Abercrombie, so largely honored in these references.

osopher of great candor and mature experience, and may be safely put into the hands of every thoughtful student.

We do not know whether we shall be justified, from this work alone, in assigning Dr. Wayland to any specific school. He admires Locke, unquestionably, and his pupils, in their references at the close of the chapters, have referred to the great English thinker more than any other metaphysician, except perhaps, Reid; but Dr. Wayland does not belong to the sensational school. Indeed, he has supplied, in a short compass, a very satisfactory refutation of Locke's principal error. He also admires Cousin, speaking of him as a philosopher of "surpassing acuteness," and adopting one of his most important principles respecting the logical or necessary conditions of thought; but he is not a transcendentalist, except so far as he practically transcends the senses and the mere formal understanding, and maintains a system of moral and spiritual truth. He is most at home, however, with the Scottish philosophers, at once modest and acute. If classed at all, therefore, he may be most appropriately associated with Sir William Hamilton, for whom he has expressed the profoundest respect, and from whom he has borrowed, with due acknowledgment, some important details. "It gives me pleasure," says he, "to acknowledge my obligations to a gentleman, whose boundless learning in every department of human knowledge, united with unrivalled acuteness and rare power of examining with perfect distinctness, the minutest shades of thought, have long since given him a position among the profoundest philosophers of this or any other age." (P. 100.) That he differs from the Scottish Coryphaeus, in some particulars, may be taken for granted. He presents, for example, the subject of consciousness in a somewhat different manner. His views of reasoning are not altogether the same. But these are matters of minor importance. It is well known that the philosophy of Sir W. Hamilton is distinguished as the philosophy of the conditioned. With Kant he holds metaphysics, in the proper sense of that term, to be impossible. The only difference between him and Kant is, that while the latter maintains reason to be formal and deceptive, Hamilton maintains it to be weak and incompetent. He ignores, therefore, all investigation of substance, essence and ultimate cause. While recognizing with Reid and Stewart, certain great fundamental principles given in the common sense, (*communis sensus*), or universal and necessary convictions of human intelligence, as underlying all thought and science, he denies the possibility of absolute or unconditioned knowledge.

He maintains that all our knowledge of nature, ourselves and God, is not only given, but held under a limit and a relation which we can not transcend. Even the idea of the infinite he holds to be a negative one, being rather the idea of the *indefinite*, than anything else, and involving, as Kant maintained, an insoluble contradiction. In his view, therefore, it is impossible to cognize in their essence or reality, either matter or mind, either God or the universe. As abstract entities, neither space nor time, neither finite nor infinite Cause, can be a subject of scientific thought. It is "not cognizable in thought"—such is his decisive expression. Indeed, the idea of cause, on this theory, is maintained to be a modification of another idea, namely, the impossibility of conceiving an entirely new beginning. Hence the fact or idea of creation, as an entirely new beginning, can not be found by reason, can not even be conceived by the mind; so that the science of being, the science of metaphysics, or of anything transcending phenomena and their laws, is absolutely impossible. Like Kant, Sir Wm. Hamilton admits the reality of God and the soul, of freedom and immortality; but he holds them either as truths of revelation, or as intuitive beliefs of our moral and practical nature, which we must admit in order to be spiritual and responsible agents. "We are thus taught," says he, "the salutary lesson that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted the measure of existence; and are warned from recognizing the domain of our knowledge as coextensive with the horizon of our faith. And by a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very consciousness of *our inability to conceive aught above the relative and the finite*, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality." (Discussions, p. 15.) How, we may ask, in passing, can that be an object of *faith*, which is not an object of *knowledge*—how, moreover, can the "existence" of a thing be recognized as a *revelation*, which is not even *cognizable in thought*; how, in a word, can the reality of the "unconditioned" and "infinite," here admitted as existing beyond our view, be expressed, even in intelligible words, or handled in a legitimate argument? True, indeed, we may not *fully conceive or comprehend* a thing; and yet we may know it as existing—existing too in its absolute, indivisible unity. In this respect reason and faith are one, in the higher action of a certain inscrutable intuition, or vision of the soul, which, through and beyond the conditioned and relative, recognizes the finite absolute, as soul, and the infinite absolute as God. How this is done

we need not explain; for like ten thousand other things of inferior moment, it may involve an inscrutable mystery.\* But such appears to be the constitution God has given us. Such the power to transcend all the subtleties of logic and metaphysics. But on the theory of Sir W. Hamilton, mental science can have nothing to do with ultimate causes, or essences of any kind. Like botany or conchology, it is a science of classification, which can recognize only phenomena and their laws, and can never, therefore, certify us of the separate, independent existence either of matter or mind, either of God or the soul. This is frankly owned by Sir W. Hamilton. "We admit that the consequence of this doctrine is—that philosophy, if viewed as more than a science of the conditioned, is impossible. Departing from the *particular*, we admit, that we can never in our highest generalizations *rise above the finite*; [the italics are ours;] that our knowledge, whether of mind or matter, can be nothing more than a knowledge of the *relative manifestations* of an existence, which in itself it is our highest wisdom to recognize as beyond the reach of philosophy." (Discussions, p. 14.) This is very nearly the position of Kant, who maintains that "things in themselves, matter, mind, God, all, in short, that is not finite, relative and phenomenal, as bearing no analogy to our faculties, is beyond the verge of our knowledge." This, too, is Sir William's own statement of Kant's views.

Thus then, mental or spiritual science is subjected to very narrow limits. Neither nature nor man can give us the remotest idea of the soul as a finite essence, or of God as an infinite essence. These things are absolutely "unthinkable." If held at all, they are held, not as a rational conviction, but as a mysterious belief. And yet, both Kant and Sir W. Hamilton are perpetually thinking of these great truths, thinking of them moreover as absolute or unconditioned realities, and presenting them in various forms of clear and eloquent speech! We have felt the force of their reasoning, and all but believed them right, and yet, we are satisfied that, in some respects at least, they are wrong, fatally wrong.

But the question on hand at present is, does Dr. Wayland take the same ground with Sir W. Hamilton; in other

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\* It may be found, however, to constitute one of the necessary conditions of human intelligence, or at least to be involved in one of these conditions. How can we conceive the finite without the infinite, how, in fact, is it possible to conceive anything as existing without an infinite Cause? It is, therefore, no more mysterious than any original or necessary conviction of the human mind.

words, does he maintain that the finite essence which we call soul or spirit, and the infinite essence or cause which we call God, can not be cognized in thought, or demonstrated in science? We should hesitate to say that he does; for some things in his book would seem to be inconsistent with it. His statements on the nature and origin of the idea of cause are certainly different from those of Sir William Hamilton. We presume that Dr. W. would agree with us in holding, in opposition to this distinguished thinker, that the idea of cause, instead of being a modification of the conviction of the impossibility of an entirely new beginning, is itself the origin of this conviction. As every change must have a cause—a conviction original, necessary, universal—then we must conceive of God as the cause of the universe; for to say that the universe of finite forms is the cause of itself, is absurd. Thus we maintain the creation of the world as a contingent truth, on the basis of what we term a necessary truth, or an ultimate intuition, namely, cause or productive power; beyond which the human mind can not go. We maintain, therefore, the impropriety of Sir W. Hamilton's attempt to analyze this conviction, to go beyond it, or to resolve it into another conviction. This statement, we presume, Dr. Wayland would accept, and yet there are several statements in his book, as well as certain omissions, which would indicate that virtually he takes the same ground with Sir W. Hamilton, in denying all knowledge, beyond that of phenomena and their laws. He seems, by silence, to ignore the a priori argument for the divine existence. The one he refers to as satisfactory is altogether inductive. From causes in nature he proposes to ascend to the great first Cause. But every one at all versed in logical inquiries knows full well that in such an argument, more is assumed in the conclusion than can be found in the premises. The argument, indeed, satisfies the popular mind, and sometimes even the philosophical mind. But why? Simply because both have assumed the divine existence beforehand, and hold it firmly on other grounds. But how the finite can give us the infinite, how by induction from phenomenal changes, or what is sometimes called invariable antecedents and consequents in nature, wherein is found no ultimate cause, or essence, and consequently no infinite or absolute cause, as distinct from nature and its forces,—how by this means we can bridge the chasm between the finite and the infinite, the relative and the absolute, the conditioned and the unconditioned, is an insoluble problem. Besides, Dr. Wayland, over and

over again asserts that neither matter nor spirit, in its real or essential character, is cognizable in thought. He asserts that in mental science, we must ignore all investigation of essence, or absolute substance, on the ground that we can know nothing either of matter or of mind but their manifestations, and the laws by which they are governed. So that nothing beyond these can be an object either of consciousness or reason. Dr. Wayland does indeed distinguish between matter and mind, as if they were distinct, substantial entities, thus assuming the existence of an essential unity or substantial ground in each, over and above all their manifestations, and the laws or methods by which they are governed; but he has already taken ground inconsistent with this position, and indeed, almost immediately proceeds to deny the possibility of knowing anything about mind or matter as entities, or of making them the objects of philosophical investigation. "The mind," he says, "becomes cognizant of the existence and qualities of matter, that is of the world external to itself, by means of the *perceptive faculties*. It knows not what matter is, but only its qualities, that is, its power of affecting us in this or that manner." (P. 9.) Here it is asserted that the perceptive faculties know *only the qualities of matter*; but not matter itself; and yet matter is assumed to exist as a distinct entity, or substance, different from mind or spirit. On what ground is the assumption made? Not on the knowledge or decision of the perceptive faculties, for they know only the qualities of matter, or certain modes of being affected by these qualities. Again, Dr. Wayland says, "In a similar manner we become acquainted with the energies of our own mind. We are not *cognizant of the mind itself*, but only of its *faculties or sensibilities*." (P. 9.) Again, "It is only as we are conscious of the action of these energies that the mind becomes conscious of the existence of mind. [How can we be *conscious* of that, namely, the existence of mind, of which we are not *cognizant*, for we have just been told that we are not *cognizant of the mind itself, but only of its energies or faculties*?] It is only by the exertion of its own powers that the mind becomes cognizant of their existence. The cognizance of its powers, however, gives us *no knowledge of that essence of which they are predicated*. In these respects, our knowledge of mind is precisely analogous to our knowledge of matter.

\* \* \* When the question is asked, what is that something of which these qualities are predicated, we are silent." (P. 15.) Here Dr. Wayland assumes that there is a *something* different from the organized or combined qualities, or

faculties which we call matter or mind ; but what that *thing* really is, he will not say. And yet, inconsistently enough, he holds it to be an actual *something*, that is, a distinct essence or substance, in addition to all qualities, or manifestations, which in matter is one kind of thing or essence, and in mind is another kind of thing or essence. On what ground does he assume the separate existence of mind, as a spiritual and it may be an immortal essence ? The "perceptive faculties" give us no information ; "consciousness," he says, "gives us none, except in relation to manifestations or energies." Is it not clear, then, that Dr. Wayland confines mental philosophy to inquiries concerning phenomena and their laws, and that his system can supply no premises whatever, on the ground of which we might prove the separate essential existence of the substance which we call soul or spirit ? So that, however we may extend our assumptions and reasonings respecting matter, spirit, God, eternity, we can never go out of the circle of *phenomena, their relations to each other, and the laws to which they are subjected* ?

Now we beg to remark, in passing, that we doubt the propriety of the phraseology employed by Dr. Wayland and others, upon this subject. Explained and limited perhaps it might be admissible ; but we are satisfied from some observation, and we may add experience, that it conveys erroneous impressions. It may be true with reference to the mere forms and changes of the external world, whose ultimate essence as well as original cause may be traced back to something far transcending matter, as a mere visible, tangible thing ; but we feel confident that it is not true in reference to mind, whose glory is, as we conceive it, to know itself as an essential substance, as well as productive cause. It comes, indeed, to the knowledge of this great fact, through, or by means of its conscious states and operations ; but the mind knows itself as consisting of something more than mere states and operations, knows itself not simply as a *fasciculus* of faculties and qualities, but as a living, spiritual essence in which these faculties inhere. The question, What is soul ? was once put by Marivaux to Fontenelle, and the prompt reply was, "I know nothing at all about it except that it is immaterial and immortal." This may strike us perhaps, as both pointed and practical. And yet, what a contradiction is here. What, know nothing at all about soul, and yet maintain it to be *immortal* and *immortal* ! This, in fact, is to know much, very much about it. It is to know something about mind, as it seems to us, quite important and even essential. That we can not mechanically

see or describe the interior entity which we call spirit, is very true; but that we can not know what it is, that we can not cognize it even in thought, is a very different thing. Do we not maintain, does not Dr. Wayland himself maintain, that it is a spiritual unit, that it is a proper, nay a substantial cause, and consequently a free, self-sustained, productive being, with nothing akin to matter, either in essence or form? Is not all this then, to maintain something essential concerning it, and thus clearly and fully to cognize it in thought? We separate it in idea from matter, not only in respect to its manifestations, but in respect to its very essence or substance, and hold that it is a pure entity, which is self-conscious, self-moved, from its own, interior force, and thence in all probability immortal. If, however, any one proposes to go deeper than its essence or substance, and inquire as to its interior content, or as to its mode of origin, or as to its union with the body, or as to the secret method by which it acts upon a thing so entirely unlike itself as matter or body, we are quite willing to acknowledge his folly; and for the simple reason that he proposes an impossibility, and therefore an absurdity. For, how analyze that which is absolutely simple, and thence incapable of analysis—and how describe an essence, or how ascertain the mode of its contact with body, when that essence is a pure spirit? We can not even define a simple element or quality of matter—for everything definable must be capable of analysis, and of consequent comparison with another. Who, for example, can define an elementary color, or an elementary sound? Everybody knows what red, blue, or green is, but he can not describe it, or define it, so that a blind man shall understand it. So everybody knows what spirit, what soul is, as to its essence, knows, for example, that it is a pure, indivisible unit, which is neither matter nor body, and thence has neither length, breadth, thickness, color, weight nor divisibility. But beyond this, of course he knows nothing, and for the obvious reason that beyond this, there is nothing for him to know. To maintain, therefore, that we know nothing of mind, but its states and operations, is unphilosophical and dangerous, for then mind can not be proved to exist, as a separate invisible essence, which is immaterial and immortal.

Here, however, we must refer to an important fact in this connection. While we know something of mind as a free, productive essence or cause, formed in the image of God who is a spirit, we know it thus only through its states and operations, by which it is actually conditioned. This is the

door by which we pass into the interior shrine. A soul which does not act, would have no knowledge of itself, as the being or essence which acts. But the action is not the cause, it is only the occasion of this knowledge. The knowledge of the soul is actually then from itself, so that in effect, personal, essential existence is a matter of consciousness ; some say a matter of reason or intuition, but it comes to the same thing, for an intuition or necessary conviction, to be known, must reveal itself in consciousness. The mental manifestation or action then is *chronologically* necessary to our knowledge of mind as an essential productive cause ; but the existence of mind, as thus essentially productive, is *logically* necessary to all such manifestation and action. Through sensation we gain perception, through perception consciousness, through consciousness the separate personal existence of the *Ego* or *I*, and having reached this fountain, as a pure, spiritual existence, which may be safely denominated an immaterial cause, we see that sensation, perception, personality, and all pertaining to personality as a conviction, are the necessary manifestations of the underlying essence which we call soul, spirit, or mind. Hence we maintain that the *I* or soul is first, is fundamental, the faculties or operations being contingent or dependent. The soul exists even when it does not act, or when it is unconscious, as in a swoon, or in a profound sleep ; so that it may live through all changes and transitions, even those which are greatest, namely, disease and dissolution. Its immortality is inconceivable, on any other ground.

Another thing is important to be remembered, and that is, as existing now, the soul is actually conditioned. It has attributes, energies, manifestations ; so that the philosophy of the conditioned and the unconditioned must go together. These things may be cognized and separated in thought, but they can not be separated in reality. Indeed, to separate the soul or spirit from its conditioned existence, or from its attributes of faculty and manifestation, is simply to make it an abstraction. It is practically to nullify it. In this respect Hamilton's philosophy of the conditioned may have a certain *conditional* and modified application to the human soul. Its nature and functions are determined to us by its conditioned powers and operations. To ignore these and so fasten the exclusive attention upon the abstract essence, which, separate from its manifestations, is to us as nothing, would be the height of folly. When Ontology takes this character, we will denounce it as thoroughly as Hamilton or Wayland. But we deem it a wiser course to acknowledge

both the essence and its manifestation, the reality as well as its form. So also it may be said that God, as the great primal productive Cause, though infinite as Essence, is conditioned to us as a present reality. We know him only through his attributes and their manifestations. But in thought as well as in faith, we can transcend all these, finite as they seem, and recognize the invisible Essence as the Infinite and Eternal *Causa Causarum*, who is above all, through all, and in all. He is not derived from the finite, neither in logic nor in nature. That is impossible. For while the finite or manifested must be the chronological condition of our knowing him, it is not the logical or rational condition; in other words while it is the occasion it is not the cause of this knowledge. God is necessary to the universe of finite forms, as the soul of man is necessary to its own operations and productions, but the universe is not necessary to God. God is first; the universe of finite souls and finite forms is next. He is Creator and Lord; we are his offspring, all nature hangs upon him. God then is the logical or necessary condition of all that exists—the logical condition of the finite soul, the logical condition of the finite universe. The whole explains the part, not the part the whole. We could not exist, nature could not be possible without God. This, then, is the first, the most fundamental of all truths.

On the other hand, if we can know nothing of the soul as an entity or of God as an entity; if we can not, as Hamilton maintains, cognize them even in thought; then the fundamental position of Auguste Comte in the Positive Philosophy must be conceded, namely, that nothing can be known either of matter, the universe, or man, but manifestations and changes in space and time. All entities as well ultimate and final causes must be ignored, and thus the very foundations of all theology and even morality left in question. The Positive Philosophy grants that there may be such a thing as immaterial spirit, nay that there may be such a being as God, but maintains that it is impossible to know anything about them, positively or scientifically. On this ground Comte over and over again denies that he is an atheist. He even affects to despise the materialists. He speaks as we do of matter, of mind, of religion even and a supreme being; but he denies the possibility of cognizing *entities* of any kind. To him they are only imaginary hypotheses which science can neither reach nor recognize. His language is almost identical with that of Dr. Wayland. The latter, indeed, admits positive causes, which Comte

denies, maintaining that *conditions* and their results are all that can be known. The mind, he claims, "is not competent to take cognizance of anything but *phenomena and their laws*;" these are Comte's own words. It is impossible, he says, with Kant, to transcend the finite, the phenomenal and conditioned. On this foundation he builds the superstructure of his Positive Philosophy, which dispenses with all theology and metaphysics, and in the ordinary sense of the term, with all religion. Now does Dr. Wayland, in the following sentence, say more than Comte? "Hence in all our investigations respecting either matter or mind we must abandon at the outset all inquiries respecting essences or absolute substances, and *confine ourselves to the observation of phenomena, their relations to each other, and the laws to which they are subjected*. The progress of physical science within the last two centuries has been greatly accelerated by the practical acknowledgment of this law of investigation. *Intellectual science can advance in no other direction.*" (P. 18.)

This quotation may be left to make its own impression. We beg only to remark that physical science is employed entirely about matter and its manifestations, and as all matter is limited both by space and time, being extended, divisible, &c., the rule referred to by Dr. Wayland may be observed in physical science without danger; and yet the students of physical science are constantly transcending it in their speculations on vital forces, as in physiology, and above all in their recognition sometimes of purely spiritual causes in nature, and of a divine presence in the universe. They transcend it, moreover, in all their references, either to the fact of creation, or to the existence of final causes. Still, we think physical science may be safely left to the investigation of phenomena and their laws. But mind, in its essential characteristics, is not limited to space or time. It is not subjected to an absolute or uniform necessity. It is spiritual and free, transcending both space and time, and thus recognizing God, infinity and immortality. Hence if mental philosophy must begin with phenomena and laws, it can not rest there. It will not rest there. It transcends all phenomena and all laws, and finds eternal realities, the soul, God and immortality. The spirit uses matter, as God uses matter, but in its essence it is separated from it by a great gulf, moves in its own uncontrolled spontaneity, exults in its own pure and eternal spirituality. Thus "the spirit of man goeth upward." "Jehovah is the portion of the soul." "In him we live and move and have our being."

Nothing but ideal perfection, nothing but God and immortality can satisfy us. We come from the Infinite, and thither we tend.

But we intimated that in some things Dr. Wayland is in apparent contradiction with himself, and here it gives us great pleasure to state, that by a happy inconsistency Dr. W., in other parts of his book, admits, nay contends for, "the idea of the infinite," not as "the indefinite," as Sir W. Hamilton maintains, but as the positive infinite, realized first in space and then in God as an absolute eternal essence and cause. Speaking of the conception of space, he says, (p. 144,) "What do we call this idea which by the constitution of our minds, emerges necessarily from this conception. It is the idea of the boundless, the incommensurable, the infinite. It is an idea which we can not comprehend, but from which we can not escape. \* \* \* \* *It is an idea neither of perception nor consciousness*, nor can it be evolved from any union or combination of these." How readily, when left to the spontaneous action of his mind, does the learned doctor thus transcend all "phenomena and their laws," and find a truth, given neither in "consciousness nor the perceptive faculties," and how completely does he nullify his own previous statements. How readily, too, does he adopt the fundamental principle on which Cousin (Lectures on the True, the Beautiful and the Good, pp. 38-101) defends the possibility of cognizing the soul and God, as substantial entities, which are given only by what he calls the intuitive reason. For on page 140 Dr. W. quotes with approbation the following from the French metaphysician, "When we have thus obtained these ideas of suggestion, [or intuitive reason, which cognizes 'things in themselves' beyond the sphere of consciousness or the senses,] we find that their existence is a necessary condition of the existence of the very ideas by which they are occasioned." Dr. Wayland on this ground defends the validity of our ideas of cause, unity, infinity, &c.; and what will surprise our readers most of all, the idea of *essence* and *substance*, about which he had claimed that we can know nothing! Thus, p. 146, he says, "We find ourselves possessed of the two ideas, essence and attribute, substance and quality," and adds, as if for the purpose of demolishing his own previous positions, "We know there must be the one wherever we perceive the other. But where does this idea of substance come from? Surely neither from the senses nor from consciousness; yet we all have attained it. It must have originated in the mind itself. We perceive the quality. The mind affirms the

existence of the substance, and affirms it not as a contingent, but as a necessary truth." So also, by parity of reasoning, he maintains the ideas of cause, of ultimate and infinite cause, which can not be derived from the perceptive faculties or the consciousness as such, though emerging as an original intuition in the consciousness, given by the Father of our spirits, in whose image we are created, and on whom, as an infinite essence, all created spirits depend. "This idea of the infinite," (we quote once more from Dr. Wayland, p. 153,) "to which the mind so necessarily tends and which it derives from so many conceptions, is one of the most remarkable of any of which we are cognizant. It belongs to the human intelligence, for it arises within us unbidden on various occasions and we can not escape from it. Yet it is cognized by none of the powers either of perception or of consciousness. [Of course then it transcends all phenomena and their laws.] It is occasioned by them, yet it differs from them as widely as the human mind can conceive. The knowledge derived from these sources is by necessity limited and finite. This idea has no relations whatever to anything finite. It has no qualities, yet we all have a necessary knowledge of what it means. Is there not in this idea a divine foreshadowing [why not say *clear intimation*?] of the relation which we, as finite beings, sustain to the Infinite One, and of those conceptions which will burst upon us in that unchanging state to which we are so rapidly tending?"

While mental science is thus encouraged to transcend the phenomenal and the limited, it is proper here to remark, that it is of vast importance that we guard against speculating beyond the range of our powers. For while we know something of the mind or spirit of man, in its essential nature and destiny, we do not know everything. The whole subject touches upon the inscrutable and ineffable, so that we know just enough for faith, comparatively little for science. Ontology as the science of being has often proved a dangerous abstraction; and yet the soul of man is a being or essence infinitely superior to what Dr. Wayland calls "brute matter," and having relations to God and eternal perfection of the profoundest and most affecting nature. So also God is an essence, infinite, self-sustained and eternal, from whom we and all things spring. This much we know, this much we are assured of from our constitutional or intuitive convictions; but ah! how much is there respecting both the soul and God which we cannot know; so that "a science of God," a science of the absolute, in any proper sense of the

term, and especially in the sense attached to it by the followers of Schelling or Hegel, strikes us as a monstrous extravagance. But we must not conclude that because we cannot know everything, we can know nothing. It is but little indeed in comparison to the unknown, which is infinite; but that little is of unspeakable value. It transcends all finite science, and lays the foundation of our hopes for eternity.

In all our science we must begin with the phenomenal and concrete, the relative and conditioned. Nor must we ever entirely leave them; for the absolute and the relative, the finite and the infinite, explain each other. Their harmony, if not demonstrated as science, can yet be discerned as reality. Both are necessary to a complete idea of the universe and man. In their combination we are saved from idealism on the one hand, and materialism on the other.

It is in this respect that some philosophers have imagined that they could construct a purely demonstrative science of mind, and thus prove not only what it is, but what it must be. Cousin first suggested this thought, on the ground of the distinction between a chronological and a logical necessity. The external and phenomenal both in matter and in mind are first given, and are hence chronologically necessary to self-consciousness, as well as our *a priori*, or intuitive convictions, such as space and time, cause, substance, unity, personality, and so forth; but these being attained, they are found to be logically or rationally necessary to any mental manifestation whatever, and indeed to the existence and reality of any phenomena internal or external. Mr. Mahan, in his Intellectual Philosophy, p. 256, refers to this in the following sentence, though he is mistaken in the supposition that he is the first to suggest it. "Necessary ideas and principles, on the other hand, admit of a kind of proof, that as far as my knowledge extends, has escaped the notice of philosophers. All such ideas and principles sustain, as we have seen, to contingent phenomena and principles, the relation of *logical antecedents*, while the former sustain to the latter the relation of *chronological antecedents*. Now in addition to the kind of proof (necessity and universality) adduced by Mr. Reid, ideas and principles admit of this also. We can designate the phenomena or principles to which they sustain the relation of logical antecedents. Thus we may prove the reality of time, by referring to *succession*, of the reality of which every one is conscious. This, in fact, is the highest kind of proof of which any principle is susceptible."

It is upon this basis, or something similar, that Dr. Hickok

has maintained the possibility of an *a priori* demonstration of the science of mind. And here therefore is the proper place to say something more definite of his two works and their relation to each other. Dr. Hickok, both in spirit and in style, belongs decisively to the German school, modified by Coleridge and Cousin, with such additions and corrections as his own philosophical genius has supplied. His present work, *Empirical Psychology, or the Science of the Mind from Consciousness*, ought to have preceded his larger and more elaborate work, on "Rational Psychology," published a few years ago, for it would have greatly assisted to explain it, and, in part to defend it. Indeed, properly speaking, there can be no Rational science of mind, in the sense of Dr. Hickok, without a previous Psychology from consciousness more or less complete. Without this, a Rational Psychology, which from some central principle or principles must explain the whole science of mind, or in which an *a priori* demonstration of fundamental principles is attempted, would be quite irrelevant. We cheerfully admit, however, that Dr. Hickok's earlier work is remarkable for its profound and comprehensive character, subtle reasoning and lofty philosophical style. Too ambitious and technical, it is quite repulsive, as we have reason to know, to many acute and well informed men. Some of its positions must be regarded in the light of assumptions, which can not be demonstrated, and some of the applications of these principles receive their force perhaps more from our practical than our speculative nature. Nevertheless, it is one of the ablest contributions to purely metaphysical science ever made in this country. Bating its extravagant claims, it supplies some of the clearest statements of prevalent metaphysical theories we have ever encountered, and contains many valuable suggestions. Its penetrative subtlety of analysis and argument, and its occasional force and even elegance of style, will attract the attention of every competent judge; albeit a friend of ours, who ought to be versed in philosophical studies, declared that he would as soon read a volume composed of Bolton stone. But as an *a priori* Psychology, giving the fundamental principles of all possible science, and above all furnishing a formal demonstration of their validity, it may be considered premature and unsatisfactory. Our limits, however, utterly forbid our entering into anything like a full discussion of this elaborate treatise. Suffice it to say, that his Psychology from Experience is intended as the complement of this; and the books ought to be read and studied together. Both do great credit to the metaphysical attainments and acumen of

their distinguished author. The Empirical Psychology, in the matter of mere literary excellence, is the superior of the two. The style is simpler and clearer. Though somewhat faulty in this respect, it is less encumbered with technical and newly coined epithets. Indeed his first work bristles with such technicalities almost as much as Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and in some places is nearly as obscure. The second work, however, almost approaches the character of a model in philosophical composition. It is more technical than Dr. Wayland's, and less popular in its general tone; but it is written with great precision and even beauty of language. Its classification of the mental powers is mainly that of Kant and Cousin, which, in our humble opinion, is the most complete and philosophical extant. Possibly Sir W. Hamilton may give us a better, when he comes to publish his whole system, in a modified or completed form; for doubtless his active and comprehensive mind will scarcely rest satisfied with his present partial speculations. In some particulars he has adopted Cousin's nomenclature now. The only decisive exception he has made has reference to the use of the term Reason, applied by Kant, Cousin, Coleridge, Hickok and others to the "noetic faculty," or faculty of intuitions; by Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Wayland to the "dionetic faculty," or the faculty of reasoning. This, however, may be more a question of words than of things. The present tendency among philosophical writers is to the first of these uses, as there is something connatural to the idea of reason, as "that which is highest in man," in its application to the intuitive powers of the human mind. The classification of Hickok strikes us as exceedingly neat and satisfactory. To Dr. Wayland's we demur a little. He has no place for the understanding, or the faculty of judgments and generalizations, *under* which *stand* so beautifully, all genera and species of predicative judgments and logical forms. He refers all this to abstraction and generalization, which in our view, better describe methods or functions of the understanding than the simple character of the faculty which performs them. So also he confines the term reason, as already stated, to reasoning, which, as he admits, creates no data, but simply takes them as given in consciousness or by the intuitive faculty, and applies them to their legitimate logical use. So that reasoning is not so much a means of investigation, or a source of truth, as an instrument of proof and application. The syllogism discovers nothing, it only proves. What, then, is the power or faculty of intuitive convictions, or the necessary princi-

ples of thought, such as space, time, unity, cause, substance, personality, and so forth? Hamilton, we think, would prefer the term *intelligence*, or pure intellection which sees or reads inwardly. Reid calls it "the common sense," using the word sense, of course, only in a *spiritual sense*. Dr. Wayland uses the term *Original Suggestion*, borrowed possibly from Dr. Brown, who resolved all the phenomena of mind into *Original* and *Relative Suggestion*. We would not contend about a word, but words are the symbols and representatives of things, and the more complete and exact therefore the better. In this view we frankly own that we do not like Dr. Wayland's terminology. It is vague and incomplete. It does not suggest the right idea. Especially it does not convey the idea of *authority* due to our elementary convictions, or first principles of all reasoning. It rather suggests the contrary. True the term "original" helps it a little, but not much; for the true origin of these great binding and harmonizing principles, on which we build the magnificent superstructure of all science and religion, is not to be sought in the suggestions of the human mind, but rather in the source whence sprung the mind itself, the great center and sum of all truth. For while these truths are ours as given in the consciousness, we neither made nor suggested them. They are of all times and ages, nay, they are superior to all times and ages. They are authoritative and universal, and belong to God, the only absolute and eternal Truth, Beauty and Goodness in the universe. Hence they may be termed truths of the *pure reason*; while the truths derived by reasoning from them, or the truths thence deduced and applied, may be termed truths of the *discursive reason*. To discriminating thought and expression some such distinction is indispensably necessary; otherwise two different things, reason as intuition, and reason as reasoning, will be perpetually confounded.\* Reason, or the highest power of the human mind, we do not believe, as Schelling and Coleridge teach, to be "commensurate or identical with existence," but we believe it to be something more than the mere formal understanding, or the power of abstraction and generalization. If it is a faculty of original suggestion, it is also a faculty of authoritative intuition, and consequently of necessary conviction, to all sane or properly constituted minds.

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\* For an exposition of this subject we refer our readers to the most perfect of Cousin's works, the recent and augmented edition of his "Lectures on the True, the Beautiful and the Good," in which some of his earlier views are modified, and some of his most objectionable expressions are changed and corrected.

Indeed, it is mind itself, in its most essential state, in its most rational mainfestation.

Of course Drs. Wayland and Hickok, with Sir W. Hamilton and all the best informed metaphysicians of modern times, reject what is called the representative theory of perception and consequently of thought, the fruitful source of delusion in philosophy, being the basis of the errors of Locke, Condillac and Hume on the one hand, and of Berkeley, Fichte and Hegel on the other. Matter and mind, the Ego and the Non Ego as separate realities and entities, are instantly given in every act of perception. Nothing intervenes as a representative of things or ideas. We know that the world exists, we know also that we ourselves exist. But how the mind is present to an external object, or an external object present to the mind, or how the mind makes that object present to itself, is a question which perhaps transcends us. Yet it may be no more mysterious than the fact that my thought, or the object of my thought, at one end of a telegraphic wire, should be communicated to the mind of a friend, at the other end of the wire. In all probability, however, both mind and matter are more than they seem. They have modes of intercourse inscrutable to us in our present state. While *in* the body, the mind is not *of* the body and may therefore easily transcend the body. It seems to be limited to a particular locality, and yet it glances from earth to heaven, from heaven to earth. It may well therefore dispense with phantasms or representative images between it and matter, and between it and its own reflected or remembered moods. For it is an original, independent spiritual essence, which has energies and intuitions far transcending all external and material things; and hence we have reason to believe that it will live and rejoice when the stars are dim. These great truths, we are happy to say, nearly all the leading metaphysical thinkers both of this country and Europe, and among these Drs. Wayland and Hickok, practically hold and powerfully illustrate. We rejoice to add that they are living, practical Christian men, whose great powers are devoted to the defence and propagation of spiritual religion.

There are many things both in Dr. Wayland's and in Dr. Hickok's book, to which, did our limits allow, we should like to refer at length. For example, we should be glad to discuss their views of consciousness, which Dr. H. makes the light of the soul, and Dr. W. a faculty of the soul, but which Sir W. Hamilton, more justly and philosophically, as we conceive, makes the soul itself; for its very essence lies in its being self-conscious, and self-controlled, as a free spiritual agent. So, also, we should like to notice Dr. Way-

land's view of sensation, which he seems to conform with affection or emotion, which is always a result of perception, and contrast them with what appears to be the juster view of Dr. Hickok, who makes sensation to consist, not of a mental affection or emotion, but of an impression or change in the senses produced by the contact of the external object. The object is one thing, the sense another thing, their contact another, and the change produced by this contact still another; and just here, in the new state or change produced by such contact, lies the fact of sensation, of which the mind takes cognizance, and from which springs, by a simultaneous act, the completed perception of the subject and the object. Dr. Hickok's analysis of this matter is exceedingly refined and beautiful. We commend it to the attention of metaphysicians. But these and many other points of importance we are compelled to omit.

In conclusion we must be permitted to refer to some statements of Dr. Wayland's, on the subject of causality, which we deem of the greatest importance; and we can only regret that he has not expressed them with more decision, and discussed them at greater length; for, in our view they contain, for us theologians, the most important point in mental science. Speaking of various instances of causation, some of which are quite dissimilar to others, he proceeds as follows:

"Hence I would ask, may there not be different kinds of causation? May not causation in matter be a totally different *nexus* from causation in mind? Were we endowed with faculties capable of knowing perfectly all the phenomena, might we not find them as dissimilar in themselves as they are in their effects?

"Such being the possibility, can it be legitimate to reason from causation in the one case to causation in the other; that is, to conclude that because causation in matter is one thing, therefore causation in spirit is the same thing? Is not the argument for fatalism deduced from a view of the indissoluble nature of cause and effect founded on this assumption?

"Granting what is evidently true, that, under precisely the present conditions, any given cause must inevitably produce, whether in matter or spirit, a definite and certain effect, are there not many things predicable of the inevitability in the one case, which can not be predicated of it in the other? For instance, I present to a miser a case of distress, precisely calculated in its nature, to awaken benevolent emotions in the mind of an intellectual and moral being in a normal condition. But, by a course of previous voluntary action, he has so changed his mind from its normal condition, that the recital serves no other purpose than to harden his heart against suffering. In his present condition, this result as inevitably follows from my appeal, as his death would follow from my plunging a knife into his bosom. Now, granting the inevitability in both these cases to be the same, is the *nexus* between the two events, of the same character? Suppose me to know the inevitability to be the same, is the moral character of the two actions equal?

"If, then, finally, the nature of causation in matter and causation in mind be so unlike, when finite beings alone are concerned, that we can not reason from the one to the other; how much greater must be the disparity when the Cause is infinite, and the effect produced is on the finite! How, especially, from causation in matter, can we reason respecting the acts of the Infinite Spirit, whose thoughts are not as our thoughts? It would surely be a humbler and wiser philosophy, if we believe in a Universal Cause of perfect holiness and perfect love, to receive the facts of his government as he has revealed them, assured that in the abysses of his wisdom, far past our finding out, mercy and truth go before his face, and justice and judgment are the habitation of his throne." (Pp. 158, 159.)

We regret that our limits will not allow us to say all that we wish to say respecting these suggestions. We have no hesitation, however, in declaring our firm and unalterable belief in the essential distinction between matter and mind, not simply as to their constitution, but as to their action. They are so distinct in this respect that they scarcely admit of comparison. That they act upon each other, can not, indeed, be denied; so that there must be certain qualities in both, which render such action possible; but the action of mind upon matter or of matter upon mind, is, after all, essentially different from the action of mind upon mind. Still clearer and more decisive, if possible, is the difference between the action of matter upon matter, and that of mind upon mind. The following are some of the points of difference.

1. Change in matter is generally by motion or change in space, one thing acting on another by displacement, and thus forming new combinations by means of the well known and uniform law, that action and reaction are equal. Thus one ball strikes another, and what we call cause instantly becomes effect. The entire motion of the one is communicated to the other, and thus the effect equals the cause. The ratio between them is exact. Change in mind must be entirely different; for mind has neither extension nor form. If *moved* at all, there is no change of locality, but only a change of thought, feeling or will. Moreover, the effect may or may not equal the cause. The cause may or may not become an effect.

2. Thus change in matter is either mechanical or chemical, or both; in mind, it is altogether spiritual and moral. An acid and an alkali are mechanically brought together. A chemical change ensues, manifested to us by effervescence, and the effect or result is a neutral salt. Here the mechanical and the chemical combine as causes to produce a definite effect. To change the mind, however, truth, reason, motive, must be presented. This change is in the affections or the

will. The result is a free, voluntary state, or a free, voluntary action. How different causation in the one case and in the other.

3. Mind is always conscious of change, matter never. The one sees, the other is blind. In mind, all causation is an affair of choice; in matter, of necessity.

4. Thus causation in matter never returns upon itself. It is always in a uniform line; so that here all effects become causes, and all causes effects in their turn, the whole forming a chain of inevitable succession, unalterable except by the omnipotence of God. The river never runs backward. But causation in mind often returns upon itself, undoes what has been done, alters the succession, changes the life. This is strikingly illustrated in the case of an intemperate man becoming a sober one, for the rest of his life. Thus the spiritual river may run backwards, or take a new course. It is true everything depends upon the will; and it is possible that the will of a man may be so bent upon sin, that sin will inevitably follow and follow forever. And thus as Dr. Wayland intimates, moral causation is conditioned by the state of the heart or will. But this does not alter the case. For it is in the exercise of freedom only that ruin is possible. Nature is necessary, but nature does not ruin itself. The power of perdition belongs to the free nature of man. In this respect nature and spirit are essentially different.

5. Matter is limited to space and time, and is thence bound by the chain of these inexorable necessities. In these therefore, all natural causation must take place. It is a thing of uniform antecedents and consequents, amenable only to the Creator of the universe. Mind discovers and appreciates the limits of space and time, but transcends them. It is not, therefore, bound by these unalterable powers. Mind is free of the universe. It overleaps the barrier of the visible and transient; for it is spiritual and immortal.

We thus establish the freedom of the will, not indeed as a freedom from the laws of its own spiritual nature, and hence not as a freedom from motive and character; for these, of course, condition its action; but as a freedom to think, to feel, to purpose and act, under God, with a view to its own free and eternal development. We have *the power to will and to do* good or evil, which nature or matter has not. So that there can be no reasoning whatever, from causation in matter to causation in mind.

From not observing this distinction, theology has often been run into the greatest absurdities. The more logically, too, the reasoning has proceeded from a mechanical view of

causation, the greater and more disastrous its errors. Anything may be proved in this way ; fatalism, atheism or pantheism. For example, it is assumed that man has a *nature*, to be evolved causatively as in matter. It is deeper than all consciousness or will. It is imposed upon us. It is a bad or sinful nature. Therefore, running back the idea, as in natural causes, to its ultimate cause, it is found in eternity, in a preëxistent state, or more logically, in God himself. Therefore,—the reasoning must inevitably proceed,—man is bound in the chains of a fatal necessity, and God is the author of sin. But this is too much to be believed, and so the poor, bewildered intellect escapes into atheism. For, it says, it is better to have no God, than an unjust God.

Again, if causation in nature and in man is the same, then all is nature—man is included in nature. All come from one source. God is the final Cause into which all other causes are resolved ; for man, not being himself a free, productive cause, but simply an effect of a previous cause or causes, and all these depending, like a chain, upon God, then pantheism is true. And thus hyper-Calvinism, which confounds natural and spiritual causes, and denies to man any true freedom, has frequently been run, logically and legitimately too, into pantheism. In this view God is the immediate cause of all effects, not only in nature but in man, the cause not only of the good, but of the bad. But bad and good are here speedily lost ; for it is a distinction in cause which makes a distinction in character and action ; and that being lost, nothing is left but God and nature. God, it is concluded, is All—both good and bad. The universe is God, God is the universe.

But make God the infinite, free, productive cause of the universe, and man, under God, a free, productive, finite cause, that is, the real and not imaginary cause of his own volitions and actions, and you save theology, you save religion and morals.

But we must tear ourselves from this interesting discussion and commend it to the attention of all thoughtful students of mental science and theology.

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## ART. IV.—THE NAZOREANS, OR MANDAI JAHIA.

## “DISCIPLES OF JOHN THE BAPTIST.”

1. *Les Nazoréens, ou Mandai-Jahia, (Disciples de Jean,) appelés ordinairement Zabiens et Chrétiens de St. Jean, (Baptiste,) Secte Gnostique.* Par L. E. BURCKHARDT. Strasbourg, 1840. One vol., pp. 113.
2. *Histoire Critique du Gnosticisme, etc.* Par JAC. MATTER. Paris and Strasbourg, 1833. 2 vols., pp. 394, 422.
3. *Johannes der Täufer.* Von J. G. E. LEOPOLD. Hannover, 1825. Pp. 170, 195.
4. *Life, Character and Acts of John the Baptist.* By Wm. C. DUNCAN. New York, 1853. Pp. 191, 198.

## INTRODUCTION.

§ 1.—*Prefatory Remarks.*

“THE Acts of the Apostles” tells us of twelve men, forming a kind of school, more than twenty years after Christ’s death, who had received the baptism of John and yet had heard nothing of the Holy Spirit, (19 : 2-7,) and of a learned Jew of Alexandria, who, at the same time, “taught diligently the things of the Lord, knowing only the baptism of John,” (18 : 25.) The latter needed to have “expounded unto him the way of God more perfectly,” and the former to be “baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus.”

Two centuries later, ecclesiastical history makes mention of certain persons who were the followers of the Forerunner of Christ, and who had become (if they were not always) opposed to Christianity. Church history speaks, also, of a Gnostic sect of Sabeans or Mendeans, which traced its origin back to John the Baptist.

This same Gnostic sect is said still to exist in Persia; and it claims to have been founded by the Forerunner of our Lord. Those who compose it are called, sometimes, Zabians, Sabians, Sabeans, Sabaites; sometimes, Mendeans, Mandeans, Mandaites, Mandai Jahia, Mandai Héié; sometimes, Nazoreans, Nasareans; sometimes, Galileans, Chaldeans; and sometimes, Disciples or Christians of St. John. But little is known by us, in America, of these Mandai Jahia, and yet their history is not only useful in a philosophical point of view, but very valuable in its bearing on the history of Christianity, and especially of that religious system known as Gnosticism.

There exists no account in English, other than a few mere notices, of these “Disciples of John the Baptist,” and of their religion. A well written treatise on the whole subject was published in French in 1840, at Strasburg, by Léonard Emile Burckhardt, under the title “*Les Nazoréens, ou Mandai-Jahia (Disciples de Jean,) appelés ordinairement Zabiens et Chrétiens de St. Jean, (Baptiste,) Secte Gnostique.*” Using this as our

chief guide and authority, we have, partly translating, partly condensing Bureckhardt, and partly composing, from other sources, new original matter, prepared, with some pains, the following article on the Mandai Jahia. It contains, we think, valuable information, and we hope that the reader may find it no less interesting than instructive.

### § 2.—*Literature respecting the Nazoreans.*

The first notice which we have of the Mandai Jahia as a sect existing in modern times, is that given by the Carmelite missionary Ignatius, who, about the middle of the seventeenth century, converted while residing in Bassora, many Sabaeans to the Catholic faith. He published a book (in Latin) respecting them in 1652, entitled "Account of the Origin, Rites and Errors of the Christians of St. John." Abraham Echellensis, a Maronite scholar and a native of Syria, who knew much personally of the Sabaeans, gives information respecting them in his *Eutychius*, (1661.) In 1678, the missionary Angèle a Sancto Josepho purchased at Bassora three Nazorean books, (Adam, John and Cholasteh,) which are now in the Royal Library in Paris. In 1680 Huntington obtained the Book of Adam and the Book of John, which are deposited in the Bodleian Library at Oxford. Of the other books of the Mandeans only fragments have come into Europe.

Valuable information respecting the Disciples of John the Baptist is given in certain publications of travelers in the East; the chief among which are those of De la Boullaye-le-Gouz, 1653, Pierre della Valle, 1674,) Tavernier, (1682,) Thévenot, (1689,) Kæmpfer, (1722,) Chardin, (1723,) and Niebuhr, (1778.) It is to be regretted that we have no later account from an eye-witness, except a few lines sent from Bassora, in 1824, to a Berlin magazine by the missionary Wolf, which, written after an interview with a Sabean farrier, who frequently confessed his inability, from ignorance, to reply to the questions of the missionary, are regarded, with good reason, as unworthy of belief.

The literature relating to the Nazoreans, written previously to the publications of Mathias Norberg, respecting the Sabaeans, (beginning in 1780,) is of little value; most writers confounding them with the Zabians, or star-worshippers. Norberg's first publications gave rise to a series of learned treatises, composed by J. D. Michaelis, Bruns, Paulus, T. C. Tychsen and Lorsbach. At length, Norberg, who had thirty-five years before copied the greater part of the Sabean manuscripts preserved at Paris, published the Book of Adam under the title "Codex Nasaraens," etc., (1815-16,) the text being printed in Syriac characters and accompanied by a Latin version. This was followed, in 1816, by his "Lexicon Cod. Nas.," and in 1817 by his "Dromasticon Cod. Nasarei." These publications called forth the learned critiques of Tychsen, in the "Göttingen Anzeiger," (1816-17,) of Gesenius, in the Jena "Litteratur-Zeitung," (1817,) and of de Sacy, in the "Journal des Savants," (1819-20.)\*

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\* The Codex of Norberg is not satisfactory, for he has committed grave errors while changing the Nazorean into the Syriac character, and his translation, owing to numerous difficulties which beset him, is faulty in many passages. His book, too, is without notes explanatory of the difficulties which one often meets, without an introduction, giving a sufficient idea of the Nazorean system, and without any answers to numerous questions necessarily excited by its publication.

## I.—RESIDENCE AND NAMES OF THE NAZOREANS.

§ 1.—*The Syrian Galileans not the Mandai Jahia.*

The Mandai Jahia live in Persia, though some have thought that the same sect is found in Syria. Germanus Conti, of Aleppo, vicar of the Maronite patriarch at Constantinople, informed Norberg that the Sabeans, or Disciples of John the Baptist, whom he calls Galileans, were then living at El-Merkab, near Laodicea, (Ladakia,) in Syria, a day's journey from Mt. Lebanon, whither, driven from Galilee by the Turks, they had fled for refuge in the beginning of the seventeenth century, and where they resided to the number of some 13,000 souls, supporting themselves, for the most part, by the culture of tobacco.

Niebuhr, who, after a careful inquiry concerning all the sects of the country, could find no trace, in Syria, of the Disciples of John the Baptist, discredits, in the Deutsche Museum, (1781,) the report of the Maronite, and thinks that he has confounded the Nazoreans, found by him and others at Bassora,—with the Nazairites, adherents of the Muhammadan Ali, whom he met with not far from Laodicea, where Conti locates his Galileans. Such books of Conti's Galileans, moreover, as had fallen into the hands of the Turks, were, he himself admits, like the book of the Nazairites. He says, too, that the Galileans had a sheikh at Merkab; and Niebuhr ascertained positively that there was at Merkab a sheikh of the Nazairites. Conti's report to Norberg therefore, is most probably incorrect.\*

Whether these Galileans be Nazairites or not, the differences observed by travelers between them and the Mandaeans prove the two to be distinct sects. These are neither few nor unimportant.

The Galileans spoken of by Conti were driven from Galilee by the Turks at the beginning of the seventeenth century; the Nazoreans were expelled from Palestine by the Muhammedans soon after the death of the so called Prophet. The Galileans support themselves, in general, by cultivating tobacco; the Nazoreans are, for the most part, artisans, frequently workers in gold and silver. The Galileans, letting their beard grow, shave their head; the Nazoreans keep both their beards and hair unshorn throughout life. The Galilean priests wear a mantle of camel's skin; the Nazorean, a white frock, (or shirt;) and, while the former never receive any salary, the latter are paid for administering the rite of baptism. The Galileans observe four festivals; the Nazoreans, only three. The Galileans celebrate

\* O. G. Tychsen, Gesenius and de Sacy agree with Niebuhr in supposing that Conti confounded the Nazoreans with the Nazairites.

the festival of the death of John the Baptist by lamentations ; the Nazoreans prohibit mourning for death. The Galileans religiously observe Sunday and Thursday ; the Nazoreans, Sunday alone. The Galileans have stone churches ; the Nazoreans have no churches. The Galileans baptize their infants in the church ; the Nazoreans, in the river. The Galileans are fond of dancing ; the Nazoreans hold it in horror. The Galileans commune, in the Eucharist, with honey and locusts ; the Nazoreans, with bread and wine.

These differences render it certain that the Galileans and the Nazoreans are not the same sect. Whether, however, the former are, as Niebuhr conjectures, the same as the Muhammedan sect of Nazairites, is a question which, as the above comparison shows, admits of serious doubts. Some of the Galilean customs seem to have originated from a corrupted Christianity rather than Islamism.

### § 2.—*Their Residence and Number.*

The Mandeans have been found by travelers, along the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates, (the Shat al Arab,) on the coast of the Persian Gulf, at Bassora, near Havisa and Shuster, the capital of Khusistan in Persia, and in such neighboring villages as are situated on the banks of rivers. The number of the people is variously given ; by Ignatius, more than 20,000 families ; by Chardin, only 80 families ; by Boullaye, some 14,000 persons ; by Raymond, in his letter to de Sacy, some 5,000 souls. The greater part of them are poor or seemingly so—laborers and tradesmen, chiefly artisans and gold and silver smiths. They all wear long beards, and are very courageous.

### § 3.—*Names of the Sect.*

The Mandeans are rich in names, each one of which, however, has made them liable to be confounded with some other sect holding sentiments directly opposed to theirs. In their sacred books they call themselves *Nazoreans* and *Mandai Jahia*. Muhammedan authors style them *Sabeans* ; travelers, *Christians of St. John*.

The name "Nazoreans" seems to connect them with the ancient Jewish-Christian sect of Nazareans or Ebionites. It brings to mind the appellation *Ναζαρεῖοι*, ("Nazarenes," Acts 24:5,) given in early days by the Jews to the followers of Jesus of Nazareth ; but the Nazoreans of our time, unlike the "Nazarenes" of old, hold the Jews and Jesus in aversion, calling the Jews sinners and Jesus the false Messiah. The name "Mandai Jahia" identifies them with the immediate disciples of John the Baptist. The name "Sabeans" has

caused them to be frequently confounded with the Zabians or Sabians, adorers of the stars; though their sacred books forbid, on almost every page, the worship of the seven planets and the twelve signs of the zodiac, which they consider to be evil divinities. The name "Christians of St. John" was given them by missionaries and travelers, who supposed they saw in certain rites of their worship, (Baptism and the Eucharist,) a correspondence with the same rites of the Christian religion, and this, although the Mandaeans, in their books, accuse the Christians of an asceticism that is useless and dangerous to morals, and are cautioned, therein, to be on their guard against those who weep before the cross, who handle the rosary, and rise to pray at the sound of a bell.

The etymology of these names is uncertain, and their origin doubtful. The term "Nazoreans" is derived, some think, from *Nassira*, a city of Irak in Persia; others from a Persian word which means *to save*, the sect believing that they alone, or that they all, will be saved. The term "Mandai" signifies either *Disciples* or *Gnostics*; and the complete name is either "Mandai *Jahia*," *Disciples of John*, (Norberg, Kämpfer, de Sacy,) or, less probably, "Mandai *Héié*," (Chaine,) *Worshippers of Life*. The name "Sabeans" signifies either *Baptists*, from a word (*tsaba*) which means *to immerse, to baptize*, or, less probably, *Apostates*, from a word which means *to apostatize*.

The name "Sabeans," de Sacy thinks, was given the Mandaeans by the Mussulmans, because, being neither Christians nor Jews nor Idolaters, their name corresponds to the only other mentioned in the Koran, where it enumerates the people [*viz.*, Mussulmans, Jews, Sabeans, Christians, Magi, Idolaters, *Sura*, 22, 17,] whom God will judge in the day of resurrection. They are mentioned also in other places in the Koran, in which it declares that whoever believes in God and in the last judgment, and leads a holy life, be he Jew, Christian or Sabeans, will be recompensed by God. De Sacy, however, does not believe that Muhammed himself referred, in these passages of the Koran, to the Mandai *Jahia*. But, we may ask, to what other sect, that was neither Jewish nor Christian, could he have alluded? Besides, Philip of the Holy Trinity says expressly, in his "Itinerarium Orientale," (bk. 6, c. 7,) "In Arabia Felix and in Persia adjacent to it, there are certain people who commonly call themselves *Mendai* and are called by the Arabs *Sabbi*." The Sabeans, moreover, conform, as we know, to certain Muhammedan usages, which secures to them religious liberty throughout the empire of Islamism, and this protection, they assure us, was accorded them by Muhammed himself.\*

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\* An Arab *munshi* told the missionary Wolf that the name is derived from the Arabic word *tsaba*, (*the host, i. e. of stars,*) and was given to the Nazoreans on account of their ancient propensity to adore the stars. If this be the real origin of the term, the name was given them before Muhammed's time by those who mistook their astrology for star-worship.

## II.—CLERGY, CEREMONIES AND USAGES OF THE NAZOREANS.

§ 1.—*Their Clergy.*

The Nazorean ministers of worship consist of three orders : 1. *Bishops*, called by them ghansefreh (Kæmpfer,) chanzebra (della Valle,) ganjawra, (Wolf;) 2. *Priests*, whom they style cheik (Chardin,) sjeich (Kæmpfer,) tarmida, khalifa (Wolf,) mollah (de Sacy;) 3. *Curates* or *Vicars*, called telmied (Kæmpfer.) These ministers, when not performing their functions, are dressed like the other Mandeans; and they keep their beards and hair long. Their sacerdotal costume is wholly white, but Chardin speaks of their wearing a red stole. This costume is composed of seven pieces, the principal of which are a white frock, a belt, a veil and a turban. Travellers are not agreed respecting the cross which several of them say, they display on their priestly robes. Chardin declares that he saw no dress among them with a cross upon it.\*

The priests have the same liberty of marrying as the other Nazoreans; and the same privilege of having a number of wives. But if a priest's first wife die, he can not take a second, unless, at least, she be not a virgin.† No one is allowed to become a priest who is not the son of a priest, and of a mother who was a virgin at the time of her marriage. On the death of the bishop, the priests and the chief men of the people choose to his place out of the sons of the deceased, him who is the best acquainted with their ceremonies, the preference being given him over the eldest son, provided he has reached his seventeenth year. If the deceased bishop has left no children, the nearest of his relatives is chosen to his office. Certain set speeches are recited over him; after which he is recognized as bishop.

The bishop inducts a priest into holy orders, by reciting orations and prayers over him for seven days; during which time he who takes orders, is obliged to fast and pray.

\* Travellers are unanimous, however, in testifying that the Mandai Jahia hold the cross in great veneration, a veneration approaching to idolatry, and on which have been founded, Chardin says, a thousand superstitions and ridiculous stories. They assert, for example that the angels take the cross, early in the morning, and place it in the middle of the sun, to cause it to shine, and they say that the world is a cross, because it is divided into four parts. Notwithstanding, they never make a representation of it, except when they wish to worship it; for fear of surprise from the Mussulmans. They keep it, therefore, in two pieces, easy to be joined together.

† Chardin says that the priests must be married. Wolf says that they may only marry a virgin, and that a widower can not take another wife. The bishops, according to him, do not marry, but live a life of celibacy.

**§ 2.—Their Festivals.**

The Nazoreans annually celebrate three grand festivals, the time of which is differently stated by travellers. 1. The festival of the creation of the world and of Adam, which is celebrated in winter, and lasts three days. 2. The festival of St. John the Baptist, observed according to some, in April, according to others in August, which continues three days. 3. The festival of Baptism [*chaid pengia* (Ignatius,) *pendgia* (Thévenot,) *pendrja* (Kämpfer,)] which is kept up five days; during which the Nazoreans are baptized in commemoration of the baptism administered by John the Baptist. It is celebrated either in June or in July. Thévenot thinks incorrectly that this festival is kept in honor of the baptism by John of Jesus Christ.\*

Besides these principal festivals, the Mandeans celebrate Sunday, as a sacred day, by resting from labor, without, however, abstaining from the performance of necessary and pressing affairs. The same day is that set apart for the baptism of infants. They do not, Kämpfer testifies, hold their assemblies in church edifices, and della Valle speaks to the same effect, when he states that they have no other churches in Bassora than the house of the priest.

**§ 3.—The Rite of Baptism.**

The principal rite of the Nazoreans is Baptism. The reception of this ordinance, is, according to them, an indispensable condition of the remission of sins and eternal felicity. It is performed upon both infants and adults, and consists in an immersion preceded by an aspersion. It is because they desire facilities for immersion, that the Mandeans are found dwelling only in places that are watered by streams sufficiently large for the performance of the baptismal ceremony.

The baptism of infants, which, as Kämpfer informs us, is thought, in their case, to do away with original sin, is performed only on Sunday, unless the child is in danger of death; for on its being received on this day depends, they think, all the validity of the rite.

Their baptism is administered in the following manner.

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\* Norberg, who, following Conti, confounds the Nazoreans with the Galileans of Syria, speaks of four festivals. 1. That of the birth of John the Baptist. 2. That of Baptism. 3. That of the death of John the Baptist. 4. That in commemoration of a victory gained by John the Baptist over a monster at Lake Tiberias (i. e. the Sea of Galilee.)

The priest stands up to his knees in the water; whereupon the infant is brought to him. He then dashes a little water upon its head, repeating, as Thévenot says, this formula: "In the name of the ancient Lord God, who was powerful before the light of the world, and who knoweth all that we do;" and so he does three times. Tavernier gives a different formula: "In the name of the first and last Lord of the world and of paradise, the most high Creator of all things;" and Norberg still a different: "I baptize thee with the baptism with which John the Baptist baptized his disciples." After the recitation of this formula, while the priest is reading something from his book, the sponsor plunges the child three times beneath the water, and forthwith takes it away. To conclude all, they who are present at the ceremony, assemble in the mansion of the child's father; where, ordinarily, there is a feast prepared. Tavernier says, that before the child is taken to the river, it is carried to the church, where a bishop reads certain prayers over its head; and thence it is borne away to the water.\*

The baptism of adults is performed not less than once every year, at the festival of five days. They would be baptized every month, Chardin says, if the priest would do it without pay. Kämpfer describes the ceremony at length. The rite is solemn and imposing.

He who performs the baptism, takes his place on the river-bank along with those who are to be baptized; holding a branch of olive, six feet long, and a branch of myrtle. He turns himself towards the north, and recites, from memory, a number of long prayers, some in a high key, and some in a deep bass voice. He bends himself, in praying, towards the mouth of the river, while he now approaches and now recedes from it. He carries his turban alternately to his neck, to his ears, and to his mouth; bends the branch of myrtle into the form of a ring, and places it upon his little finger. Meanwhile, the faithful are disrobing; after which they each take a sacerdotal habit of a coarse tissue, and a branch of myrtle, which they hold in their hand during the whole ceremony. The priest now enters the river up to his knees; and, turning himself anew towards the north, makes various

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\* Infant baptism is performed in a somewhat similar manner among the Syrian Catholics and the Maronite (Catholic) Christians. Among these latter, however, the trine immersion is performed in a font, and is administered by the priest.

The Nazoreans most probably derived the practice of infant baptism from a corrupted Christianity; though it is possible that the practice may have been self-developed, as it was at quite an early period (the third century) in the Christian church, from the erroneous idea that the rite of baptism cleanses from original sin, and is of itself a saving ordinance.

motions with the ring of myrtle, places it around the branch of olive, plunges it into the water, and bends himself as he recites the prayers. Hereupon commences the baptism.

The candidate takes his seat upon the river-bank, and repeats the words of the priest: he then enters the water, places himself on the right hand of the priest, dips himself three times, and sprinkles himself three times. Then the priest sprinkles him three times, with the words, "In the name of the first and latest God, Lord of the world and paradise, most high Creator of all things." He plants his olive branch upon the bank, takes the candidate by both hands, places him in front of himself, immerses him three times, including his head, gives him drink three times from his hand, crowns him with his myrtle, gives him his hand, that he may receive the felicity of divine grace, and sends him away.

After the lustrations are finished, all go to a spacious place on the bank of the river: the faithful take their places: the priest approaches from behind, and anoints their foreheads with oil of sesame: \* he passes along the ranks, and imposes his hands upon the baptized, meanwhile reciting prayers.

The Nazoreans, even now, Boullaye testifies, practice ordinary baptism at morning and at evening; and this they will not omit on any day. The readiness with which they permit themselves to be baptized, has often deceived Christian missionaries, who have sometimes believed they have gained converts to Christianity; whereas the baptized have thought that the missionaries had performed upon them nothing more than a ceremony of their own religion.

#### § 4.—*Their Eucharist.*

Baptism and unction are followed by a communion. The priest takes bread from the hands of his curate on the right, and a vase of water from those of his curate on the left. He places a piece of bread in the hand of each communicant; and the water is passed from one to another in a shell. The bread is a cake made of rice-flour, mixed with wine and oil. The flour represents the body; the wine, the blood; while the oil, which is the symbol of charity, represents the people. The wine is made from dry grapes, pressed with water. This is used because it is more easy to procure than ordinary wine among the Muhammedans. The same liquid, probably, serves also for the communion cup.

\* As the Mandeans will not use the oil made by the Muhammedans, or purchased from them, the priest has the grains of sesame pounded on the spot by his assistants.

After the communion, the faithful hasten to the river to wash their mouths, that they may remove every particle of the sacred elements. The priest exhorts them to constancy in their faith; in pledge of which he takes the hand of each, and causes him to repeat this oath: "He is witness who seeth all things; Jesus Christ [?] is witness; John is witness; the water is witness." After a prayer, the priest dismisses the assembly, promising them the remission of their sins. Each puts off his baptismal costume, resumes his usual dress, and pays the priest for his trouble a *manudi*, which weighs a quarter of an ounce.\*

#### § 5.—*Their Priestly Sacrifices.*

Besides these rites, which are analogous to the Christian sacraments, there is another practiced among the Mandai Jahia, which calls to mind the Jewish sacrifices [Lev. 1: 14: from which Kæmpfer derives the institution.] This is the sacrifice of the fowl. It can be performed by the priests alone. When a fowl is to be killed, the priest assumes his sacerdotal habit. He takes the fowl, plunges it into water, washing it carefully; after which, turning towards the east, he wrings off its neck. As long as the blood continues to flow, he keeps his eyes and thoughts elevated to heaven, frequently repeating these words: "May this flesh be pure to all those who shall eat of it."

The same ceremony is observed when a sheep is to be slaughtered. The place where it is to be killed, is first carefully cleaned, and is then sprinkled with water, and covered with palm branches. On these the victim is slain; or, as Chardin and Boullaye say, in a hut built of large branches of the palm-tree.

The same thing is done with fish; and with every other animal, Kæmpfer says, which is used for food. The ministers, therefore, are also, as Thévenot pleasantly remarks, the butchers among the Nazoreans.

#### § 6.—*The Nazorean Marriages.*

On the occasion of a marriage, the parents of both parties and the guests assemble in the house of the betrothed. She

\* Kæmpfer says that the Mandaeans celebrate this Eucharist in memory of Jesus Christ; but Burckhardt thinks that they no more perform this ceremony in his memory, than they celebrate, as Thévenot says they do, the *pendgia* in commemoration of his baptism. The missionaries too, he thinks, have suffered themselves to be deceived by this rite of the Nazoreans, as they have been by their frequent baptisms, and therefore, speak, erroneously, of the "mass" of the "Christians" of St. John.

is seated under a pavilion ; coming to which, the bishop asks whether she is a virgin. She affirming it by an oath, the wife of the bishop is charged to ascertain the truth of her assertion. If the woman be found a virgin, the wife of the bishop declares so on oath ; and then all present go to the river. The future husband first enters the water and is baptized with all the ceremonies. The rite is then performed upon the bride. This done, all return towards the house, and take their place among the relatives. Then the bridegroom takes the bride by the hand, advances and recedes seven times, and then walks with her to the place where a halt has been made, near the door of the house. The priest follows, reading all the time, from his book. At length they enter the house, and the affianced couple seat themselves, back to back, under a pavilion, on the sofa or carpet, which serves them for a couch. The minister presses their heads together three times. Then he opens his book of fates, by which he predicts and tells the affianced the most fortunate day for the consummation of their marriage. At the appointed time, the bishop perfects the ceremony by putting rings upon the fingers of the young husband.

If the woman be found not to be a virgin, the bishop will not, on any account, assist at the marriage ; and, if the young man desire to go on with the ceremony, he must have recourse to a simple priest. In the same manner, if the newly married husband has not found his wife a virgin, even if he resolves, notwithstanding, to keep her, the bishop will not complete the ceremony. The people, too, are so jealous of being married by the bishop, and it is considered so dishonorable not to be, that it is rare that a marriage with such a person is able to stand. This severity, Tavernier says, is regarded by parents as a means of keeping their daughters under control.

The priests will scarcely marry those women who are found not to be virgins. They would not do it at all, did they not wish to avoid the inconveniences which are likely to result from their refusal ; for, if the priests will not marry them, they will, in revenge, become Muhammedans.

The case is similar with regard to widows. According to the Nazorean law, they are not permitted to remarry ; but they are allowed to do so in practice, from the fear just mentioned. Raymond, vice-consul at Bassora, in 1811, wrote to de Sacy, that there is a third *Scheckh*, (*i. e.* priest,) for marrying widows. If he is dead, and no one has been appointed in his place, it happens, now and then, that some

widows, tired of their widowhood, become Mussulmans in order to procure husbands.

On account, partly, of this strictness with regard to widows, the men have not the power of repudiating their wives.

According to their law, the Mandeans can have only one wife; but they take two or more; not the laity alone, but even the clergy; after the manner of the country: looking upon polygamy as improper rather than criminal. They justify this usage by saying, that, if one of their wives be barren, the fecundity of another will often save their family from becoming extinct; and by saying, moreover, that, as their women can not marry from among their own people, and are more numerous than the men, many of them, if monogamy alone were practiced, would pass their lives without being married.

#### § 7.—*Things Impure.*

The Nazoreans are scrupulous with regard to uncleanness and purification; as much so as the Jews and the Muhammedans. They consider defiled the flesh of animals which have been slaughtered by the Muhammedans. So, too, do they regard the vessels which the latter have used; breaking them, if made of clay, that no one of their own people may be defiled by their use. Even hides taken from those animals which the Muhammedans have killed, they look upon as impure.

Women, though as careful as the men in cleansing themselves, are considered impure, and are not permitted to enter the church.

The Nazoreans hold blue in abhorrence; so much so that they will neither wear nor touch anything of this color, and regard every one who is dressed in blue as a stranger to their faith.\* The true cause of this repugnance is the instruction given by the priests, who pass off this color for unclean and impure, in order to separate their people from the Turks, whose garments are generally blue; and, especially to prevent their intercourse with Turkish women, who frequently

\* They found this repugnance on the following fable. Some Jews dreamed that the baptism of John would destroy their law. Knowing this, and seeing John the Baptist about to baptize Jesus, the Jews brought a large quantity of indigo, and cast it into that part of the Jordan where Jesus was to be baptized, so troubling the water that the baptism was prevented. But God sent some angels with a large vessel of pure water, drawn from the Jordan; and thus John was able to baptize Jesus. From that time God cursed the color blue.

wear blue drawers.\* A Nazorean would rather become a Catholic than wear blue.

### III.—SACRED BOOKS OF THE MANDEANS.

## §1.—*The Language and its Characters.*

The sacred books of the Mandeans are written in a language and a character altogether peculiar.

The language is an Aramean dialect, wavering between the Syriac and the Chaldee; approaching, however, more nearly to the latter. It presents many singularities; and these often make it difficult to be understood. The gutturals are confounded; one consonant is exchanged for another; the daghesh forte is omitted in *nun* [ն] as in Chaldee; contractions are frequent, the same letters being omitted in writing which are silent in pronunciation; and the distinctions of gender, number and person, are often neglected. Besides this, the Nazorean orthography is peculiar, and the copyists have committed errors. In general, the dialect is incorrect both in its grammar and in its orthography. In consequence of all this, it presents many difficulties to the interpreter, who has often, in order to make out the sense, had to resort to the analogy of the Chaldee, the Syriac, the Arabic, and even the Persian.

The Nazorean alphabet, like the Hebrew and the Syriac, has twenty-two letters. Its characters resemble most closely the Nestorian and the Estrangelo. The writing is not syllabic, as is the *Æthiopic*, but, as in the Talmud, the vowel-letters [‘*in*] serve to mark the vowels; and these are written, sometimes alone, sometimes joined to the consonants, as in the Pehlir and Guebre of the Parsees.

In the book and fragments published by Norberg, the Nazorean characters have been changed into Syriac; and the *literae quies-cibiles*, when they do not serve as sign-vowels (*matres lectionis*) have been replaced by the Syriac vowels. In making these changes, Norberg has often acted arbitrarily; for which he has been justly blamed in the three critiques on his work—the authors of which would have preferred to see the text faithfully reproduced without changes, and in the Chaldee character rather than in the Syriac.

## § 2.—*The Books and their Contents.*

The Mandeans say that the original copies of their ancient sacred books were burnt during the persecutions which they

\* Thévenot says the true reason is because the excrements of dogs are used in making this color, and the dog is deemed by them an impure animal. According to him, moreover, the Mandeans dislike green also, because it is the sacred color of the Muhammedans.

suffered from the followers of Muhammed, under the immediate successors of that Prophet. This, however, does not prove a later origin of the books which they now possess, for it is not probable that all the copies of their ancient writings could have been destroyed.

The books with which we are acquainted, containing, as they do, notices which render it evident that they were edited posterior to the time of Muhammed, fix also the epoch of the composition of those portions, at least, in which the notices are found, and we must admit, as respects the books of Adam and Divan, that they were composed in separate parts, by different authors, and, no doubt, at different times.

The manuscripts of the Nazorean books which we possess, were transcribed by copyists from others more ancient. Adam Zuhrun, for example, a priest, or scribe, who lived at Bassora in the first half of the seventeenth century; and whom Tychsen erroneously regards as the author of the *Sidra Adam*, is known to have made copies of the Sabean sacred writings. Copyists, no doubt, sometimes acted as editors, and, it is likely, made additions occasionally, to the originals. This, if true, will account for the fact, that, in some sections, passages are found which presuppose the existence of Muhammedanism and a later and corrupt Christianity, while, in others, the historical details are such as were evidently composed at a period more ancient.

We know more or less of five or six, perhaps seven, sacred books of the Nazoreans: 1, the Book of Adam, by Norberg's edition, and the fragments explained by other scholars; 2, the Book of John, by means of travelers, and the manuscripts and fragments published by Tychsen and Lorshash; 3, the book Cholasteh, by travelers and their manuscripts; 4, the Divan; 5, the *Sefar Malvashé*; 6, the books of Magic, by means of travelers; 7, perhaps another book, the manuscript of which de Sacy discovered in Paris.

1. The Book of Adam (*Sidra Adam*) was given, the Mandaeans say, by God, through the angel Raphael, to Adam. It consists of two parts; the former of which contains fifty-seven discourses (or sixty-one, reckoning the four alphabetic psalms;) the latter, seven. Some parts of the treatise were written not before the seventh century of our era; others, not before the ninth or tenth. The principal elements, however—the speculative ideas—of the *Sidra Adam* are, clearly, more ancient than the seventh century; and the form in which they appear in many parts of the book,—as, for example, where an opposition to the Gnostic Christians is evidently intended, and where accusations are made against Christianity similar to those which the first apologists refute,—proves that these parts, at least, may claim an antiquity coeval with the times of Gnosticism.

The style in which the work is written, is neither noble, sublime, nor majestic ; and it abounds in repetitions. Imagination plays in it an important rôle ; but it is a disordered imagination, the sketches of which exhibit in general, neither harmony nor proportion, nor a just distribution of parts. The contents of the book, generally speaking, consist partly of instructions, partly of exhortations, partly of hymns, and partly of prophecies.

2. The Book of John (Sidra Jahia) purports to have been received from God by John the Baptist, and to have been handed down by him, as were, indeed, all their sacred books, to the ancestors of the Sabeans. It contains religious histories, particularly the life of John the Baptist, from his birth to his death,—the whole of which is intermingled with apocryphal fables. The date of the composition of Sidra Jahia is unknown. The oldest manuscript which we possess, was transcribed in 1629.

3. The book Cholasteh,—a word which means, according to some, *the Complement*, according to others, *Salvation*,—contains the Liturgy of the Mandeans.

4. The Divan, that is perhaps, *the Hall*, or *Court*, is much the largest book of the Nazoreans. It is divided into different parts ; composed, it is most probable, by different authors. The Sabeans think it very ancient, having been, as they say, communicated by God to angels many ages before the creation. As the book speaks of the caliphs, those parts could not,—unless the passages which allude to the caliphs be interpolations,—have been written before the middle of the seventh century. It contains, among other things, prophecies respecting the fall of the angels, the creation of man, and changes in the world, then future, but now past.

5. The Sefar Malvashé,—that is, the Book of the Signs of the Zodiac, contains the astrology of the Nazoreans ; a science to which they are much devoted.

6. The Books of Magic may be identical with the Sefar Malvashé. They treat of the influence of the stars upon men.

7. The book discovered by de Sacy is, most probably, part of one of those already mentioned ; either a fragment of Sidra Adam, (Gesenius;) or the preface of Sidra Jahia, (Tychsen,) or of Cholasteh (Paulus.)

#### IV.—RELIGIOUS SYSTEM OF THE NAZOREANS.

The religion of the Nazoreans, philosophically speaking, is a religion of Gnosticism. Its principles are now, from thorough investigation on the part of scholars, quite well

understood; a result arising chiefly from the publication, by Norberg, of the *Sidra Adam*. Formed as it is "out of the elements of an older eastern theosophy," engrafted upon Christian ideas, Mandaism will be found, on examination, to have, as Neander perceived, "an important connection with the history of Gnosis." Notwithstanding this, the system has been, almost universally, treated slightly by writers on Church History, and even by those who have composed special treatises on Gnosticism.\* It will be seen, from what follows, that it deserves more attention.

### § 1.—*Gnosticism in General.*

That philosophical religious system which prevailed in the East during the first four centuries of Christianity, the leading aim of which appears to have been the reconciliation of the difficulties attendant upon the existence of evil in the world, is known in the history of religion as Gnosticism.† Many of the elements of which it was constructed may be traced back to a period anterior to Christianity. These, in process of time, developed themselves, in connection with Christianity, into different systems, which are distinguished rather by their different cosmogonies than by any fundamental variation in principle. The elements of these systems,—which are not blended together in the same manner in all,—are "elements of Platonic philosophy, of Jewish theology, and of old Oriental theosophy."

Though "a living principle peculiar to themselves," animates all the Gnostic systems, modern researches prove, that they each contain many elements which have been derived from various ancient systems of religion. Among these, the old Oriental Parsism, the system of Zoroaster, seems to have furnished to Gnosticism the dualistic element, the doctrine of two active principles, the good and the bad, in Nature; though the power of the evil principle is made more prominent in Gnosticism than in Parsism. In this respect, Gnosticism connects itself, as recent investigations show, rather with Brahmanism, and especially with Bud-

\* Matter alone, of the writers on Gnosticism, gives the Sabaeans a place more honorable, or spacious, than a note. He allows them twenty-eight pages in his "Histoire Critique du Gnosticisme." (T. ii., pp. 394–422.) Neander treats of them in an appendix of two pages, in his "Genetische Entwick d. Gnost. Systeme." (Pp. 223–225.)

† The term *Gnosticism* is derived from the Greek word *γνῶσις*, (*gnosis*,) *knowledge*, *i. e.*, *a higher kind of knowledge*. Those who said that they possessed and were guided by it, are called *Gnostics*, (*γνωστικοί*,) *i. e.*, *those who had acquired a higher wisdom*. Paul speaks of a "gnosis" [ "science," *i. e.*, *knowledge*] "falsely so called," (*ψευδώνυμος*,) in I. Tim. 16: 20; "which," as he says, "some professing, have erred concerning the faith."

dhism,—theosophic tendencies and ideas coming yet farther from the East.

The Gnostic sects may be divided into two classes: the one, Alexandrian, attached to Judaism; the other, Syrian, opposed to it. The Syrian Gnosis, in general, arrayed itself against Judaism, "as a religion too material, too earthly, too confined, too little theosophic." It denied all connection between Judaism and Christianity; and "representing, as it did, the God of Christ and the Gospel as a different being from the God of Nature and of History," it, of necessity, did away with "the connection of Christ's appearance with nature and with history." Christ's *humanity*, therefore, it refused to acknowledge; representing whatever belonged to his human appearance as an allusion, *a mere vision*, (*Docetism*.)

The Gnostic sect that inclined to Judaism, (the followers of Cerinthus, Basilides and Valentin,) "held to a gradual development of the Theocracy among mankind, from an original foundation of it in the race." Of those among the Gnostics who came into conflict with Judaism, the one party (the Ophites, Pseudo-Basilideans, Cairites, the followers of Carpocrates and Epiphanes, and the Prodicians, Antitactes, Nicolaitans and Simonians) was inclined to unite Christianity with Paganism; while the other party (the followers of Saturnin, those of Tatian, the Encratites, and Marcion and his school) strove to apprehend it "in its purity and absolute independence."

The Syrian Gnostics,—whose system "was particularly modified by the influence of Parsism," and which, as has been stated, was, in several respects, opposed to the Alexandrian, or Jewish Theosophic Gnosis,—"consisted mainly," as Neander remarks, "of such as, before their coming over to Christianity, had not been followers of the Mosaic religion, but had already, at an earlier period, formed to themselves an Oriental Gnosis, opposed as well to Judaism as to all popular religions; like that of which we find remains in the books of the Sabeans and of which examples may still be found in the East, among the Persians and Hindoos."

Notwithstanding their opposition in some particulars, however, the Syrian and the Alexandrian Gnosis often pass over to each other in their modes of conception. It may be questioned, indeed, "whether," as Neander says, "we can properly speak of a Gnosis originally Alexandrian; whether Syria is not the common home of everything that goes under this name,—whence it was merely transplanted to Alexandria; in which latter place it received a peculiar

stamp from the Hellenic, Platonizing tendency which there prevailed."

### § 2.—*The Mandeans Gnosticism.*

The religious system of the Mandai Jahia contains not a few elements of the Alexandrian Gnosis, though it is, doubtless, more closely allied, in its origin, with the Syrian development of Gnosticism. Parsism and Buddhism lie at the basis of the system, but its Jewish and Christian elements are numerous and influential. Christian ideas, arrayed in a mystic dress, are found in abundance in the doctrinal books of the sect, but they are always thoroughly penetrated and corrupted by the leaven of Gnosis. The following brief outline of the religious doctrines of the Mandeans given in this and in the next section, is all that our limits will permit.\*

There exist in Nature two eternal principles, each of which is independent in its existence. Ferha or Fira, [i. e., *Bvθōs*, *Depth*, (de Sacy,) or *Phænix*, (Norberg,) with less probability,] and Ajar, [i. e., *Ether*, (*the Upper Heavens*), *Πλήρωμα*.]† From these two primordial principles proceeds Mana [i. e., *Image*, (Norberg,) or *Eternal*, (Gesenius;) cp. the Ormuzd of the Persians,] the king of light. From Ferha emanate an infinity of Æons of light, called from him Ferhi, and innumerable myriads of Shekina. From Mana emanate numberless other Mana, [cp. the *Πλήρωμα* of the Gnostics,] who encircle the throne of their chief and sing hymns in his honor. From him there flows forth also a primitive Jordan [i. e., a full stream] of light, from which are derived 360,000 Jordans, to supply the immensity of the world of light. His kingdom, in a word, is an empire of light; all therein is harmony, and nothing in it is imperfect. Soon, however, division, and discord, and evil, come.

The First Life, one of the creatures of light, [cp. Valentin's *Noīs*,] addresses a prayer to Mana, and this prayer, which speaks of the imperfection of everything, in consequence of the absence of absolute good, produces a being named Outra, that is, the Support, or the Image of Life. Outra, however, is not equal to the First Life, but is Jushamin, [from *asham*, to transgress: cp. the *Σορτα* of Valentin,]

\* Burckhardt has made out a very complete analysis of the Sidra Adam, in which the principles of Mandaism are fully stated. The analysis occupies fifty-three of the one hundred and thirteen pages of his treatise.

† Compare the Zeruene-Akarene of the Zend-Avesta, the *Bvθōs* and the *Evvōia* of Valentin.

the Second Life. With Outra is connected a new world, and Outra produces an infinity of Outra, a second Jordan, and another Pleroma. Three of these Æons, jealous of the creation of the First Life, ask a portion of light from the Second Life, in order that they may create spirits for themselves, and a world in which they may reside with the Second Life, and in which the First Life shall be forgotten. The Second Life yields to their prayers, and this is the cause of all that is imperfect and vicious in the world.

The youngest of the three children of Jushamin is Abatur, [i. e., the *Excellent Father*: cp. the *Ustier* of the Persians, the *Σορπα* Achamoth of Valentin, and the *Σορπα Προούρειος* of the Ophites,] who is the Third Life. Incapable of forming the world, Abatur opens the gate which shuts the empire of darkness, and casts a glance over the black and bitter water [i. e., chaos] that encircles it. The image which he reflects upon the water is his son Fetahil, [which signifies (Norberg) *God has opened*,] the likeness of his father, and a spirit of a superior order, who is allied, however, to the black water of the empire of evil. Fetahil is of a mixed nature, partly good and partly bad. He is the Demiurge, i. e., the Creator.

Creation, however, is not executed without the intervention of the Supreme Life, and under the auspices of Gabriel, or Hebel Ziva, [i. e., the *Resplendent*,] the Apostle (or Messenger) of Life (Manda' di Héié.) He it is that gives to the bodies of Adam and Eve, created by the Demiurge, and the seven planets, a celestial soul, and who, with his two brothers, Anush [literally, *the Tame Animal*, (Norberg,) i. e., *Man*] and Shetel, [which means (Gesenius) *whom God hath placed*,] instruct and protect them and their descendants.\*

Hebel is, moreover, the Apostle of Life in the world of darkness, which opposes him, and in the world of light, which receives his instructions with respect. Anush becomes incarnate in the person of John the Baptist, who, after accomplishing his mission on earth—that is, the consecration of men, by the baptism of life, to the kingdom of light, and the destruction of Jerusalem, the enemy of the Nazoreans—will return, robed in splendor, to the abode of the Supreme Life.

To the world of light is opposed a world of darkness. The head of the latter, which is of later creation than the

\* The Nazoreans name the descendants of Adam as we do: his son, Abel; the son of Abel, Shetel (Seth;) the son of Shetel, Anuoh (Enos;) making, however, Seth's brother his father.

former, is Ur, [i. e., *Fire*.] This realm is peopled by Buri, and is filled with death, devouring fire [cp. the "fiery angel" of Apelles] and mud, and with wickedness and falsehood. Its demons [i. e., divinities] exercise an injurious influence on the planetary world of Fetahil. They that do this, are, in particular, the spirits of the seven planets [cp. the "world-governing angels" of Saturnin] and of the twelve constellations of the zodiac. Among the chief of them are Veaus (the Holy Spirit) and Mercury (the False Messiah.) [Something like this is found in the system of the Basili-dean and that of the Cairites.]

The world is to last from the creation of Adam to his death, 480,000 years. At the epoch of Adam's destruction, those souls which have lived a life of purity, and have elevated themselves to the light by morality, pass into the regions of all light, while they who, not following the type of the pure life, have fallen into the power of the enemies of light, shall perish with those enemies. According, however, to some parts of the Book of Adam, such impure souls are not forever proscribed; Fetahil will himself at length anend them, will deliver them from prison, baptize them and array them in light [cp. the *ἀποκατάστασις* of the *Σοφία Achamoth* of Valentin.]

Such in an outline is the religious system of the Nazoreans. The leading principles of Mandaism, we perceive, are those of Gnosticism. The two empires of good and evil, and their worship, the theory of the emanation, the alteration and the reproduction of existence, the triumph of light, and some of the secondary doctrines, as that of the syzygy (union) of the celestial intelligence, and that relating to anthropogony, are in both absolutely the same. But all is changed in the detail. In its myths, its usages, its terminology, and in all its relations, the system of the Mandeans is altogether richer than any other of the Gnostics. It is not, however, as some have thought, the less ancient on that account, for this superior richness may be very well owing simply to the fact that we possess richer sources from which to draw our knowledge of the Mandeans religion.

What now shall we say of Mandaism? Is it an original branch of Gnosticism, or has it merely been subjected, in past centuries, to the influence of Gnosticism? This is a question not easy to answer. It is, we should say, an original development of Gnosis. Every where in the system, Oriental Irrism and Buddhism display themselves, and from the influence of such principles, working

on Christian elements, we may well derive the origin of Mandaism.

§ 3.—*Hebel Ziva, John the Baptist, and Jesus.*

Hebel Ziva, the “Apostle of Life,” John the Baptist, and Jesus, have each important parts assigned them in the religious system of the Mandeans. Hebel Ziva is the great instructor, both of the world of darkness and of the world of light. He is the true Messiah. Hebel is assisted in his mission by Anush, who is incarnate in John the Baptist. Nebu, or Jesus, the false Messiah, opposes them both.

The instruction which Hebel gives to men he has received from God, the Supreme Life. His moral precepts, as stated in the Sidra Adam, are quite pure, and are often identical with some given in the Old and New Testaments.

Among these are such injunctions as the following, the biblical origin of which can not well be doubted: Commit not adultery; neither rob nor kill; lie not, and do not love deceit; honor your father and mother; covet not what is not your own; when you make a gift let there be no witnesses; if you give with your right hand, let not your left know it—if with your left, not your right; if you see one hungry, feed him; if thirsty, give him drink; if naked, clothe him; for he who giveth shall receive; keep not a labore’s hire over night; swear not falsely; receive the word of God with an humble heart, etc. Other precepts decidedly Christian in tone, have a more sectarian bearing.

This Apostle of Life, to whom the Nazorean have transferred much that our Scriptures relate in the history of Christ, and for the very conception of whose character they are indebted to Christianity, or at least, to the Old Testament, though himself the author of baptism, came to John the Baptist, and asked to receive from him the baptism of life. The scene, as described in the Sidra Adam, though different in many respects, is evidently founded upon the true historical account of the baptism of Jesus by John.

The Messenger of Life came to John and said, “Baptize me with the baptism with which thou baptizest, and pronounce over me the name which thou pronouncest.” The Baptist, being fatigued, put him off till the next morning. The following day, John went into the middle of the Jordan, opened his arms, and received therein the Apostle of Life. The Jordan, seeing him, overflowed its banks, but retired at the glance of his eye. “I have baptized thousands of souls,” said John, “but such a man as thou never came unto me before.” The fishes and the birds glorified the Apostle, saying, “Blessed be thou, and the place to which thou comest, and the place whither thou goest!” John, now recognizing Hebel, said, “Thou art he in whose name I have baptized; lay on me the hand of truth.” The Apostle replied, “If I lay my hand upon thee, thou wilt depart from thy body.” John answered, “I have seen thee; I desire not to remain here; separate me not from thee.” There-

upon Hebel casts John's body of flesh and blood into the Jordan, wraps him in a bright garment, and crowns him with a tiara of light. Then he takes him to the place of all purity, where he will remain forever.

Anush is represented on earth by John the Baptist. According to the Sidra Adam, John is the son of Abo Sabo [*i. e.*, the *Old Man*, Zacharias] and Aneshbat (Elizabeth.) He baptized in the Jordan for forty-two years before the advent of Nebu. Jesus, who is Nebu incarnate, was baptized by him, but he falsified John's doctrine and baptism. After performing his mission, John was crowned with light, and conducted to the world of all splendor, in which, one day, there will be united to him all the faithful who have received the baptism of life.

Anush, according to the same Book of Adam, was to dwell at Jerusalem; was to come into the world in the days of Faltuse (Pilate) with the virtue of the highest king of light. He was to heal the sick, to restore sight to the blind, to cleanse the impure, to comfort the broken-hearted, to make the dumb speak, to raise the dead. He was, moreover, to point out the difference between death and life, darkness and light, error and truth, and to restore lost men to the favor of God. Here, evidently, is a picture of John copied from the life of Christ (cp. Matt. 11: 5., Luke 7: 22.)

According to the account given in the Sidra Jahia, John was married. He entrusted his four sons to the Jordan and not to his wife. He died a natural death, but ordered his disciples to crucify his body, in imitation of his relative Jesus. He died at Shuster, in Persia, where his tomb is still pointed out, in a house near a river which they take for the Jordan.\*

Jesus is represented in the books of the Sabeans as the false Messiah. He is spoken of as clothed in fire, as seducing men by false miracles, and raising the dead by the aid of demons. Nebu, the Sidra Adam says, will be born of a virgin; will change the doctrines of the Jews; will say that he is God, and the Son of God, and will call himself another Hebel Ziva. He will baptize in impure water, in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and will call his adherents religious, just, and Christians. He will produce discord between nations. Twelve other impostors [the Apostles] following him, will go through the world for thirty years.

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\* This account is an invention of later times. If it be not an addition made by some editor of the Sidra Jahia, it proves, taken in connection with the mention of rosaries and prayer-bells, the book to be of comparatively recent origin.

After all the false prophets [Abraham, Moses and Jesus] the fourth and last [Muhammed] will come.

Jesus, the same books say, was baptized by John in the Jordan. An account of the baptism and its attendant conversation, is found in the Book of John. The Baptist, at first, objects to giving "the impostor" the ordinance; but being commanded so to do by Abatur, he performs upon Jesus the baptismal ceremony. After the baptism, the Jordan speaks and says: "May the Jordan, in which the false Messiah has been baptized, be changed into a furnace; may the bread which he eats, be changed into a coal of fire!"

This account of the baptism of Jesus is a Mandeans invention. Some other things related of him in the Nazorean books, have been transferred, with alterations, from Christ's true history, though they represent him as "the Antichrist, sent by the star-spirit to betray mankind."

#### V.—ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE MANDAI JAHIA.

The Nazoreans, according to their own account, came originally from Palestine, where they received their doctrine and their religious ceremonies from John the Baptist. The persecutions of the Muhammedans compelled them to retire to the places which they now inhabit; the protection granted them by the Prophet himself having been of no service to them under his successors, the caliphs Abubeker, Omar, Tamerlane and a certain Mobarech, who burnt their books and destroyed their churches. At a later period they submitted—probably to save themselves from similar persecutions—to the Nestorian patriarch at Babylon, from whose jurisdiction they separated about the year 1480.

Though this account of their origin is given universally by the Nazoreans, as missionaries and travellers testify, it is doubted by some scholars, who think that the sect was formed at a later period, by the amalgamation of Jewish, Christian, and particularly Parsee elements of religion; that it chose John the Baptist as the object of its speculations and adoration, naming itself from him, and afterward—by an error like that of the Gnostic sects of the Sethites and Abelites, or that of the orders of the Carmelites and of Augustin—deriving from him their origin.\*

The majority of the learned—among whom are Gesenius, Hase, Guericke and Neander—agree in assigning the Man-

\* So Baumgarten-Crusius, in his Bib. Theology, p. 143. O. G. Tychsen also, holds to a very recent origin, but his remarks apply to the Galileans of Syria, whom he thinks identical with the Muhammedan sect of the Nazairites.

dai Jahia an ancient origin, and some among them—as Matter, Hartmann, Neander and Barkey—connect the sect with the primitive followers of John the Baptist.\*

The account given by the Mandeans of their origin from the immediate disciples of the forerunner, seems to be based upon a reliable tradition. It must be admitted, however, that we can adduce in its favor no proof so positive as to justify the assertion that it is, beyond a question, historically true. Yet, on the one hand, there exists no good reason for denying the tradition, and, on the other, if we can not prove it absolutely and certainly reliable, we can at least adduce sufficient arguments to show its very probable correctness, and arguments which, supposing the tradition true, do much toward explaining the origin and history of the sect.

1. The language of the Nazoreans, which partakes of the peculiarities of the Galilean dialect, strongly favors the belief that Galilee was the cradle of the sect, though it must be admitted with Gesenius, that these peculiarities are not inexplicable even on the supposition that the land in which they now dwell is their native country.

2. If as Grotius and Herder assert, the Gospel of John is a polemic directed against the disciples of John the Baptist, or if, as Michaelis, Storr and Hug contend, was aimed at both these disciples and the Gnostics, we have a strong link in our chain of historical proof that the Mandeans have descended from the times of early Christianity. It can not be shown, however, that the Apostle wrote with any such intent; for though the earlier biblical critics hold that his Gospel had a polemico-dogmatical purport, its tenor as a whole and the words of the author (20: 31) show that the treatise had a more general object. In some passages of the Gospel, perhaps—as in the prologue, and in 19: 34, 35—a side-glance may be cast at certain heretical opinions of the times, some of which we know were entertained by the school of the disciples of John the Baptist.

3. An almost conclusive argument in favor of the ancient origin of the Nazoreans is furnished by those passages in the church Fathers, which speak of a sect of Hemero-Baptists, (Day-Baptists.)

The passages in question are the following:

1. Hegesippus, who wrote Church Memoirs about 160, A. D. mentions

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\*A late writer, who is not free from the Tübingen taint, Stuhr, even thinks that he recognizes in certain parts of the book of Adam, a doctrine anterior to Christianity, from which the latter borrowed some elements of its morals, an idea which is clearly an historical *hysteron proteron*.

as quoted by Eusebius, (H. E. 4, 22,) "Hemero-Baptists" among the Jewish sects.

2. Justin Martyr, in his "Dialogue with Trypho," (c. 80,) enumerates the "Baptists" [Hemero-Baptists?] among his five Jewish sects.

3. The "Apostolical Constitutions," (compiled in the third century,) speaks of a sect "who, every day, unless they be baptized, do not eat; and also with regard to their table-couches and their dishes, that is, the mixing-bowls, and drinking-cups, and seats, they make use of none of them, unless they first be purified in water."

4. The "Recognitions" of Clement—composed in the third century, and now existing only in the Latin translation of Rufinus—has the following: "Some among the disciples of John who seemed to possess influence, separated themselves from the people, and announced their master to be the Christ." (Lib. i., c. 54.) Again: "One of the disciples of John affirmed that John was the Christ, and not Jesus; and so much the more, he said, since Jesus himself declared John to be greater than all men, and the prophet. If, therefore, he said he is greater than all, without doubt he is to be esteemed greater than Moses and even Jesus Christ himself." (Lib. i., c. 60.)

5. The "Clementines"—written in the third century—speaks of "One John" who "was an Hemero-Baptist." (Hom. ii., c. 23.) He is mentioned as the founder of the sect of the Hemero-Baptists; and as having had twelve apostles and thirty chief men to aid him.

6. Epiphanius, in his work "Against Eighty Heresies"—written soon after 374 A. D.—mentions the Hemero Baptists fourth in the enumeration of his seven Jewish sects. They distinguished themselves from the rest of the Jews, he says, "by baptizing every day, at all seasons,—in spring, autumn, winter and summer; whence it has taken the name Hemero-Baptist." "They were wont to say," he continues, "that it is not possible for a man to live in any other way, unless he baptize himself every day in water, freeing and purifying himself from every cause of blame." (Haer. 17.) Again: "They used to assert that no one can attain eternal life unless he baptize himself every day."

7. Epiphanius speaks in another place, (Haer. 29,) of the heresy of the Nazareans, by whom he means the Christian Ebionites, as being "anterior to Christ," and of themselves as "not acknowledging the Lord;" which, Matter thinks, connects them with our Nazoreans. But Epiphanius, who is not noted for accuracy, probably errs in saying the sect was "anterior to Christ;" and, if not anterior, no connection can be proved between them and John the Baptist's disciples, since the Christian Ebionites, as we know, denied the divinity of Jesus.

8. The "Index of Heresies," wrongly attributed to Jerome by some, says: "The Hemero-Baptists wash (*lavant*) both their bodies and their houses, and their furniture, every day."

These patristic passages are perfectly conclusive, if one can show the identity of our Mandaeans with the Hemero-Baptists, and the identity of the latter with a primitive school of the disciples of John the Baptist. This identity, however, though contended for, as to the first link, by Mosheim, Herbelot, Walch and others, and sustained, as to both particulars, by Neander, Matter and others, can not, perhaps, be proved to entire satisfaction; since, on the one hand, the Nazoreans of our times are by no means Hemero-Baptists, [*i. e.*, do not baptize every day;] and since, on the other, the Hemero-

Baptists are not necessarily to be reckoned disciples of John the Baptist. It may be responded, indeed, that the Nazoreans of our day have gradually relaxed from the strictness and zeal of their ancestors,\* and that we are distinctly informed in the Clementines that John was the founder of the sect of Hemero-Baptists. But to this it may be replied again, that the Hemero-Baptists administered their baptism to themselves, whereas the Nazoreans receive the rite from the hands of a priest; and that the words of the Clementines, "One John [*Iωάννης οὗτος*] was an Hemero-Baptist," do not, of necessity, refer to John the Baptist.

Some who contend that our Nazoreans are descendants of the Hemero-Baptists, a view ably supported by Mosheim in his *De Reb. Christ.*, (p. 43-45,) deny, with that distinguished historiographer, that the John who is said to have founded the latter sect, was John the Baptist. Had Mosheim † read the religious books of the Mandeans, yet unpublished in Europe in his time, he would, doubtless, have changed his opinion.

Upon the whole, after giving all objections their full weight, we can not but think that the historical connection of our Nazoreans with the Hemero-Baptists, and through them, with John the Baptist, is rendered very probable by the testimonies above adduced from the church Fathers; especially by those from the Recognitions and Clementines. This probability is almost converted into a certainty, when we call to mind the fact, that some parts of the religious books of the Mandai Jahia, bear the impress of a high antiquity; and when we reflect that their system, considered theosophically and ritually, is, at the same time, *Gnosticism* and *John-the-Baptistism*; and must, therefore, in all probability, date from an epoch when John still had a party, and when the development of Gnosticism was yet in progress. Most modern scholars, accordingly, not only hold that the Nazoreans had their origin in the first ages of Christianity, but admit, with Hase, Neander, Leopold and Hartmann, that they are, as they claim to be, descended from the early disciples of John the Baptist; some of whom, as Neander says, "contrary to the spirit and intention of their Master, took, after his martyrdom, a course hostile to Christianity."

This opinion is most probably correct. And if we can

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\* On this point Mosheim remarks in his "De Rebus Christianis," as quoted in Murdock's translation of his Church History, (vol. i., p. 35:) "But it is a fixed principle with them all to this day, that the oftener they baptize, the holier and happier they are; and they all would receive baptism every month, nay, every day, if they could. The avarice of their priests, who will not baptize them without a fee, has rendered the repetition of the rite less frequent."

† 1755.

not trace the connection between our Mandai Jahia and these ancient followers of the Baptist, link by link, with absolute historic certainty, we can, at least, supposing the connection admitted, satisfactorily explain it from the historic facts which we have in our possession. In this the New Testament itself lends us important aid.

4. During the whole of the Forerunner's ministry, even after he had announced Jesus to be the Messiah, and had referred some of his followers to our Lord in person, he was attended, as were some of the Old Testament prophets, by a select band of disciples. These he instructed in the Old Testament Scriptures; encouraging in them the practice of rigid fasting, and teaching them special exercises in prayer. No doubt, he spoke to them often of the Messiah and his coming reign; but his instructions, we know, did not, in general, pure as they were, raise his disciples above the fleshly and earthly sense of the Old Testament Messianic predictions.

A feeling of opposition to Jesus exhibited itself in John's disciples, even before the imprisonment of their master; as is evinced by their complaint of him before the Baptist, (John 3 : 26.) When, soon after, their master languished in confinement, unaided by Jesus, they doubted still more whether he could be the divinely appointed deliverer of Israel; and even the mission of inquiry on which they were sent to our Lord, by the Baptist, (Matt. 11 : 2-19,) though satisfactory to John himself, seems not to have effected the removal of their misgivings and unbelief.

After the death of John, there survived him a school of his disciples, who recognized not, if they did not actually discredit, the New Testament idea of the Messiahship of our Lord. We find some of them coming, years afterward, to Ephesus. Apollos, who "was instructed in the way of the Lord," and yet knew "only the baptism of John," (Acts 18 : 25;) and twelve "certain disciples," who had not, any more than Apollos, heard of the special sending of the Holy Spirit, (Acts 19 : 2.) Apollos appears to have known that Jesus was the Christ; but he conceived of him, and of his relation to the Forerunner, incorrectly, having heard nothing, perhaps, of the event of the day of Pentecost, and of the outpouring of the Spirit upon the church. The "certain" disciples seem not to have known even that Jesus of Nazareth was the promised Messiah. Both they and Apollos, however, when better instructed, were obedient to the gospel.

Doubtless there were others of John's disciples, more at-

tached than these to the individuality of the Baptist, and less susceptible than they to the higher and more spiritual doctrines of Christianity, who had wandered, after the execution of their Master, beyond the limits of Galilee and Judea, not only into Asia Minor, but toward the farther east; keeping up, wherever they went, a school of disciples of John the Baptist. Those among them that knew of Jesus at all, were not willing to recognize as the Messiah announced by John, him who had left his forerunner to perish in prison, and who was not able to save himself from a shameful death upon the cross. His was not the accomplishment of the Messianic hopes which they had formed under the ministry of the Baptist.

Their minds being filled with such feelings, their opposition to the religion of Jesus went on continually increasing; and the rapid progress of Christianity seemed only to inflame their envy the more. Forsaking the example of their Master, and forgetting his teachings, they elevated him above Jesus; ascribing to him honors which he never possessed, and never claimed. The Gnostic tendencies of the age speedily invaded their religious system, as it did Christianity; and those speculative minds which embraced their leading doctrines, built them up, by degrees, into a mixed system of Judaism, Christianity and oriental theosophy. Jesus was, at length, declared to be the false Messiah, and inferior in dignity to John; another Messiah was invented, the apostle (or Messenger) of Life, as being superior to the Baptist, in whose name, indeed, John had baptized, and whom he had worshipped; and to this Messiah John's disciples now assigned all those attributes which the believer in the New Testament ascribes to Jesus Christ.

Thus, these disciples of the Baptist wandered farther and farther from Christianity. The great Gnostic movement which operated in Egypt, Asia Minor and in Syria, and the consequent intermingling of the more fundamental ideas of the East and West, changed them, at length, into our Mandai Jahia. Their subsequent residence among the Mussulmans, exposed their doctrines to the influence of Muhammedanism; and, afterward, their temporary union with the Nestorians brought them nearer, once more, to Christianity—not however, to a purer Christianity, but to a Christianity which had departed from the simplicity of its founder. This connection, while it has introduced among the Mandeans corruptions of Christian rites, has made more moderate their opinions respecting Jesus of Nazareth; and has prepared

them partially for the invitations of those who may be sent to declare unto them him "who hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the gospel."

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#### ART. V.—PARTY SPIRIT IN AMERICA.

A FOREIGNER coming into the United States is struck not only with the peculiarity of our political institutions, but with their practical working. He notes among the people a general acquaintance with national affairs, and a deep interest in the operations of government. He is especially surprised to observe with what tenacity the masses adhere to abstract political principles, and how earnestly yet prudently they contend for their establishment. He sees our public prints filled with discussions on questions of right and policy, and the people deeply interested in these questions, although not probably likely to be immediately affected by their decision. If he happens to be present at one of our popular elections, he is astonished at the enthusiasm with which voters throng to the polls, with which spectators watch the progress of the contest. Entering our legislative halls when some party question is under consideration, and viewing the crowded galleries and lobbies, or attending a political gathering where the champions of opposite parties discuss the principles and acts of their respective parties, and noting the intelligent and earnest interest with which the people listen, and then engage in debate among themselves, he can not but contrast such scenes with those to which he has been accustomed in the Old World. In a word, he perceives that Party exists in America to an extent utterly unknown in other countries. Stopping here, and blinded by prejudice, he might be inclined to draw a comparison unfavorable to the workings of our institutions. He should go farther and consider not only the extent, but the peculiar character of Party Spirit in America.

A careful and candid investigation will indicate the following peculiar characteristics. It is not sectional, but tends, as will hereinafter appear, to counteract the influence of sectional animosity. In its origin it is based upon principle and not prejudice. It is not factious or revolutionary, and seeks to remove evil or accomplish any good not by changing the

Government, but under and by means of the existing form. The instrument which it employs is not the sword, but the ballot. Nor has it to do at all with class distinctions. Plebeian and Patrician orders are not recognized. Neither wealth nor descent enter into its distinctions. Principles, abstract, yet of practical importance, mark the line which divides American citizens into parties. Finally, Party Spirit in America, though entirely unrevolutionary, is yet vigorous and earnest, giving tone to national character, stimulating activity, and securing progress.

It may be proper to inquire into the *causes* which have tended to beget and foster American Party Spirit. Noting these, we must conclude, that right or wrong, desirable or not, it is necessary, the legitimate, and inevitable effect of existing causes. What is the *character of our people*? They are bold, stirring, devoted to liberty. They possess a strong sense of individuality—of personal right, and personal dignity. This they inherit from their fathers. They breathe the spirit of independence which, a stranger in Greece and Rome, was first manifested by the Barbarians of Europe, which has been less purely operative and more repressed in Continental Europe, which has ever been to some extent prevalent in England, which indeed has ever characterized the Anglo-Saxon race, but which on our shores alone has exercised its legitimate influence. This character, inborn with our nation, has been developed and fixed by all the circumstances of national origin and progress. Driven to these shores, and compelled to depend upon themselves, our Pilgrim Fathers learned, in the stern school of necessity, lessons of self-reliance and manly independence. The kind hand of an overruling Providence directed their steps, and followed them with his blessing. Success, the best tonic to noble minds, added strength, and inspired with confidence. The very geography of our country fosters this spirit. Its climate is invigorating; its scenery inspiring. All the movements of nature, like the ceaseless working of some vast machinery, seem to urge man onward, and compel him to activity. Such a spirit, bold, stirring, independent, naturally results from the character of our ancestors, from the circumstances attending our birth and growth as a nation, from the physical characteristics of our country. Such a spirit we actually find existing in all parts of our country, and pervading all classes of society. From it results the tendency to the formation of fixed political opinions,—opinions modified, doubtless, in every individual, by the various influences of personal character, education, prejudice, but yet the result of fearless

inquiry and independent thought, opinions too, cherished, and the subjects of earnest contention. From the same cause arises the disposition to scan the workings of antagonistic principles, and to watch the operations of opposing parties. But our people are also distinguished for general intelligence and practical good sense. They are well informed on most practical subjects, and especially on the subject of government. Possessed thus of knowledge and natural capacity, and fettered by no artificial restraint, they can not but think. Thought necessarily begets opinions—opinions which they afterwards especially love, because (in addition to other reasons) they are their own. But *what is the nature of our Institutions?* We proudly call them 'free'; and that term well indicates their character. They impose no restraint calculated to hinder the development of the people. In fact they do more. Themselves depending upon the people, they demand the existence of a people free to think and with power to act. They put government into the hands of the people and so almost compel an interest on their part. For example, the quadrennial election of a chief magistrate by the people, leads our citizens to feel their power in the conduct of affairs, and so to cherish intelligent and independent opinions on the various questions of right and policy involved in their administration. It is easy to see that if no power existed with the people to rectify evils and prosecute plans for improvement, they would soon cease to cherish an interest in government; and party, save of a revolutionary character, would be impossible.

The character of our people then, combined with the character of our institutions, seems to make parties and party spirit inevitable. It is utterly vain to attribute the existence of either to wire-pullers and demagogues. They no more create party spirit than the miller who avails himself of a fall of water, creates the power which turns the wheel, or orders the laws of gravitation and motion. They can only fall in with and give some direction to a force which they could not call into being.

Assuming the causes suggested, it may be required to account for combined and regularly organized parties. It is by no means to be supposed that all the various opinions and preferences of the people are represented in the creeds of the two or three parties which contain the mass of the people. In the same party there are great differences of views. But for the sake of efficiency, men agree to waive minor differences, and such as are most individual and so less likely to be prevalent, and unite in support of some great

principles which afford a more common platform, and are more likely to insure success. They rally round leaders who come nearest to representing their belief, and who are possessed of ability to uphold a party's flag. Having thus combined for the attainment of certain common ends, men subsequently become more attached to their party because it is their own. Their efforts for its advancement, and the opposition encountered from their antagonists, strengthen this attachment. Finally, individual character, educational bias, association of ideas, all exert their influence. But none of these would account for the origin of party spirit. The operation of these implies its existence. They might all be removed, and party spirit would still remain—modified, indeed, but ready still to exert its influence, and be itself affected by various causes.

The fact that new parties spring up indicates the existence and nature of party spirit. A new party is a new classification of old elements, founded on principles before existing and recognized, but not made the basis of a classification. Thus, a popular and effective man, influenced by whatever cause, comes out in opposition to both of the great political parties of the country, and writes upon his flag a sentiment common to both, cherished perhaps by many members of both, but relinquished in order to secure union and efficiency. Immediately followers flock to his standard, and a new party is formed. Or it may happen that the issues of a party are abandoned, from a change of the circumstances which evolved them. In this case, the line of demarkation becomes less distinct; or other issues equally distinctive will be made, and changes will occur from one party to the other, as various causes may operate; or new parties may be formed of the old material, and embracing principles old and admitted, but not before made a basis of classification. These phenomena, even when in themselves slight, and producing little disturbance, yet indicate the independent existence, and to some extent, the characteristics of party spirit in America.

We propose now to show that party spirit is upon the whole, an advantage. It is not without evil, and of this we shall speak hereafter; but it is sufficient to observe that the evil is less than the good, and that it is incidental rather than inherent or necessary.

There is an *a priori* probability that party spirit is beneficial and right, derived from its cause. Having seen that its origin is in the bold, intelligent, liberty-loving spirit of our citizens, and the freedom of our political institutions, we may

reasonably conclude that it is itself good or of wholesome tendency.

Paradoxical as it may seem, parties secure union. They do this by offering common platforms on which all sections may stand together. Thus united and national action is secured, and sectional jealousy is abated. Thus society is in a manner organized, and elements which would otherwise remain forever distinct and hostile, are made to combine harmoniously, and something like order and unity is attained. Parties are the transverse lines which unite together the different portions of our country widely distant geographically, and having different, if not conflicting interests. Our argument may be better conveyed by supposing that no great national parties existed in America. It is plain that there would be no common bond between sections widely removed, and of different sentiments and habits. Every section would be disposed to look out too much for self. There would be the centrifugal force of sectional spirit, without the centripetal influence of some common national organization. In our national legislature, in the selection of a chief magistrate, efficient action would be impracticable, if there were not some common ground on which the North and South, the East and West, could bury sectional differences and cordially coöperate to secure great national ends. In like manner party spirit tends to correct and restrain the rancor of sectional spirit. The former is at least a cross current which turns and abates the force of the latter. Even were party spirit an evil *per se*, it would still be better for it to exist so as to restrain the influence of sectional animosity—to act as a compensating, balancing power. But we are sure that, with all its disadvantages, it is at least less an evil than unrestrained sectional spirit, from which it is essentially distinct. It is more founded in principle and more intelligent. It is less bitter and less selfish. For these assertions we appeal to facts. Sectional discord is ever disturbing national quiet, and threatening national safety. How well that it may be absorbed and lost in a more powerful and less dangerous element. This view may seem to present confusion as existing in the machinery; but really there is unity in the midst of complexity and apparent disorder—one force compensating for and regulating another. Analogies to this are to be found everywhere in nature, on a small scale in the animal economy, and on a larger scale in the relations of the different elements of creation. In the past and present condition of our country, the beneficial influence of party spirit in this particular, is apparent. All the signs of the times

indicate the approach of a period when it will be still more necessary. To this period Lord John Russell refers in his comparison of the English and American constitutions—a period when our country shall be crowded with a dense and heterogeneous population such as now characterizes some European countries, when there shall be a greater variety of character, a greater number of conflicting opinions and interests, and a greater fermentation of public feeling. Our vast and increasing territory will long postpone, but can not avert this day, and eventually will serve to increase the danger. *Now*, our wide extent of territory is favorable to the peace and union of the nation. Sparseness of population, and a predominance of rural life, must ever be conservative. Quiet and comparative solitude tend to allay the fever of fanaticism engendered in the crowded and heated masses of cities. But how will it be when we have the immense territory likely to become a part of our country, and combined with it a proportionably dense population—when we have both our own wide geographical surface, giving rise to numberless different and conflicting opinions and interests, and a teeming population like that of parts of Europe and Asia? Will not the strength of our constitution, and the intelligence and patriotism of our people, find a trial more severe than any which has yet been encountered? Will not every means of preservation be necessary? And in the light of the foregoing observations as to the nature and tendency of party spirit, will not its influence then, be of the highest importance?

Related to our last argument, yet distinct from it, is the tendency of party spirit to keep down class distinctions so far as their influence upon government is concerned. Let the proviso be well noted. With class distinctions, in themselves, we have nothing to do now. We are free to confess that we regard them, even in our republican country, inevitable and perhaps not undesirable. But none, surely, will argue that they should have any connection with government. Such a connection is far too repugnant to the genius of our institutions, and the character of our people. Its folly is clearly shown in the conflicts at Rome between the Plebeian and Patrician ranks, in the injury resulting to both classes, and the long train of evils falling upon the Empire itself. Equally evident is it that the spirit of party and the existence of parties differing on national and abstract questions are absolutely fatal to such a connection.

A tolerably even balancing of power is necessary to the existence of parties. When one becomes too weak to exert

an influence, or to hope for dominance, there will be no motive to remain in it, and it will of necessity fall away. As a practical fact, we know that there have been in our country, since its beginning, at least, two great parties, possessed of nearly equal power, and each struggling for ascendancy. From this characteristic of American parties, we draw an argument in their favor. They operate as salutary restraints upon each other. All history proves the tendency in those holding the reins of government to exceed their legitimate right in the administration of affairs, and the danger of such encroachments to the liberties of the people. The most vigilant watchfulness is necessary to prevent neglect, mismanagement, and corruption on the part of government officials. It is not enough that they be responsible to the people generally. They must feel themselves under the eye of those who will be quick to note a fault and give it publicity. It is a principle of law, that it is better for ten guilty men to go unpunished than for one innocent man to suffer unjustly. Here the maxim may be appropriately reversed. It is better for honest men sometimes to be suspected and removed from office, than for one dishonest man to occupy a station of great power in the government, and be at liberty without fear of retribution, to jeopardize the interests of the country. Rotation in office, though not without its evils, and sometimes working hardly, is yet upon the whole necessary to secure fidelity on the part of public servants. But not only do parties secure a strict surveillance upon government officials, but a restraint upon the operations of each other. The best principles carried to excess lead to despotism. The best man or set of men, meaning ever so well, will end with ruling tyrannically, if unchecked by external force. In our country neither party can carry their principles too far without encountering strong opposition from their antagonists—opposition which will effectually prevent extreme action. And if any measure can not bear close inspection, it must be defeated. The party in power, aware of the approaching trial at the ballot-box and of the strenuous efforts which will be made to remove them from their position, will not dare to press measures of doubtful expediency or right. They will forbear to use imprudently that power which they may so soon be compelled to relinquish.

Parties preserve the materials for full and impartial history. False statements may be made, and for a season pass current, but ultimately they will be contradicted; and the contradiction will exist with the falsehood to counteract its

influence. The best security against error or misstatement is the presence of one interested to detect and expose them. Moreover, newspapers, pamphlets, and books written for the time, will furnish large material for the future historian of America who, like Macaulay, shall think that not only official transactions and outward events are to be noticed, but also the inner life of a people, with their varied opinions and feelings. It is chiefly by the influence of party spirit that such fair and full sources of information will be preserved.

Party Spirit exerts a beneficial influence upon the intellectual character of a people. Nor is this assertion inconsistent with the remark before made, that it is itself in part the result of popular intelligence: since it is no impossible or unusual thing for an effect to react upon, and increase its cause. Schools, Colleges and other educational means are the result of an appreciation of the advantages of knowledge; yet they in turn heighten that appreciation. Party Spirit promotes a habit of reading. This alone widens the range of thought. Fondness for reading does not confine itself to the subject which awakened it, but extends to other things. Thus is mind still farther cultivated and strengthened, and a larger amount of information diffused. But especially do a people imbued with party spirit read of national affairs, and so by a familiar acquaintance with the workings of the plans, and operations of government, become competent to be what they are, Sovereigns. The very bringing into contact masses of men who differ in opinion, is highly favorable to intellectual development. In any community where one idea, or one set of ideas, or one system prevails exclusively, and without opposition, stagnation of thought and intellectual torpor is the inevitable result. In proof, witness the condition of any neighborhood isolated from the rest of the world, having little communication with other people, and relying wholly on their own internal resources. The simple existence, and presentation to the popular mind, of questions of a practical and immediately interesting character, would alone be of immense benefit, by exciting inquiry, begetting thought, and so quickening mental life. But there is a yet more direct influence wielded. Party Spirit promotes free discussion. By means of the press, in legislative halls, and before the people in popular assemblies, opposite opinions are brought into conflict. Facts, arguments, wit and eloquence, are all made to play a part. The people are, in a manner, at once the contestants and judges. How naturally do they become versed in political history, good judges

of argument, skilled to detect fallacy, able to appreciate public speaking, ready themselves to speak when occasion may require, and shrewd on all practical subjects. Then the private contests which occur upon a smaller arena are not without important educational influence. The court green, the country store, the lonely forest road, the fireside circle, witness many a trial of strength highly beneficial to those engaged, and affording interest and instruction to those who listen. The youth of America, especially, learn not always their most important lessons from schools and books, but often from newspapers, and political discussions between candidates at court, or less interested and able disputants in the neighborhood or home circle. And many a boy has received far more of inspiration, and gained far more of oratorical power from play-ground mimic discussions, than from the declamation exercises of School or College. These are the conclusions of reason. They are confirmed by facts. In ancient Athens, the people were characterized by a love for attendance upon popular assemblies, for listening to, and engaging in political discussions. Doubtless they carried this fondness too far; yet from this source they acquired not a little of that correctness of taste, soundness of judgment, and practical ability, for which they are even now so justly renowned. And is it not true of the people of our own country, that where they have not enjoyed the means of scholastic training or technical education, they yet possess a large amount of good sense, useful information, and shrewdness in matters of every-day life. The historian or philosopher who makes no allowance for educational influences besides Schools and Colleges, utterly neglects some of the most important.

Parties are beneficial because they secure a fair representation of all the people in government. Assuming the desirableness of this end, we shall show that it does result from the alleged cause. It must be remembered that a tolerably equal division of power between different parties is necessary to their existence. No one can all the time hold the reins of government. To a greater or less extent there must be rotation in office on a large as well as a small scale. Each party must have a turn in the exercise of authority. In this way, then, very effectually, are all the citizens of our country, in the long run, enabled to play some part in the conduct of national affairs. Then too, even when any one party is nominally in power, it must not be supposed that they exercise unlimited control. On the contrary, the minority always wield a large amount of power.

For in the first place, they are represented in the national councils, and may exercise an influence in modifying and directing the dominant party. Indirectly they may exert a not less decisive influence upon the course of public affairs "by virtue of the naked force which belongs to opinions." There are moreover some peculiar circumstances which tend to increase the power of the minority, and give them a real part in the government. Every one knows that it is far easier to make than to answer objections, that there is no creed or system or plan against which objections may not be urged, and that the party in a controversy who assumes no special ground, but only attacks the position of his opponent, has greatly the advantage. The minority act always on the offensive, presenting no front for attack themselves, while the ruling majority must guard carefully their own salient points, without the opportunity of directly assailing the minority. There is, besides, a disposition in human nature to respect and sympathize with a minority, and to forbid the undue triumph of a successful party. At least the vanquished party always have it in their power, by a prudent course to avail themselves of the reaction of feeling invariably attending great success. Nor will a moderate liberal policy, on their part, generally fail to secure magnanimous treatment at the hands of their successful competitors. Finally, there are always in the party in power, many men of conservative feelings who will not consent to extreme measures, who thus act as a restraint upon their party. Failing to make themselves heard, they leave its ranks for the other party, and so change the balance of power. By the influence of minorities then, and by the oscillations of power between contending parties, the whole people share in the exercise of rule, and are represented in government. This is in fact the only way, or at least the only desirable way, in which all the people can rule. The other alternative is perfect unanimity on all occasions and subjects. But such unanimity, if possible at all, is manifestly inconceivable in our country, among the American people. And if possible, with man's imperfect nature, it would be undesirable. Progress is the result of the conflict of opinions. Unanimity would render society absolutely stationary.

Party spirit increases the interest of the people in the government of the country. It does this by diffusing a knowledge of its affairs, of abuses, evils, and sources of gratulation; but especially by making every citizen feel his personal worth and power, and leading him to exercise all the rights of a citizen. The importance of this is immense.

Under any government, it is highly desirable for every individual to feel identified with the country in responsibility and interest. It is peculiarly so under our own, which depends for its very existence upon the people. It were better that citizens should go to the polls and vote, ignorantly, or even in a wrong spirit, than indifferently remain at home. One of the great signs and causes of the decline of Roman greatness was the indolence and carelessness of the people in exercising the elective franchise.

It seems necessary to a complete treatment of the subject, to notice the evils resulting from party spirit. We shall briefly indicate some of these.

An uncharitable disposition is fostered. All differences of opinion and controversies tend more or less to this. Men who might otherwise be friends, are induced to cherish mutual jealousy and hatred. Often neighborhoods are disturbed by the fierceness of political strife, and even when no personal unkindness is felt, there is a tendency to look with suspicion or contempt upon political opponents. A crying evil connected with party spirit is the aspersion of character. This was well ridiculed by a London journal, during our last presidential canvass. It observed that both of the candidates for the presidency were the worst men in the country, and utterly unworthy of public confidence, judging from the representations made of each by the opposing party. In general, excessive devotion to party tends to narrow-mindedness, and intolerance of opposition.

There is danger of a resort to unworthy measures in the prosecution of party schemes. Low cunning, petty maneuvering, and sometimes base deception, are apt to be used to secure success, and are too often employed and justified by men who would scorn such means in their private transactions.

It is possible for men whose devotion to party begins in principle, to come at last to confound means with ends, and to sacrifice right to policy.

As already incidentally admitted, party spirit tends sometimes to the unequal, if not partial distribution of the honors and emoluments of office.

Finally, party spirit may induce an undue attention to politics, causing a neglect of other and more pressing claims. It may also beget a too great habit of controversy and declamation. These evils have been alleged against the people of some States; many of whom do doubtless devote time and energy to reading political documents, and to fruitless con-

troversy, which would be better employed in studying or doing the business of life.

Of all these evils it may be remarked generally, that they are *occasioned*, rather than *caused*, by party spirit. They are incidental rather than necessary, and arise from the abuse and undue extension of that which is itself good and beneficial. Any good agent in nature or society, may be made an engine of evil; but this susceptibility does not render the agent itself either useless or unworthy. It is sufficient to know the danger and guard against it. Party spirit is, as we have seen, a strong and necessary force, and one of practical benefit. The fact of its application, by the designing demagogue, for vicious purposes, is no argument against it, but only shows the need of caution, and the tendency of men to pervert every power to the accomplishment of evil. It is worthy of inquiry whether there can exist any good without affording the possibility of evil; whether the very capacity for use does not also necessarily involve a corresponding capacity for abuse. Certainly, whatever may be conceived as possible, we find in the actually existing state of things, nothing good in nature, which may not be perverted or abused so as to become evil. The very capacity of fire to afford, and of our bodies to receive wholesome and pleasant warmth, seems to suppose an equal capacity of the one to exert, and the other to receive, painful and destroying power. Such analogies might reconcile us, when we search in vain to find any unmixed good in anything connected with human society in its actual condition, by clearly indicating that the arrangement is not accidental or occasional, but designed and universal. It is gratifying to notice that the evils occasioned by party spirit generally work their own cure. The antidote accompanies the poison. Take, as a single example, the defamation of personal character. It is carried to such lengths as to fail of its end. It must be admitted, however, that the *reflex* influence of abuse and detraction, upon the moral nature of those employing them, is not abated. Perhaps this is but right, and an exemplification of the divine arrangement that he who raises a weapon against his brother, often fails of accomplishing his design, while he himself suffers from the recoil.

It is also a hopeful view of this matter to observe that the evils of which we have spoken, *having their cause in human nature, and only occasioned by party spirit*, diminish in proportion to the diffusion of intelligence and right principle, whilst we do not believe that the force of party spirit itself would be removed or lessened by any such cause.

And this suggests the thought with which we conclude—the duty of patriots and philanthropists in their connection with parties, and with reference to party spirit. They should sedulously guard themselves against being unduly influenced, and earnestly seek, by the diffusion of intelligence and virtuous principle, to control and direct a force, which is highly beneficial, if properly restrained and directed, but which they could not, if they would, destroy.

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#### ART. VI.—THE EXTENT AND CHARACTER OF THE NOACHIAN DELUGE.

THE question we propose for discussion in this paper is, Was this flood universal, or simply local? Did it cover all the earth, or was it confined to a limited portion of our globe? Were the ancestors of all existing birds, beasts, reptiles and insects in the ark? Or were only a few species there, while other species were safe on land, far from the flood of Noah?

We strongly incline to the latter opinion. It seems to us that, while the Noachian deluge was universal, as to man, it was local and limited, as to the earth. We do not think it reached any part of this country, or of Europe, or of Africa, and but a part of Asia. We well know that public opinion is on the other side of the question, and that commentaries, histories, geographies and poetry sustain or rather create this public opinion; but let us go into the question, and see how we shall come out of it.

We shall attempt

1. *To name and answer all the prominent reasons for believing that the Noachian deluge was universal.*
2. *Shall state reasons for believing that it was confined to a part of Asia.*

Among the reasons for supposing the Noachian deluge universal, are

1. *The statements of Scripture.* This authority states that “the waters prevailed exceedingly upon the earth; and all the high hills that were under the whole heaven were covered. Fifteen cubits upward did the water prevail; and the mountains were covered.” From this statement it is inferred that the entire globe was submerged: for a body of water that

inundated all the high hills under heaven, and flowed over the mountains, must have covered all inferior elevations. And here we frankly admit that, if this account is not figurative, but literally true, our discussion is terminated. The flood was universal. But is the whole narrative rigid fact? Moses tells us that "the windows of heaven were opened and the fountains of the great deep were broken up." Is this exactly so? Where are those windows and fountains? When God said, "I will open the windows of heaven, and pour you out a blessing," does any one suppose that divine blessings are liquid, and come to us from above through a sky-light?

Is not this language evidently figurative and adapted to the ideas of primitive times? So "the fountains of the great deep." It is now well known that the center of our globe is fire, not water. If a part of the Mosaic account is plainly figurative, we are at liberty to ask if other parts are not also figurative? May it not be, that, instead of all the high hills in existence, only all those which were then known to exist were meant? This would accord with Scripture style. Moses himself often uses the word *all*, when he evidently means only a great part. In one place he tells us that "the hail smote every herb of the field and brake every tree of the field." But a little further on, he says that "the locusts did eat every herb of the land, and all the fruit of the trees, *which the hail had left.*" This use of universal terms is common to all the sacred writers. For example, Matthew says of John, that "there went out to him Jerusalem, and *all* Judea, and *all* the region round about Jordan." If this is literally true, then not an individual remained in the great city or in all the populous towns of Judea. Millions thronged the desert-born and desert-bred preacher, and, to the last one, professed their faith in Christ. It is evident that Matthew meant merely that a great number flocked to hear John in the wilderness. So we may suppose that Moses meant that, as far as the flood extended, it rolled over the mountain tops. And, if the deluge was caused by the sinking down of a large region of country, bearing with it, hills, mountains and men, then an ocean might be upon that particular region, while all other parts of the world were tranquil. In other places, the beasts might roam as before, the birds fly, and the fishes swim. Provided only that all men were on the drowned district, the Mosaic account is correct and exact. That such was the case, will appear more evident as we proceed.

2. *It is truly said that in all countries, there is a tradition*

*of the deluge.* Every classical dictionary tells us of Deucalion's flood. It is mentioned in Chaldee literature. An ancient Phrygian coin has been found, having on it an ark and the name of Noah. Even the Pacific islanders tell of the deluge. But does this prove that the flood was as extensive as the tradition? We think not. For, as all men, but Noah and the elect seven, were drowned, the account of the flood must have spread from them; and, as all nations are their children, the tradition spread with the human race. It ought to be noticed that these frontier people always speak of the survivors of the flood as living at a great distance from their country. The tradition is just what we might suppose it would be. For the deluge, though limited in extent, destroyed all mankind, and was an awful monument of divine justice. It would be told from father to son and would fix itself in the memory of the nations. Moreover, it has been recorded in the sacred books of Jews and Christians, and thus would spread into the oral and written histories of mankind.

3. *The universality of the deluge is supposed to be proved by the sea-shells that are everywhere found, even on the tops and sides of the highest mountains.* Some of these shells are beautiful, and while they are scores of miles from salt water, they are one, two, or three miles in the air. What but a deluge could have put them there? The first question to ask when you pick up a shell on the top of a mountain is, "What kind of a shell is this?" It is a sea-shell. Well! And what kind of a sea-shell is it? Is it like any other sea-shell? Look closely. Bring it down in your pocket, and ask some conchologist, whether there are any fish now living, with shells like this? He will tell you no, and there never have been any such within the memory of man. "That," he says, "is a fossil shell, and belongs to a fish that lived before man was created." Now, if this is so, then Noah's flood had nothing to do with it, and its being on the mountain is no proof of the flood. The sea-shell found on the mountain, was there perhaps a million years before man was created, and was no more put there by Noah's flood, than the top stone of Grey Lock was laid by the ripples of the Housatonic.

4. *The irregular surface of the earth is supposed to have been occasioned by Noah's flood.* Probably most persons who look upon our mountains, valleys and plains, and all the rough or rounded outlines of the globe, think that these resulted from the wild, tumultuous and powerful waves of a deluge. If this was so, then the rocks and soils, with vegetable, ani-

mal and mineral remains, ought to be found heaped up confusedly upon each other. A flood powerful enough to scoop out oceans and to throw up hills and mountains, would have mixed up everything in terrible disorder.

But what is the fact? Simply, that the most beautiful and perfect order exists in the earth's crust. Those layers of rock, of which we have spoken, lie regularly upon each other, the world around. And in each of the fossiliferous rocks the remains are arranged like specimens in a cabinet. Frail shells and plants are whole, and the various parts of a skeleton lie regularly together. All this shows that they have never been moved by a flood.

But, it may be asked, how do you know all this? How do you get at these layers of rock and see all those wonderful fossils? Why, sometimes we find a place where old ocean has worn the land off. Then, there are sides of mountains and deep valleys, and river banks, and mines. But you say all these go down but a small distance. True. And, as we can not go down to the lower rocks, they come up to us. We look for low-lying rocks on high mountain tops. The earth's crust has, in places, been forced outwards by inside pressure, forming long chains of mountains. This force, acting from beneath, threw up all the layers of rock, and at last, breaking through them, escaped, leaving the layers tilted up upon their edges. As granite is the lowest rock layer, of course this must form the center of the mountain ridge, and all along the dividing line that runs on top of the range, there will be two granite layers coming together. As the fossiliferous rocks come next, so each side of the granite there will be a layer of rock of the same thickness, of the same composition, similarly stratified and filled with the same kind of fossils. Then follow other layers in a similar manner. Now, this shows that these two granite layers were once one, and that they were the lowest down. It shows too, that these two layers of fossiliferous rocks were once united, and lay above the granite. And so on with all the rest.

It is in this way the geologist measures the thickness of these layers. He finds the dividing line on the top of a great mountain, and beginning with granite, he travels off to his right hand, it may be, as far as the granite goes. This thickness he measures. Then, he begins with a fossiliferous layer, travels over and measures that. So, he measures every layer, until he comes to the one which is now the outer layer of the globe. He adds all together, and finds perhaps the united thickness is ten miles. He then plods back over those up-

turned edges of rock until he comes again to the dividing line. He then paces off to his left hand over granite, and over every layer of rock that he measured before, and finds that they match. He has no doubt they were once horizontal and were joined together, but were thrown up in this manner, at one or more convulsions. And when he sees that the order in which these rocks lie in this spot is also their arrangement all over the world, and when he sees evident marks of fire rather than water on them, you might as well try to make him think that a tap of a mason's trowel on the dome of St. Paul's, made all London, as that Noah's flood had anything to do with the face of the earth. Not a trace of the flood is now to be seen anywhere.

5. *Mankind were exceedingly numerous at the time of Noah, it is said, and were so widely scattered, that a deluge, to have drowned them all, must have covered the whole earth.* Some say that there were more people living then than there are now. This we regard as an enormous error. No census of that period has come down to us. So we must reason it out. From creation to the flood was about 1600 years, and there was only one pair to begin with. From the flood to now, is more than twice 1600 years, and there were four pairs to begin the new world.

Then the antediluvians were so long lived that, in any given period, their generations would not be a fourth part so numerous as ours. With us a man is a father at twenty-five, a grandfather at fifty, a great-grandfather at seventy-five, and a great-great-grandfather at one hundred. But Noah was five hundred years old before he was a father. And his three sons were about one hundred years old when the flood came. Moreover, they entered and left the ark without posterity.

Society also, was perfectly corrupt, and vice is ever unfriendly to population. The wars, too, that they waged, tended to extermination. Now, putting all these things together, it is hard to believe that the antediluvians, when destroyed, were more numerous than the people of New England, or that they occupied a greater extent of country. If this is so, then a country no larger than New England, or even the northern states, might sink down and be overflowed, without having the whole earth inundated.

6. *The ark rested on the top of Mount Ararat, it is said.* Hence, the flood must have gone over that mountain, and as that is about 18,000 feet high, it is inferred that it must have gone over the earth. But is this so? If the ark lodged on the top of Ararat, how did the travellers get down? From its

top, for three miles toward its base, is eternal ice and snow. Why was not the ark frozen up there, and Noah, like Capt. Franklin lost, with no government to send after him? Then, people lived in the tropics, and wore almost no clothing. To send them right up into an arctic cold for a twelvemonth, would have destroyed them. But, if they took buffalo robes and blankets with them, how would the tropical animals get along? Would not all their drink have frozen up? But, if the land sank from under them, and the water took its place, then they would have been in the same climate as before. Again, when the land rose up from the sea, were they caught on the horns of old Ararat and carried up into the frozen regions? Were they left up there to slide down over ice needles and ice rocks, with all their elephants and other animals? No. Before the land rose they floated along to the edge of the sea, and in due time landed on a dry and fertile shore which had not been flooded. This idea is strengthened by the fact that olive-trees do not grow on Mount Ararat. The dove got his leaf from the new country. But, *does not the Bible tell us that the ark rested on the top of Ararat?* No! Our translation says "upon the mountains of Ararat," a long chain, at any point of which, and at any elevation, these old world sailors may have landed. The Syriac translation says the ark rested on Mount Cardon. The Latin translation says it rested in Armenia. Well, Armenia is a country. Ararat and Cardon are chains of mountains in that country. One writer might mention merely the country, and another might speak of its mountains. No one has designated the spot with certainty.

At the base of the present Mount Ararat is a Catholic monastery. There they show you some of the very vines that Noah planted. But your faith is somewhat weakened, when they show you, also, the very spear that pierced Immanuel's side, and the hand of Saint James holding a piece of the real ark, and the point of one of Saint Paul's fingers, and a bit of a skull of a sacred virgin. Their monastery, they tell you, is on the very spot where the ark grounded. Very well. Put that down in your note-book. As you stumble along among the mountains of Armenia, some hundreds of miles south, you come to another monastery. It is on the top of Mount Cardon. It has a sign out, "The Monastery of the Ark." They tell you that the other place is all a sham. It is certain that, for hundreds of years, the anniversary of the advent of Noah has been observed here, first by Christians and now by Mohammedans. Put all this to-

gether, and what do you think of the ark's resting on the top of the present Mount Ararat?

7. *The last reason for believing that the deluge was universal, that we ever heard of, is the unanimous opinion of all mankind, until lately.* But this is not so. Some of the best theological writers, centuries ago, denied that this earth was all covered by the deluge. Matthew Poole, who died in 1679, and Bishop Stillingfleet, who died in 1700, and other powerful and pious writers, taught a limited flood. Geology has only verified the results of profound reasoning.

It seems as though our work was now done; but there are some strong things left to say, directly on the other side.

1. *A limited deluge answered God's design.* This was to drown all human beings but Noah and family. The animal and vegetable tribes were included, only because a flood that destroyed men, would necessarily destroy them. Now, if there were but a million or two of human beings on an area not larger than the northern and middle states, a very partial deluge would have answered God's purpose. By sinking that tract the work would have been done.

2. *The ark was too small to contain pairs of all creatures, with their food.* Its dimensions have been taken in tons and inches by experienced ship-builders. Bishop Wilkins says, that if anything, it was rather too large. All our commentators take the same idea. They are puzzled to know how to get live cargo enough for the good old ship. Let us see how they calculated. The ark is about 44,000 tons, and there are, they say, only from two hundred to two hundred and fifty species of four-footed animals, and other creatures in proportion. If this was so, they would have had elbow room enough. But science sadly contradicts the statement. Instead of two hundred species of quadrupeds, over one thousand species have been described; over six thousand species of birds; over two thousand species of reptiles; over 120,000 species of insects are known to exist. Not far from half a million of species are now known, and as various parts of the world, with new continents and islands, are explored, thousands of species are annually added to the list. Thousands of arks could not have held pairs and septuples of all these with their food.

But, if the ark had been large enough, the various creatures could not have lived together in it. To say nothing of their preying on one another, the natures of different animals require different climates. The white bear of the Arctic ocean, and the lion of the equator, and other creatures, could

not have lived in the same ship and climate a year together. Animals and plants were not created in one spot, and then spread abroad, accommodating themselves to places. No. They were created in different centres, and with few exceptions, can not live out of their proper districts. The animals which Noah took into the ark were merely species which belonged to the tract that was to be destroyed. All other animals were safe in their own regions.

3. *Noah took no fishes or amphibious animals into the ark.* Do you say that they could have lived in the water? But, would not the terrible surges, beating against mountain sides, and wildly rolling over continents, have crushed and killed them? If not, would it not have so buried or dispersed their food that they must have died of starvation? If not, as the flood mixed up the salt and the fresh water into a brackish compound, how could the fishes have lived a year? Fresh-water fish die when put into salt water; and salt-water fish can not live in a fluid much less saline than the sea. Only suppose that the country sunk and you have no difficulties with the fishes.

4. *Noah took no plants or seeds with him.* A deluge, rolling and ploughing over the land, would have stript the rocks all bare of soil and vegetation and have mixed them up in a common ruin. When he landed, it would have been on sterile, muddy rock. But, if the flood was limited, and the ark grounded near its edge, all that Noah and his fellows needed to do was just to walk a little way into a region full of trees and fruits and flowers. And when the drowned district came slowly up from its baptism, all things on its surface would be very much as before.

5. *There is not water enough to cover our whole globe.* It would have to be about five miles deep, above what water we now have; and this would require eight times more than now exists. Where could all this come from and go to? If all the rain that the air can hold, before it falls, should come down all around the earth, the depth would be but about seven inches. If our present oceans were spread equally over the globe, the depth would be only three or four feet. This would not be much of a deluge. But, if the inhabited part was sunk, some three miles deep, then, from the Caspian, Black, Mediterranean, Red and Arabian seas, between which we suppose the flood to have occurred, water enough would have rushed in to cover all the high hills and all the mountains of Armenia, and to have drowned a world or race of the ungodly.

6. *An universal flood would have destroyed our planet.* You have seen that a depth of water, five miles thick, all around the earth, must have been created for this purpose. This would have increased the equatorial diameter of the globe some ten or twelve miles. Thus thickened, the surface of the earth would have revolved with an immensely accelerated speed, so much so that the centrifugal force would have overcome the attraction of gravitation, and have sent the ark flying off in a tangent into infinite space.

Moreover, the planet itself would be likely to burst and fly to pieces, just as a grindstone always does, when its centrifugal force is greater than the attraction of cohesion. Then what would have become of the nicely balanced machinery of the solar system, if the weight of our earth had been so seriously increased by miracle, or if it had flown to fragments? Only let the flood be local and be caused by subsidence, and there was water enough; and the weight and velocity of the earth would not be changed.

7. *There are trees now living which are older than the flood.* There is a tree in Senegal, which scientific men say is 5,332 years old. That tree was a thousand years old when Noah went into his ark. There is a tree in a certain church-yard in Mexico, which is said in the Bibliotheque Universelle, to be nearly cotemporary with the creation. A flood that tore up the foundations of Africa and America, must have uprooted all the trees. But these trees have never been moved. Moreover, to bury a tree in water, for a year, would be as likely to kill it as it would to kill an elephant. These old world trees, and there are thousands of others, show that the flood and they were strangers.

8. *Certain extinct volcanoes prove the same thing.* Near the centre of France, there is a district about forty miles long, by twenty miles broad, crowded into which are some two hundred old, inactive volcanoes. Several of these are more than one thousand feet higher than Vesuvius. They have thrown out no fire or ashes within the historic period. Indeed, they are proved to have been extinct since creation. Now, here is our point. These tall, old volcanoes are covered, from apex to base, with ashes, cinders and other light scoria, which, if the flood had covered France, must have been washed away. There they stand, to show that Noah's flood did not visit Europe, just as the old trees tell us it did not visit Africa or America.

In this paper we have not treated the subject so fully and so exactly as we should have done in a thoroughly scientific

essay. We have simply sought to give our readers an insight into this subject. The great fact of the flood we reverently admit, and bow before that justice which inflicted it. It shows us the awful nature of sin, and makes us adore that infinite grace, which has provided in Christ, a way of escape. But, that the flood was local and limited, seems to us in agreement with reason, with Scripture, with scientific facts, and with the purposes of God. Such is the view which we believe all, or nearly all, modern geological writers take of the deluge. We have gleaned from their ample and glowing pages but a few facts. To those pages we refer for more extended illustrations.

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#### ART. VII.—DIVINE PROVIDENCE.

*The Relation of Divine Providence to Physical Laws.* A discourse delivered before the Porter Rhetorical Society of Andover Theological Seminary, August 1, 1854. By GEORGE I. CHACE, LL. D., Professor in Brown University. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1854.

THE discourse bearing the above title, was pronounced at the anniversary of a society which has numbered among its orators, some of the most pious and learned men of their age, and before an audience, which, it might be justly anticipated, would most carefully weigh the sentiments which might be uttered. We are therefore warranted in concluding that its author has given to us his maturest convictions on the subject of which he treats. The term "crudities," which some (critic who, we fear, has not thought very profoundly on the theme under discussion) has seen fit to give to the speculations here presented, is most unworthily applied to them. No one who has been permitted to enjoy the instructions of Prof. Chace, and been brought in contact with his mind—one of unusual logical ability—can be made to believe that he would at such a time, and on such an occasion, give expression to half-digested thoughts, and present the results of only a superficial investigation of his great theme. He has carefully examined the strength of the positions he has taken. He honestly believes that they are entirely tenable. It is with unfeigned diffidence that the writer of these pages sits down to the task, which he has

assigned himself. The personal relations which he has sustained to the author of this discourse, relations of the most tender and intimate nature, present their claims, and seem to urge him to lay aside his pen, and not make the attempt to call in question the views which have here been presented. But he is aware that no person who makes to the public a manly and an honest avowal of his convictions on any subject, will shrink from a candid examination of the sentiments he puts forth. He cheerfully courts investigation, and receives thankfully any light, let it come from whatever direction it may, if it will only throw a brighter radiance around his favorite theme.

An introduction, happily conceived and expressed, in which the author quietly, though indirectly, magnifies his office as a student of matter rather than of mind, prepares the way for the formal announcement of the topic he proposes to discuss, viz., "The relation of certain known organic and physical laws to the doctrine of a Divine Providence, directing the course of human events." It is admitted that the doctrine of Providence is taught in the Scriptures, and the implication is a fair one, that the teachings of these Scriptures are ultimate and authoritative on the subject under consideration. Frankly is the belief avowed that "the numerous beneficent provisions, so visible in the physical arrangements of our world, alone create an antecedent probability that its moral welfare would be provided for." The long practical acquaintance of our author with the phenomena of science, has taught him the uniformity of the operation of nature's laws. This uniformity being admitted, two questions present themselves to us. Is it to be supposed, in the first place, that exceptional cases will arise, and that in order to meet the necessities, whether physical, intellectual, moral or spiritual, of human beings, there will be a deviation from this apparent uniformity? Or, in the second place, is it to be supposed, that to effect the same results, this uniformity being preserved, nature's laws may nevertheless be made subservient to the accomplishment of the particular purposes of divine Providence? The first question, though not discussed at large in this discourse, has a direct bearing on the positions which it attempts to establish. No man who accepts the divine revelation, can doubt for one moment, that such exceptional cases have arisen in the course of man's moral history, and that there have been most manifest deviations from the ordinary operations of natural laws. The skepticism of Hume and those who acknowledge him as a guide, may

lead to the utterance of the proposition, that "no amount of testimony can prove the truth of a miracle." But the sophistry involved in the discussion of such a proposition, is so plain that every candid mind rejects it at once. There is, then, *no such* stability in the workings of natural law, but that for good and sufficient reasons, God may not apparently reverse its operation. It is the general rule, that life having become extinct, the human body returns again to its native dust. Yet, there may be an exception to this rule, and when a worthy end is to be secured, the same power which created that corruptible body, may instantly raise it up from its resting place in the grave. All arguments, therefore, against the divine interference in the accomplishment of moral ends, drawn from the uniformity of nature's laws, and the stern and unrelenting march of these laws, as they urge their way on to the prosecution of the purposes for which they were ordained, are of no avail to set aside the truthfulness of that which we receive from the most competent human testimony, that God has by miracle interposed for the furtherance of His own designs, as a moral governor over moral beings. Without confounding ordinary with extraordinary events, we see not how he who accepts the doctrine, that God has accomplished the ends of His government through the operation of miraculous agencies, thus making physical laws directly subservient to His own purposes, may not as readily accept the other doctrine, that He *may* also bring about the wise purposes of the same government through the operation of the same physical laws, without the intervention of a miracle.

An impression, somewhat extensive, seems to have been left upon the minds of those who have made themselves familiar with the discourse under consideration, that the doctrine of a special Providence is denied by its author. The view taken of God's Providence appears to be that to which Dr. Godwin refers in his treatise against atheism, viz., "That the Creator, having brought all things into being, gave to universal nature laws, by which, as a machine, once set in motion, it goes on without any subsequent act of power or interference of its Maker." Hence, the feeling of gratitude to God, which so spontaneously springs up in the hearts of devout men, when they have escaped some imminent peril, threatening the loss of limb or life, is a feeling not reasonably cherished, if the escape be attributed to a direct special interposition of the divine hand. It is to be exercised rather on the general ground, that God has established the laws of nature, and the individual has obeyed these laws, without

any immediate divine agency exerted upon him. The motive to gratitude is general, not specific. It would be specific, if it could be made to appear that the interposition was of the nature of a miracle, but coming only in the course of the ordinary operation of natural law, the thankful emotion is to be awakened, on the ground that a wise and good Creator has given to His universe such laws as He has imposed upon it, and it has happened that the working of these laws has proved beneficial to the individual. This theory of God's Providence is certainly a chilling one. It seems to banish Him from all concern in the affairs of His creatures, and brings us under the control, not of a wise and good Father, but of laws which appear to be endowed with *some* of the attributes of divinity, without those perfections which make God the watchful guardian and the ever present friend.

It is worthy of consideration, whether an admission has not been made at the outset of the discussion of the theme of this discourse, which is fatal to much of the reasoning which follows. It is conceded that there is a speciality in the act "by which God immediately operates upon the hearts of men by the influence of his Holy Spirit, touching the springs of feeling and desire and action and causing them to flow out in accordance with his most perfect will." But are not the laws which govern the intellectual and moral world, as uniform in their operation as the laws which govern the physical world? With a desire to ascertain the latter, we enter the laboratory of the chemist. Before us are two substances, carbonic acid and lime. Numerous experiments bring us to the conclusion that the combination of these two substances in certain proportions, invariably gives us another substance, the carbonate of lime. Let the experiment be repeated any number of times, and the requisite conditions being complied with, the same result will always follow. But there is just the same certainty in the results of the phenomena of mind as in matter, and we can predict as truly, let the proper conditions of action be given, what will follow in the one department as in the other. It may be more difficult to ascertain what these conditions are, because of the exceedingly subtle and mysterious nature of that which is acting and being acted upon. But that the results will follow, the conditions being fulfilled, no one can doubt. Equally true is it, as every one who has thoroughly studied Edwards on the Will must be convinced, that our moral natures are subject to the dominion of law, and that the will and affections are governed by laws as fixed and uniform in their operation as the laws of matter, so that it is just as

certain that they will obey what at the time is regarded as the strongest motive, as it is certain that the arrow will describe an accurately determined curve, when a certain amount of force is brought to bear upon its propulsion from the string of the archer's bow.

Now it is admitted that when God would effect a specific purpose in carrying forward the plans of his moral government, it is not derogatory to his character, by a special interposition of his power to bring into existence and control the actions of both mind and heart. Because the laws of these two great departments are uniform in their workings, it does not hinder but that he may make these workings subservient to the accomplishment of particular purposes. In doing all this, moreover, the result secured is not regarded as miraculous, but as occurring in the ordinary course of events. Why may he not just as directly act through physical laws and make them subservient to the accomplishment of the particular purposes of His moral government? "Surely," says Dr. Woods, "God has invested the mind with suitable powers, and has given it suitable laws, and these powers are as operative and these laws are as uniform, as the powers and laws of the material creation. And as the mind is incorruptible and has an inherent activity far above any activity found in the natural world, we should suppose that if a divine agency could be dispensed with, anywhere, it would be here. The machinery of the intellectual and spiritual world is manifestly more excellent in its structure and makes a higher display of the perfection of its author, than the machinery of the natural world. No one, therefore, can reasonably think that the laws of the natural world are such, and were originally designed as such, as to supersede the constant agency of God, without thinking also that the laws of the mind are such and were designed to be such as to supersede his agency in the mind." We submit whether there was not in the drawing of the bow and the guidance of the arrow which smote the King of Israel between the joints of the harness, just as much of the nature of a special interposition of Divine Providence exerted for the accomplishment of a particular design, as there was a special interposition of Divine Providence in the suggestion made by the Spirit to the Apostle Paul, forbidding him to go into Asia? In the one case there was a direct action on mind, in the other a no less direct action on matter, while in neither was the action miraculous.

The question is asked, "Shall we suppose the elements of nature, like the hearts of men, to be immediately acted upon

by God?" and the difficulty in answering this question in the affirmative seems to arise from the reflection that the laws which govern these elements are so fixed, overlooking the equally clear truth that the laws which govern the hearts of men are just as fixed. The author of this discourse maintains the position that the agency of God is not concerned, in making the phenomena of nature subservient to the accomplishment of his moral ends. He frankly confesses, however, that his position is not the one usually assumed. It is certain that all the great standard writers in theology, differ from him. His first argument in favor of the view he takes is, "that physical agents have certain specific offices assigned them in the economy of nature, upon the due performance of which the stability and perpetuity of the existing order of things depend, and it is not easy to see how these agencies can be diverted from their obvious design, as parts of the mechanism of the outward world, without disturbance of the order and harmony of nature." But if this argument is in its widest extent a valid one and proves anything, does it not prove too much? Have there been no instances in which there has been a diversion of physical agencies from their "obvious design as parts of the mechanism of the outward world?" "But these instances," it may be urged, "are to be ranked in the class of miracles." It matters not where they are ranked. The admission that such events may occur, if an emergency arises which calls for them, is a virtual surrender of the position that the "stability and perpetuity of the existing order of things" are *so* dependent on the action of physical agents, that they can never be broken up, even under the most pressing circumstances. If the accomplishment of one purpose of a moral government may be brought about through miraculous agencies, without any essential "disturbance of the order and harmony of nature," why may not the accomplishment of another purpose in the moral government of God be brought about through physical agencies, working in their ordinary, uniform manner, without any "disturbance of the order and harmony of nature?" Besides, is there not such a thing as *moral* necessity as well as *physical* necessity, and if, when God would secure the ends of a righteous government, *moral* necessity is deemed no obstacle in the way of bringing about the desired result, why should *physical* necessity be any more an obstacle? Those who have been most skeptical on the subject, have become convinced, by personal examination, that the Scripture account of the overthrow of the ancient cities of the plain of Jordan, is the faithful de-

scription of an actual occurrence. It is, moreover, believed that this overthrow was the result, not so much of a miraculous agency, as of the action of ordinary volcanic forces, there being an eruption of fire followed by a general conflagration of the bitumen which abounded in the plain. Shall our conviction of the stability of nature's laws prevent us from seeing in an event like this, the immediate agency of Divine Providence? Did not God exert a direct influence on those volcanic forces, and make them the means of accomplishing a specific end? We admit that it is beyond our province to decide positively that when either individuals or communities suffer from physical causes, this suffering is to be viewed as an act of retributive justice, an exhibition of the Divine displeasure toward them for their sins. Such a decision would be falling into the error of which the friends of Job were guilty, who were so confident that the patriarch was peculiarly culpable, because he was called to pass through peculiarly sore trials. The truth is, it is presumption for us to attempt to interpret in all their bearings the acts of the perfect Being who controls all things. What appears to us as an act of Divine vengeance, may be a blessing in disguise. The thunderbolt, commissioned as we certainly think it may be, to do its work of death, may strike a man to the earth, not necessarily because he is a "sinner above all men that dwell in Jerusalem," but because a benevolent Father would remove him to a better world, without the pains of a lingering sickness, and the distress of an agonizing death. Believing that the purposes of God's moral government have been brought about by miraculous agencies, and seeing no reason to call in question the commonly received opinion that physical law, without the intervention of a miracle, may conduce to the same end, we are prepared to say that the volcano, the earthquake, the tempest and the thousand active forces of nature, *may* be made immediately the instruments for the furtherance of the moral purposes of God among men, and that they not only may be, but have been, and will continue to be.

The second argument in support of the theory that God does not act directly by physical causes to bring about moral ends is, that the contrary "supposition is at variance with the clearest and most unquestioned teachings of physical science." But here again the formidable objection meets us, that however "clear and unquestioned" these "teachings" may be, it is a historical truth that God *has* acted directly, though miraculously, by physical causes, to bring to pass His moral purposes. The force of this objection is not to

be evaded by saying that the discourse treats, not of the extraordinary, but of the ordinary operations of the divine government. Reasoning from the greater to the less, it is a fair inference, that if the phenomena revealed to us by physical science, are not of so fixed and uniform a character, but that they may be reversed or set aside if the ends of a moral government require it, then these phenomena in their ordinary development, may, if it so please their author, be made tributary to the accomplishment of the same ends. It is urged, that in the operation of nature's laws, there is a fixed uniformity. Thus, when all the requisite conditions are met, (the due admixture of the elements, and the application of the spark, being taken into consideration,) gunpowder will always explode. Nothing can prevent it. It matters not what may be the character of those who come in contact with it, be they innocent or guilty; they must suffer, provided there be a sufficient quantity of the combustible matter, if an explosion follows. This certainty of action is seen throughout all the forces of nature. These forces are dormant until their slumbering energies are aroused by certain causes, and then they act and must act. All the changes going on in the physical world, are regulated by the sternest law and can be modified by no prayers, affected by no moral considerations, but hasten on in their own rounds, regardless of all human intervention. "The course of nature," says the author, "having its august rise in the constitution and physical arrangements of the globe, dependent at each step of its sublime march upon material agencies, can no more be turned from its path, without disturbance of natural laws, than the ball leaping from the mouth of the exploding cannon." The eloquence of a passage like this does not remove an impression made upon us, that the sentiments uttered look somewhat like a deification of nature, a species of refined Pantheism, while God, the great first cause and governor of all things, is cast quite into the shade. They have a depressing influence on our minds, as we think of lifting up our hearts in solemn prayer to God, that, in their hours of peril, by land or sea, He will interpose directly for the safety of those we love. We have some misgivings whether they are in harmony with the devout words of an inspired writer, "He commandeth and raiseth the stormy wind which lifteth up the waves of the sea. They mount up to the heavens, they go down again to the depths; then their soul is melted because of trouble. They reel to and fro, and stagger like a drunken man and are at their wits' end. Then they cry unto the Lord in their trouble, and he bringeth them out of their dis-

tresses." And as a consequence of these cries, it is added, "He maketh the storm a calm, so that the waves are still." These unhappy beings did not stop to consider whether "the august rise in the constitution and physical arrangements of the globe, dependent at each step of its sublime march upon material agencies" did not present an insurmountable objection to the offering of a prayer to God for help. They believed that God could, and if consistent with His own purposes, that He would interpose directly, in answer to their prayer to save them from impending destruction, by laying His hand upon the wild elements, and saying to them in His own voice of authority, "Peace, be still."

It will be seen that the discussion at this point is eminently practical, involving in reality, the question of the propriety of prayer in those special emergencies, where we are brought under the control of physical agencies, and a dependence on the immediate intervention of a higher power, is acknowledged, at least in words. In times of pestilence, we appoint our seasons for special prayer to God that He will avert from us the blow of the destroyer. In times of drought, we beseech God to open the windows of heaven and pour out the long desired rain. When the storm howls around our dwelling and we feel the fury of the winter's blast, our thoughts at once go after those who stand in intimate relations of kin, or friendship to us. We think of their danger, and as we bow the knee in prayer, we beg Him who

"Plants His footsteps in the sea  
And rides upon the storm,"

to come to their aid. So many and so frequent are emergencies like these arising, giving occasion to the utterance of the most fervent supplication, that a thoughtful man may well be excused, if he ask himself the ground of his confidence in the probability of securing the special agency of God in the accomplishment of the purposes he wishes to see brought to pass. And in the prosecution of his inquiries on this subject, he need not, on the one hand, confound ordinary with miraculous events, nor on the other, call in question the uniformity of the action of nature's laws. No fervor of prayer, of which he may have been the subject, has prevented but that fire will burn or that the absence of heat will result in the process of freezing. The most prolonged supplication has not brought it to pass that one in the full possession of his mental powers with the proper application, has failed to make progress in knowledge. Neither have the most earnest petitions availed that he whose moral nature is not wholly perverted, has not

felt guilty in the commission of sin. Just as soon might a man suppose that his prayers will prevent the lengthening shadows of a setting sun, as to suppose that under ordinary circumstances the uniformity of the operation of nature's laws will be broken up. But who can tell what, on the large scale of the universe, the uniformity of nature's laws is? Is it not possible that in answer to his prayers as one of the fixed antecedents to the accomplishment of the divine purposes, God may make physical laws in all the uniformity of their action, subservient to the promotion of the objects which the good man wishes to be secured. With all our knowledge of physical agencies, how little we know. We witness the phenomena of nature, and we ascribe them to certain causes. But a closer examination of these causes, shows them to be only effects of still antecedent causes. And in tracing these continually receding causes, were we endowed with more far-reaching powers of investigation, might we not be brought to a sphere of operation, where we should see the immediate agency of God in making them conduce to the accomplishment of his own purposes. May it not be that in this sphere, and not in the lower one which comes within the range of our observation, the prayers of God's needy children may reach His ear, and He may so control the elements, that the blessing they ask may be bestowed, or the danger from which they would be delivered, may be averted. It is, at the least, to this sphere of operation that faith looks. The speculative reason may bewilder itself in mazes of mystery, as it seeks to know what possible connection there can be between prayer and such an adjustment of the forces of nature, as to bring about a desired result. But in obedience to its own promptings, the pious heart reposes with confidence on a God who sits not apart in gloomy solitary grandeur from His creatures, but governs all events of their lives, making them bear in some way, on the promotion of His own glory. Thus, believing that the divine mind may be directly influenced to bring to pass a desired end, without departing from what appears to be the ordinary operation of nature's laws, such a heart carries its want to the ear of its God. It rejoices in the belief that He can, and if no good reason to the contrary prevent, that He will put forth His power among those more occult forces which come not within the range of its investigations, but upon the action of which depend all events which are occurring in the physical world.

If the foregoing statements be correct, and they certainly seem to accord with the representations of Scripture, is it a

self-evident proposition, that in all cases "the mighty procession of events in the natural world moves forward in stern and uncompromising order, regardless of human wishes—regardless of the vicissitudes of human condition?" Not to repeat what has already been said upon miraculous interpolations, do we find nothing in the sacred Record to lead us to question this proposition? It was a wish of the patriarch that the home of his nephew Lot might be spared, and he prayed that there might be a special manifestation of Divine Providence in saving the wicked cities of the plain. God distinctly assures him that he shall be gratified in his wish if ten righteous men can be found in these cities. Had the ten righteous men been found, would it be an error to say that through the influence of "human wishes," those forces of nature which afterward proved so destructive, would have been held in check? The long drought in the time of Ahab, is to be viewed no more in the light of a miracle than the seven years of famine which visited the land of Egypt in the days of Joseph, and yet both its origin and termination are represented, in an important sense, as a special manifestation of God's providence, dependent on the "human wishes of the prophet Elijah." And as an incentive to *us*, to believe in the efficacy of prayer, it is said that he was a "man of like passions with us." So many illustrations bearing on this point will suggest themselves to every inquiring mind, that it is useless to multiply them. They surely are of some weight in proving that it is not at all improbable that God may make physical causes bring about the accomplishment of the purposes of His special providence.

The third argument to establish the position of Prof. C., is "that the experience of mankind does not afford evidence of a special relation in physical events, to the character of the individuals or nations principally affected by them." To qualify this statement, it is added in a note "that the question is not whether the course of events in the natural world was pre-arranged in view of the requirements of man's moral probation, but whether the divine power is continually interposed in altering that arrangement to meet emergencies not provided for in it." The most strenuous advocate for a special Providence, acting even through physical causes, firmly believes that so far as the divine mind is concerned, there are no such emergencies as are here referred to. Hence, there can be no alteration of any previous arrangement. Does the author admit that by the pre-arrangement of God, the course of events in the natural world was made to meet the requirements of man's moral probation? If he does, he rests

upon the same ground that the believer in a *special Providence* assumes, for such a believer maintains that, although by a direct interposition of Divine Providence operating through physical causes, certain acts of favor or disfavor are done, this does not hinder but that this was all pre-arranged. Because it is a *special providence*, it does not prevent its being a *providence*, a something foreseen. If he takes the ground, that there is no connection between the pre-arrangement, by God, of the course of events in the natural world, and the requirements of man's moral probation, how is it *certain* in any case, that these requirements will be met? In the course of the "moral probation" of the apostle Paul, it became necessary for him to go to Rome. But what certainty would there be that he would ever reach Rome, if God exercised no direct control over the storm which swept over the Adriatic and threatened the destruction of the vessel in which he had embarked? The fulfillment of every prediction recorded in the Scriptures, has been intimately connected with the operation of physical laws, and the same mind which foretold the accomplishment of the prediction, must exercise a constant and direct control over these laws, and make them subservient to the fulfillment of his purposes. It is said "that a careful collection of statistics on this subject would not show or render probable even, that the agencies of the natural world are directly employed by God in the administration of His moral government." In reading a statement like this, one can hardly fail to be reminded of such divine sayings as these: "If ye walk in my statutes and keep my commandments and do them, then I will give you rain in due season, and the land shall yield her increase, and the trees of the field shall yield their fruit. And it shall come to pass, if thou shalt hearken diligently unto the voice of the Lord thy God, to observe and to do all his commandments, blessed shalt thou be in the field. Blessed shall be the fruit of thy body and the fruit of thy ground, and the fruit of thy cattle, the increase of thy kine, and the flocks of thy sheep. Blessed shall be thy basket and thy store. And the Lord shall open unto thee his good treasure, the heaven to give the rain unto thy land in his season, and to bless all the work of thy hand." In language equally graphic, are the consequences of disobedience set forth. If the above statement be correct, then however plainly it be asserted that there were periods in Jewish history when the greatly altered appearance of the face of the country, the barrenness of the soil, etc., were attributable to the moral delinquencies of the people, this is not to be taken as a literal truth, but set down to the

imagination of writers, whose poetical temperament led them to indulge in these flights of fancy. It is not for us, indeed, to say that in all cases, what seems to be adversity befalling a people, is necessarily to be referred to a special interposition of providence in the way of the infliction of retributive justice. Neither are we warranted to draw the inference that prosperity is a sure index of the divine approbation. But we can not say positively, that in no instance is adversity a special manifestation of divine judgment, or prosperity of divine approbation. To refer all the different forms of desolation which have swept over a disobedient nation, to the operation of unconscious laws, keeping out of view the wisdom and intelligence of Him who makes the laws of nature subservient to his own purposes, seems to be shutting out God from the control of the affairs of His universe. Because we may sometimes misjudge in these matters, ought we to say that never is there any connection between the visitations of evil or blessing, and the special providence of God?

The illustration which the author adduces of the sad decease of one of our missionaries, who in passing up the Brahmaputra was killed by the falling of two trees across the boat in which he was sailing, is deemed pertinent to the view he takes. In this painful event he sees no special Providence of God. The friends of missions on the contrary, recognize it as such, though they in vain attempt to clear up the dark mystery which hangs over it. The devotees of Budh might regard it as a "manifest interposition of their deity in protection of the faith which the infidel stranger had come to subvert and overthrow." And thus because the Christian might be perplexed by the mystery and the Budhist rejoice at the opportuneness of the event, it would be wiser for us, such seems to be the conclusion, to keep out of view the immediate hand of God, and regard it as a kind of casualty, a thing which happened to occur, but in no way directly provided for in the purposes of infinite wisdom. We prefer to trace the event, even in its minutest details, directly to the hand of Him "of whom, through whom and to whom are *all things*, to whom be glory forever and ever, Amen."

In some of the other illustrations we think we discern traces of that vicious mode of reasoning, which sets aside what we regard as the doctrine of a special Providence, because of the apparent misjudgment of men as to the bearing of events which are occurring in this physical world. That there is a universal tendency in the human mind to regard unusual occurrences, especially in the physical world, as sig-

nificant of the Divine will, would seem to prove that there is some connection between these occurrences and this Divine will. There may be, there doubtless have been gross error and superstition connected with these views of God's special providence. But the universality of the feeling, that God works directly through physical phenomena, to accomplish the purposes of His moral government, is a probable evidence that this feeling has been transmitted from the age of man's primeval purity down to the present period, and has its foundation in truth. And all this may be so, notwithstanding the incorrect decisions which men may have made, with regard to both the judgments and the mercies of Heaven. A man's self-love may lead him to view his own interests as in a special manner under the direction of a beneficent God. He may believe that all the elements and all physical laws have a special commission to minister to the furtherance of *his* welfare. But an intelligent Christian, firmly believing in the special Providence of God, knows that God does not design that he shall enjoy an uninterrupted course of what he calls prosperity. If adverse events befall him, even events brought to pass through the intervention of physical causes, he is none the less disposed to see the hand of a benevolent Father in them all. Yea more, there may be times, when he may reasonably ask himself whether even the very prosperity he enjoys, may not after all be in some sort, a judgment of heaven. He thus may come to correct the decisions of his self-love, and view the events which are occurring in his history, through a wholly different medium.

In discussing the extent of God's Providence, the author presents three suppositions, which may be regarded as the three theories which explain the extent of the Divine government. The first two may be reduced to one, corresponding to what is called the general Providence of God, *i. e.*, that the great outlines of events have been arranged by God, while the details seem in some respects to be contingent. The other theory corresponds to the theory of a particular Providence and recognizes the Divine hand in all things. The strong objection to the latter theory seems to be that it asserts the direct agency of God in circumstances of so trivial a nature that it appears derogatory to the Divine dignity to suppose that He would concern Himself immediately in the arrangement and development of circumstances so unimportant. There is, it is thought, a violation of the old rule of criticism, never to introduce the idea of the Divine interposition, where the presence of God is not worthily and justly called for. But if it be inconsistent with the dignity

of God to uphold and govern these trifling events, then is it not inconsistent with His dignity to have established causes which invariably produce these events? Besides, we have yet to learn that any event, of however trifling a character it may seem to us to be, is unimportant in the fulfillment of the purposes of God. It is urged "that in the moral as well as the natural world, there is always an exact relation between the magnitude of an event and the forces giving rise to it." Unless we beg the question, by saying that although in a given case where the forces giving rise to an event, *seem* to be very small in magnitude, they really are not so, every person, familiar with the facts of history, will recall events which were brought about by apparently the most trivial causes. A thing of comparatively so trifling a character as a convivial feast was the cause of the death of the greatest of earthly conquerors, breaking the unity of his empire and changing the face of things throughout the entire world. It would not be right to say that substantially the same results would have followed, had not Alexander the Great, fallen a victim to his unbridled passions, by his indulgence at that Babylonish festival, since the probabilities are all against such a supposition. For the accomplishment of the designs of Him who rules over the world, it was necessary that the hero of so many battles should be conquered by a power, whose might he could not withstand, and that the vast consolidated empire he had built up should be rent in pieces. In selecting the means that should work such a mighty revolution, it mattered little whether the forces were of a greater or smaller magnitude, provided only, the result be secured. And since, in this, as in innumerable other instances, causes the most trifling in our judgment, were able to bring about the result, such causes were chosen. Indeed, it is the Divine assertion, that "God chooseth the weak things of the world to confound the mighty," and the truth of the assertion is exemplified not only in the progress of a spiritual kingdom among men, but in the great transactions of the physical world in connection with the unfolding of the plans of Divine Providence. It may be urged that if we introduce the Divine agency in these little, trivial events, we furnish occasion for errors of judgment without number and lead men to ascribe to Providence what a more rational view of things would cause them to ascribe to other causes. Thus an old Jesuit historian exulting over the destruction of the kingdom and nation of the Goths in Spain, observes that "it was by a particular providence that this occurred, that out of their ashes might rise a new and holy Spain to

be the bulwark of the Catholic religion," and as proofs that this "new Spain" was especially "holy," he points us to the Inquisition and the submission of a priest-ridden people to the Papal Hierarchy. The Protestant, on the contrary, sees no such design in this event. And yet, as a devout, thoughtful man, knowing that in the vast, and what to us seems to be the complicated machinery of the Divine plans, there are "wheels within wheels," he might believe that God's hand was specially employed in these events, to bring about an ulterior design, of the most benevolent character, although these particular events were the immediate occasion of the prosperity of what he believes to be a false religion. It is by undertaking to interpret the providences of God in a way to satisfy the demands of our self-love, that we "run into folly and delusion, if not involve ourselves in graver and more serious misfortune." But it certainly is not the part of candor to go over to the other extreme, and deny the direct agency of God in what to us appear to be the trifling concerns of life. In human governments, the quoted maxim, "*de minimis, lex non curat*," the law does not concern itself with minor things, may be an appropriate one, but it can hardly be applied to the Divine government, since it is unquestionably true that the gravest results depend upon the smallest antecedents.

The author considers the objection that some persons may urge, that although all the questions involved in the doctrine of particular providence can not be comprehended by reason, yet as that doctrine is taught in the Scriptures, we are to let go of reason and cling to revelation. If the advocates of this doctrine contend that it teaches anything directly *contrary* to reason, we may be sure that such teachings will find no confirmation in the Word of God, and we may reject them at once. But if, as it is generally conceded, human reason can offer no valid objections to the performance of miracles, if they are made subservient to the bringing about the purposes of God's moral government, (since such a performance rather *transcends*, than is *contrary* to reason,) how can it offer any valid objections to the doctrine, that to the accomplishment of the same purposes, the laws of nature, without any deviation from their uniform action, may be made directly tributary. Do not the Scriptures, directly and by implication, assert such a connection between physical laws and moral ends, that we may cheerfully admit it as part of our creed, that the "laws of nature may constantly maintain the order and stability of the universe and at the same time lend themselves as pliant instruments in its moral

government." This view so ably set forth and vindicated by Chalmers, and doubtless maintained by the Christian Church generally, we are sorry to see held up to scorn, as being in the not very elegant phrases, "mere whining and cant and drivel, utterly unworthy of the book, in support of whose claims it is offered,—utterly unworthy of the head or the heart of any true man or good Christian." We repeat it, we exceedingly regret that Prof. Chace should have given utterance to such expressions as these, not merely on the ground of the want of good taste displayed in them, but because they aim a blow directly against both the intellect and the piety of those who oppose the view which he maintains. He has quoted the exact language of Scotland's most gifted divine, in his masterly discourse "on the consistency between the efficacy of prayer, and the uniformity of nature," and calls the train of reasoning by which he supports his position, "mere whining, and cant and drivel." We are sure the audience which he addressed could not have responded to such an assertion, and it must have grated harshly on the ear of many a one who listened to it. Almost every page of the Scriptures recognizes what we believe to be the doctrine of special Providence. We see not how God can be styled the Being who hears and answers prayer, if he does not make physical laws, in some way, promote the ends of his moral government. And since his designs are above our comprehension, and the methods he takes to accomplish these designs, equally above our comprehension, neither the one nor the other properly come within "the sphere of our reason." It is not contended, by the most earnest defender of the doctrine of special Providence, that revelation calls for "our belief in opposition to the clear and distinct affirmations of the faculty" of reason. In that sublime prayer which Solomon offered at the dedication of the Temple, he put up this specific petition, "When heaven is shut up, and there is no rain, *because they have sinned against Thee*, if they pray toward this place, and confess Thy name, and turn from their sin when Thou afflictest them, then hear Thou in heaven, and forgive the sin of Thy servants and of Thy people Israel, that Thou teach them the good way wherein they should walk, and give rain upon Thy land which Thou hast given to Thy people for an inheritance." Now, when the limited, narrow reason of a short-sighted mortal comes to the investigation of the connection between the sin of a guilty and the prayer of a repenting people, and the operation of the physical laws by which rain is on the one hand withheld, and on the other, poured out, how "clear"

and "distinct" can be her "affirmations" on the subject? We are disposed to exalt Reason to the highest point she can rightfully claim, but we can not do as France did, make a goddess of her. It is "not only impious but unphilosophical to go about with an attempt to mould and conform an authoritative doctrine of the Bible, either by the arguments of human reasoning or by the illustrations of human fancy. And this is no impeachment upon the supremacy of reason. Let reason be employed in pronouncing upon the claims of Christianity to be a religion from heaven, and in proving that the Bible is not a fabrication of impostors, but the authentic record of inspired truth. Let it be further employed in ascertaining, upon the approved principles of criticism, the sense of its original language and in bringing forward a correct representation of that sense to the illiterate. But after these are accomplished, it is the part of reason to resign her office, for if she advance a single inch further she steps beyond her province. It is the part of reason, amid the clashing pretensions of the various systems which are proposed to it, to seek for the genuine record of the Divine will; but it is also the part of reason to listen exclusively to the voice of inspiration after she has found it; and I am not renouncing the authority of my judging principle, but following its dictates, when after the Bible is established as the directory of my faith, I offer to it the unconditional surrender of my understanding, and submit my mind as a blank surface to whatever the Almighty by his word and by his doctrine chooses to engrave upon it."\* We commend these Christian sentiments of Dr. Chalmers, to the careful attention of the reader, and respectfully ask him to compare them with the opinions of Prof. Chace on the true province of reason in matters of religion.

Did the limits of this article allow, we should say a few words on that part of the discourse in which the author considers the objections made to his views, arising from the fact that the belief in a Divine Providence controlling the events of our lives, is so consoling, that it is not best to disturb it, "although the doctrine be not expressly taught in the Scriptures and not easily reconcilable, indeed, with the known constitution of the outward world." If there be any one who urges such an objection, he is not so much to be reasoned with, as passed by in silent contempt. All the writers we have read on this subject, hold no views of the doctrine of

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\* Chalmers' Posthumous Works, vol. vi., page 186.

Divine Providence, which are not strongly confirmed by the authoritative teachings of revelation. In the course of the discussion of the supposed objection, several positions are taken, which are far from being self-evident truths. "Wisdom is a higher endowment and virtue, than simple goodness." An explanation of the terms here used, might make this to be received as a proposition which commands our belief. In its present form it may not so readily be admitted. That the special ordering by God, "of all events and circumstances in my life, for the promotion of my highest good," precludes all "merit on my part, in willingly submitting to them," is not so clear. Merit means "reward due," and implies that the person to whom it belongs is deserving praise. Whether it shall or shall not be accorded, depends upon the character of the emotion cherished or the action put forth, and not upon the cause of the emotion or action. Because, as has already been admitted, God by the influences of his Holy Spirit, touches "the springs of feeling and desire and action, and these flow out in accordance with His most perfect will," are these feelings and desires and actions, in no sense meritorious? Again, the author acknowledges that God's love antedates, and is the cause of our love to Him, thus rendering it certain, that so confirmed is the alienation of man's affection from his Maker that this alienation is subdued only by a special act of God's power and grace. But is the love to God, thus awakened in the heart, in no sense a praiseworthy emotion? If, moreover, "all the events and circumstances of my life have" not "been specially ordered by God, for the promotion of my highest good," have *none* of them been thus ordered? Is there not at least *one* "event and circumstance," which I may directly trace to the hand of my heavenly Father, and to the discipline of that one event and circumstance" I "willingly submit." And because the event is the ordinance of God, is there no merit in the submission? Bishop Butler, to whom we cheerfully accord the praise of "seeing things as they are, without the distortions of prejudice and passion," tells us that the "receiving of affliction, as what God *appoints*, or thinks proper to permit in His world, and under His government, will habituate the mind to a dutiful submission. But ought we not to conclude that the "merit" of all such submission is taken away the moment we come to regard the affliction as an "appointment" of God? The theology of Prof. C. as developed by the statements to which we have alluded, and others to which we have not time to refer, is completely antagonistic to the theology taught, as we suppose, in that honored "school of

the prophets," the Andover Seminary, and could not, from the very nature of the case, have been favorably received by the audience before which his discourse was pronounced. Brought to the test of the sacred Record, we do not think it would bear the scrutiny to which it would be subjected by the infallible oracles of God.

Near the conclusion of the discourse the author lays before us the supposed feelings of a man "whose ideas of God and His government have been formed chiefly from the observation of His works," while listening to an exposition of the doctrines which have by the Christian church been regarded as fundamental, from the days of the apostles down to the present time, the special providence of God, the occurrence of all events, in accordance with His will, either permissive or decreative, the overruling of suffering and sin, in some way to promote the ends of His moral government, the divine decrees, election and reprobation, &c. Our philosopher listens to the discussion of these and the collateral themes growing out of them. The supposition is that he has never been the subject of that spiritual change, the first effect of which is to bow the pride of man, and to bring him to the distinct perception of a whole class of truths which "the natural man receiveth not." Can such a man be competent to sit in judgment upon the character and dealings of a Being whose very existence is to him but little better than a nonentity? How poorly qualified for his task, when he ignores the whole scheme and history of redemption as occupying the prominent place in the purposes of Jehovah. Of course, such a man would doubt the subserviency, in any way, of physical law to the promotion of the ends of a moral government, viewing that government especially in its relation to the progress and final triumph of a spiritual religion. Of course he would deny the truth of that doctrine which is the very key-stone of our faith, the salvation of man "not by works of righteousness which we have done," but by the grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ; since the denial of the doctrine of election in its scriptural representation of the divine choice," not as *determined by*, but as *determining character*," is a virtual denial of the doctrine of salvation by grace. It is not to be supposed that any man, whose heart has not been changed by the Holy Spirit, will cordially welcome a truth which strikes such a fatal blow to his self-righteousness. His self-love, moreover, would probably lead him to reject the doctrine, that God's great end in creation was, first of all, the promotion of His own glory, rather than the mere happiness of his creatures. Equally abhorrent to such

a man would probably be all the doctrines of grace, and we are not to wonder if he casts them all aside, though the experience of thousands who have been in his position teaches us, that the work of God's Spirit on his mind and heart, would at once remove all his prejudices and lead him most cordially to receive all these doctrines. Perhaps we judge our philosopher too hastily. He might have more modesty, and if he were a true, earnest student of nature, and had cherished any proper conceptions of the greatness and wisdom of the Author of nature, he might feel, at least in some measure, the force of the words of him "whose preëminent ability as an ethical philosopher was chiefly due to his power of seeing things as they are, without the distortions of prejudice and passion." "Suppose one who never heard of revelation, of the most improved understanding, and acquainted with our whole system of natural philosophy and natural religion, such a one could not but be sensible that it was but a very small part of the natural and moral system of the universe which he was acquainted with. He could not but be sensible, that there must be innumerable things in the dispensations of providence past, in the invisible government over the world at present carrying on, and in what is to come, of which he was wholly ignorant, and which could not be discovered without revelation. Whether the scheme of nature be in the strictest sense infinite or not, it is evidently vast, even beyond all possible imagination. And doubtless that part of it which is opened to our view is but as a point in comparison of the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout eternity past and future, in comparison of what is even now going on in the remote parts of the boundless universe, nay, in comparison of the whole scheme of *this* world. And, therefore, that things lie beyond the natural reach of our faculties, is no sort of presumption against the truth and reality of them, because it is certain there are innumerable things in the constitution and government of the universe, which are thus beyond the natural reach of our faculties.\*

In bringing this article to a close, we are happy in being able to say, that our faith in God's providence extending to all events, has not been weakened but strengthened by the review of this discourse. Giving all the prominence to reason which it deserves, we still hold to the belief that there is a spiritual perception of truths connected with the character and government of God, the decisions of which are to be

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\* Butler's Analogy, part ii., chap. ii.

relied upon by him who honestly seeks to be guided by infinite wisdom. Most heartily can we respond to the language of the devout Cowper, whose singularly pure and sanctified tastes make him as good authority on these subjects, as though his life had been spent in the investigation of the laws of science.

“ Happy the man who sees a God employed  
 In all the good and ill that chequer life!  
 Resolving all events, with their effects  
 And manifold results, into the will  
 And arbitration wise of the Supreme.  
 Did not his eye rule all things, and intend  
 The least of our concerns, (since from the least  
 The greatest oft originate.) Could chance  
 Find place in his dominion, or dispose  
 One lawless particle to thwart his plan,  
 Then God might be surprised, and unforeseen  
 Contingence might alarm him, and disturb  
 The smooth and equal course of his affairs.  
 This truth philosophy, though eagle-eyed  
 In nature’s tendencies, oft overlooks,  
 And having found his instrument, forgets  
 Or disregards, or more presumptuous still  
 Denies the power that wields it. God proclaims  
 His hot displeasure against foolish men  
 That live an atheist life—involves the heaven  
 In tempest—quits his grasp upon the winds  
 And gives them all their fury, bids a plague  
 Kindle a fiery boil upon the skin  
 And putrefy the breath of blooming health.  
 He calls for famine, and the meagre fiend  
 Blows mildew from between his shriveled lips  
 And taints the golden ear. He springs his mines  
 And desolates a nation at a blast.  
 Forth steps the spruce philosopher, and tells  
 Of homogeneal and discordant springs  
 And principles—of causes, how they work  
 By necessary laws their sure effects,  
 Of action and reaction. He has found  
 The source of the disease that nature feels  
 And bids the world take heart and banish fear.  
 Thou fool! will thy discovery of the cause  
 Suspend the effect or heal it? Has not God  
 Still wrought by means since first he made the world?  
 And did he not of old employ his means  
 To drown it? What is his creation less  
 Than a capacious reservoir of means  
 Formed for his use and ready at his will?  
 Go, dress thine eyes with eye-salve—ask of him,  
 Or ask of whomsoever he has taught,  
 And learn though late, the genuine cause of all.”

## ART. VIII.—NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

*The Life and Epistles of St. Paul.* By Rev. W. J. CONYBEARE, M. A., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Rev. J. S. HOWSON, M. A., Principal of the Collegiate Institute, Liverpool. In two volumes. (New York: Charles Scribner. 1854. 8vo, pp. xxii, 459, 560.) These noble volumes have been anxiously sought for by clergymen and scholars in this country. The work was well received in England, and the public estimate of it was very high previous to its appearance in an American dress. It is the joint work of two of the most accomplished scholars of the English Church. Mr. Conybeare is distinguished for his classical and biblical attainments, and Mr. Howson is equally celebrated for extensive historical and geographical research. The general plan of their work may be gathered from the following extract from the Introduction:

“The history of the Apostle must be compiled from two sources; first, his own letters, and secondly, the narrative in the Acts of the Apostles. The latter, after a slight sketch of his early history, supplies us with fuller details of his middle life; and his epistles afford much subsidiary information concerning his missionary labors during the same period. The light concentrated upon this portion of his course makes darker, by contrast, the obscurity which rests upon the remainder; for we are left to gain what knowledge we can of his later years, from scattered hints in a few short letters of his own, and from a single sentence of his disciple Clement.

“But in order to present anything like a vivid picture of St. Paul’s career, much more is necessary than a mere transcript of the Scriptural narrative, even where it is fullest. Every step of his course brings us into contact with some new phase of ancient life, unfamiliar to our modern experience, and upon which we must throw light from other sources, if we wish it to form a distinct image in the mind. For example: to comprehend the influences under which he grew to manhood, we must realize the position of a Jewish family in Tarsus, ‘the chief city in Cilicia;’ we must understand the kind of education which the son of such a family would receive as a boy, in his Hebrew home, or in the schools of his native city, and in his riper youth ‘at the feet of Gamaliel,’ in Jerusalem; we must be acquainted with the profession for which he was to be prepared by this training, and appreciate the station and duties of an expounder of the Law. And that we may be fully qualified to do all this, we should have a clear view of the state of the Roman empire at the same time, and especially of its system in the provinces; we should also understand the political position of the Jews of the ‘dispersion;’ we should be (so to speak) hearers in their synagogues; we should be students of their Rabbinical theology. And in like manner, as we follow the apostle in the different stages of his varied and adventurous career, we must strive continually to bring out in their true brightness, the half-effaced forms and coloring of the scene in which he acts; and while he ‘becomes all things to all men, that he might by all means save some,’ we must form to ourselves a living likeness of the *things* and of the *men* among which he moved, if we would rightly estimate his work. Thus, we must study Christianity rising in the midst of Judaism. We must realize the position of its early churches with their mixed

society, to which Jews, proselytes and heathen had each contributed a characteristic element; we must qualify ourselves to be umpires (if we may so speak) in their violent internal divisions; we must listen to the strife of their schismatic parties, when one said 'I am of Paul and another, I am of Apollos;' we must study the true character of those early heresies, which even denied the resurrection, and advocated impurity and lawlessness, claiming the right 'to sin that grace might abound;' 'defiling the mind and conscience' of their followers, and making them abominable and disobedient, and 'to every good work reprobate;' we must trace the extent to which the Greek philosophy, Judaizing formalism, and eastern superstition blended their tainting influence with the pure fermentation of that new leaven which was at last to leaven the whole mass of civilized society."—*Vol. i., pp. ix., x.*

Mr. Conybeare, who wrote the introduction, goes on to enumerate other requisites to a proper understanding of the personal history and missionary labors of St. Paul; such as a knowledge of the state of the different populations which he visited; the Greek and Roman civilization; the points of intersection between the political history of the world and the sacred narrative; the social organization and gradation of ranks; the position of women; the relations between parents and children, masters and servants; the quality and influence of the Greek and Roman religions; the public amusements; the operation of the Roman law; the courts and magistrates before which the apostle was so often arraigned; the military institutions of the early empire; the roads over which he journeyed; the commerce and navigation of the time; the geographical position and face of the countries through which he passed, or in which he labored, and finally, the writings which he has left. From all these sources the authors profess to have gleaned the *materiel* for these noble volumes. We think the work gives evidence that the design of the authors has been very faithfully executed. It is certain that they have brought a vast amount of learning to bear on its accomplishment. Mr. Conybeare has contributed translations and explanations of St. Paul's letters and speeches, while Mr. Howson has furnished the greater part of the historical and descriptive chapters; though the former has contributed considerable portions of this division of the work.

We think highly of the exegetical labors of Mr. Conybeare. Instead of retaining the received version of the speeches and epistles of St. Paul, he has given a free translation, in which he has aimed to give the apostle's full meaning, instead of his precise words. He says:

"In order to give the true meaning of the original, something of paraphrase is often absolutely required. St. Paul's style is extremely elliptical, and the gaps must be filled up. And moreover, the great difficulty in understanding his argument, is to trace clearly the transitions by which he passes from one step to another. For this purpose something must be supplied beyond the mere literal rendering of the words. For these reasons the translation of the epistles adopted in this work is, to a certain degree, paraphrastic. At the same time, nothing has been added by way of paraphrase which was not virtually expressed in the original."—*Vol. i., pp. xviii., xix.*

In some instances we think Mr. Conybeare has been unfortunate in the use of terms, as in the substitution of "Glad Tidings" for "Gospel." In not a few cases, he has seemed to apprehend a defect in the received version, but

has failed materially to improve it. As an instance of this, we may note 2 Tim. 2: 23, which he renders—"But shun the disputations of the foolish and ignorant, knowing that they breed strife." The objection to our version, we think, is well taken, but we are not satisfied with the reading which the critic would substitute. We think the apostle is here cautioning against being "wise above what is written." *Απαιδεύτος* signifies "untaught," being another inflection (with a negative) of *παιδεύοντα*, which occurs in the twenty-fifth verse, and is rendered by the translator "instructing." *Παιδεύειν* signifies strictly, to teach a child, though it is sometimes extended to his correction, and even to the teaching of those further advanced in years; *παιδεύω* means taught, hence, *ἀπαιδεύτος* untaught. By *ἀπαιδεύτος ζητήσεις*, we are therefore to understand "untaught questions," that is, matters which God has not made known. Such matters the apostle commands Timothy to avoid.

We might specify several such instances, but our space will not allow of it. Nevertheless, in a great majority of cases, each deviation of Mr. Conybeare from the authorized version, is a passage from obscurity to clearness, from darkness to light. Undoubtedly scholars will differ as to the value of his exegetical labors, in special instances; but we think all will agree that, on the whole, he has done much to elucidate the scope and meaning of the writings of St. Paul. He has contributed to the understanding of the epistles, as systematic discussions, while the contributions of Mr. Howson, by revealing the tendencies and errors which they were designed to correct, afford a comprehensive idea of their general drift and design.

The labors of the latter were different from those of Mr. Conybeare. His labors were chiefly exegetical, while those of Mr. Howson were mainly geographical. In this department, the author is thoroughly at home. The only complaint we have to make is, that his learning appears sometimes to be redundant. His historical parallels and illustrations are too abundant, and sometimes even offensive, as when he refers to the Nabob of Oude, and Abd-el-Kader, to illustrate scenes in the life of St. Paul. Besides, Mr. Howson is somewhat inclined to mingle his own conjectures with the facts of Scripture. There is also an occasional touch of romance scarcely consistent with the dignity of the sacred history. We will simply cite the reader to the description which he gives of St. Paul's earlier training in schools, and the picture he draws in the opening of the eighteenth chapter, of the apostle's mood on his approach to Corinth. But these are trifling drawbacks. Where the value of labor is so positive and so great, we can afford to make allowances for such defects. Mr. Howson's chapters abound with varied information respecting all the places with which the name of the apostle is connected; their history, geography, scenery, customs, laws and institutions. He also discusses disputed questions respecting the chronology and antiquities of the apostolic history, with rare acuteness and discrimination. And there is a tone of piety pervading the whole which renders it peculiarly grateful to the Christian reader.

In the course of our reading of these volumes, we have occasionally met

with views to which we could not subscribe. We have found nothing, however, to which we wish to note an exception, unless it be to the speculations of Mr. Conybeare, in the thirteenth chapter, respecting the church, the ministry, and the ordinances of the gospel. It is but just to say that, for a churchman, the views of Mr. C. on these subjects are moderate. In common with other Episcopalians he holds to three orders in the ministry, though he does not seem to ground the theory so much on divine appointment or apostolic institution, as on the law of ecclesiastical development. We think his brief paragraph respecting infant baptism is exceedingly weak and inconclusive. We also question the statement which he makes of the apostolic condition of baptism. He tells us that converts were merely required to "acknowledge Jesus as the Messiah," previous to their baptism, and that their instruction in the principles and duties of the new religion, was left till after that event. We think this statement needs some qualification. The commission which our Lord gave his apostles, certainly put teaching—all the teaching necessary to open the way to the new life—before baptism. It is scarcely probable that the order which he prescribed was so soon set aside. The subsequent practice of the church in requiring an extended course of instruction for the catechumen, previous to baptism, was doubtless a perversion of his design. Yet the order which Christ established, and the very terms of the apostolic commission, gave prominence to teaching as a means of conversion, and consequently, as a preparation for baptism; thus affording a show of authority for the course adopted by the post-apostolic churches in this respect. We think there is evidence that the apostolic practice was to baptize converts who were led, through the preaching of the gospel, to profess faith in Christ, as soon as they were converted. And it is also true that special care was bestowed on their edification after their baptism. But the claim that little or no attention was given to their instruction previous to their receiving that rite, where circumstances admitted of it, can scarcely be allowed, in view of the glimpses afforded us in the Acts and Epistles of the Apostles.

In reference to the primitive mode of baptism, Mr. Conybeare, in common with the leading scholars of the continent, concedes that it was by immersion. He says:

"It is needless to add that baptism was (unless in exceptional cases) administered by immersion, the convert being plunged beneath the surface of the water, to represent his death to the life of sin, and then raised from this momentary burial to represent his resurrection to the life of righteousness. It must be a subject of regret that the general discontinuance of this original form of baptism, has rendered obscure to popular apprehension, some very important passages of Scripture."—*Vol. i., p. 439.*

If any one should desire to know what passages of Scripture are obscured by the too general change in the form of this rite, the answer may doubtless be found in the following extract from another work of Mr. Conybeare, published several years since. Alluding to the believer's death to sin, he there holds the following language :

"We must remember, too, that this actual death to a former state of being, was typified in the outward form of that rite which admitted the converts into union with the flock of Christ; when the baptized person was plunged below the surface of the water, and thus made to undergo a kind of burial, to represent the transition he was making from one existence to another. And it is this to which St. Paul so often alludes, when he speaks of being buried with Christ by baptism, and thereby made to share the death of our Lord."—*Whitehall Sermons*, pp. 89, 90.

With the slight abatements which we have noticed, we heartily commend these volumes to our readers. They have the rare merit of being equally adapted to the wants of the minister, and to the capacity of the people. All classes may reap advantage from their perusal, and we trust they may be widely circulated. They are brought out in beautiful form, and are offered at a price which practically places them within the reach of all.

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*A Complete Concordance to the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament.* By ALEXANDER CRUDEN, M. A. (New York: M. W. Dodd. 1854. Imperial 8vo, pp. 856.) It is needless to say anything in commendation of Cruden's great Concordance. It is unquestionably the most perfect work of its kind that has ever been produced. The edition before us contains the unabridged work—the work as Cruden arranged and completed it. Mr. Dodd has entitled himself to the thanks of ministers and Bible students, for producing the work in this complete form. Those who are familiar with it, value it above price.

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*Lectures on the Seven Churches of Asia Minor.* By the Rev. JOHN CUMMING, D. D. (Philadelphia: Lindsey & Blakiston. 1854. 12mo, pp. 544.) This is another volume—the third, we believe—of Dr. Cumming's "Apocalyptic Sketches." It is pervaded by the same tone of earnest feeling, and characterized by the same wealth of illustration as the previous volumes. The style of Dr. Cumming is quite diffuse, sometimes florid, but it is generally the vehicle of good sense and evangelical doctrine. We think his works are adapted to the wants of the people. Certainly they contain nothing above the capacity of general readers. And though we by no means agree with some of the views which he puts forth, we can cheerfully commend his writings to our Christian readers.

We have two more volumes of Dr. Cumming's writings from the same publishers—his *Minor Works*, first and second series. The titles of the subjects treated in the first series are, "The Finger of God," "Christ our Passover," and "The Comforter." The subjects discussed in the other volume are, "A Message from God," "The Great Sacrifice," and "Christ Receiving Sinners." These subjects, as the reader will see, bring us to the very substance and life of the gospel. It is enough to say that they are treated in an able and judicious manner.

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George P. Putnam & Co. have issued a new and cheap edition of *The Monuments of Egypt; or, Egypt a Witness for the Bible.* By FRANCIS L.

HAWKS, D. D., LL. D. This valuable compilation of the recent discoveries in the history and archæology of Egypt is intended to furnish illustrations and proofs of the events recorded in the Scriptures. It has already done good service in the cause of the Bible, and we are glad to see it reissued in this convenient form. It is furnished at a price that will bring it within the means of the great mass of readers.

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*Synonyms of the New Testament*; being the substance of Lectures addressed to the Theological Students, King's College, London. By RICHARD CHENEVIX TRENCH, B. D., Professor, &c. (New York: J. S. Redfield. 1854. 12mo, pp. 250.) Prof. Trench is well known, through his previous works, as a scholar of rare attainments, and a critic of uncommon acumen. His research in the department of philology has evidently been prosecuted with a real enthusiasm. In the volume before us, he has entered a field of great importance, and to the extent that he has gone, has performed a work of immense value. The words of the New Testament furnish the rudiments of the Christian system. It is only by a strict attention to their import that we can make any advance in the noblest of all sciences. The whole can be mastered only by a mastery of the parts. Unless we carefully weigh and determine the force of the terms employed in the New Testament, we shall never attain to a complete and comprehensive understanding of its great truths. The study of synonyms, more than any other exercise, tends to secure an accurate knowledge of the precise force of words. It tends to promote that patient investigation of words, that accurate weighing of their value, intrinsic and relative, which are indispensable to the full understanding of their meaning, as well as to their legitimate use. The work of Prof. Trench before us, will afford important aid in the prosecution of such investigations. It is adapted to meet the wants of students in the outset of such inquiries. It is not exhaustive, yet it may be said to furnish the diligent and earnest student all that he really needs. We trust that it may lead to a more careful and minute investigation of the original language of the New Testament.

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*The Belief of the first Three Centuries concerning Christ's Mission to the Underworld.* By FREDERIC HUIDEKOPER. (Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Co. New York: C. S. Francis & Co. 1854. 12mo, pp. 187.) It is a curious fact that our ecclesiastical historians have made so little account of the current belief of the church during the first three centuries, that Christ at his death, descended to the place of the dead, on a mission to the departed. This appears to have been a general belief among the early Christians. Prof. Huidekoper has collected the evidences and expressions of this singular article of the early faith from the writings of the early Christian Fathers, with a statement of all the circumstances which they included in it. From the fact that this belief prevailed so generally, and was deemed to be so important, the author deduces an important argument for the genuineness of the four gospels. He argues very forcibly that if the early Christians had

forged these writings, they would have incorporated this doctrine in them. The silence of the four gospels respecting so essential an article of the early faith, is therefore a proof of their genuineness and authenticity. The volume of Prof. Huidekoper furnishes a very compact summary of the patristic literature of the doctrine of Christ's mission to the underworld. It is an important contribution to the history of early Christian doctrine.

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*Paley's Evidences of Christianity.* With notes and additions. By CHAS. MURRAY NAIRNE, M. A. (New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1854. 12mo, pp. 501.) It is unnecessary for us to say anything in favor of Paley's "Evidences of Christianity." This work has long been recognized as one of the most masterly defenses of historical Christianity. And though it is sometimes defective, yet as a whole, it is unsurpassed in its particular field. Paley's doctrine that utility is the basis of morality, led him into quite material error in his chapter on "The Morality of the Gospel." It is remarkable that a man who could present the credentials of the gospel in so unanswerable a form, should so signally fail in unfolding its contents. The editor of this edition has undertaken to supply the defect of Paley in this particular. He has also made additions, intended to meet the sublimated forms of skepticism which have prevailed since Paley's day. He has drawn the matter for his notes and additions from various sources, and has materially added to the value of Paley's great work. The work in its present form is equally adapted as a text-book for seminaries and colleges, and for popular use.

We have also received from M. W. Dodd, New York, a new edition of *Cumming's Bible Evidence for the People*. This work has enjoyed considerable reputation as a popular Manual of Christian evidence. It does not treat the subject at so great length, nor with the logical consistency of Paley, though we think it is adapted to do good, especially among the young.

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Messrs. Carter & Brothers, New York, have issued a cheap edition of *Infidelity; its Aspects, Causes, and Agencies*. By Rev. THOMAS PEARSON. We have before spoken of this work, and we would again heartily commend it to our readers. It is not a treatise on the evidences of Christianity, but a statement of the phases of unbelief, and its sources.

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*Morning and Evening Exercises for every day in the year.* By WILLIAM JAY. In four volumes, small 8vo. (New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1854.) These exercises consist of brief remarks by way of exposition and practical inference, on various passages of Scripture. The excellence of these volumes is well known. Their value is much enhanced by the arrangement of the present edition, the exercises for morning and evening being combined in the same volume, instead of being separate as heretofore. The use of such a work would add much to the impressiveness and profit of family worship. It would not only serve to restrain the haste with which this duty is too frequently performed, but it would conduce in an essential degree,

to improvement in religious knowledge. And for sound Scriptural views and an evangelical spirit, we know nothing of the kind superior to Jay.

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*The Better Land; or the Believer's Journey and Future Home.* By AUGUSTUS C. THOMPSON, pastor of the Eliot Church, Roxbury, Mass. (Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon, Lamport & Blakeman. 1854. 12mo, pp. 244.) This volume is composed of discourses which the author had delivered to his people in the course of his pulpit ministrations, and which they requested might be given to them through the press, previous to his departure for a tour among the Asiatic missions of the American Board. They are characterized by strong faith, fervid imagination, evangelical views, and soundness of discrimination. The style is sufficiently ornate, though not florid. The subjects treated are the Pilgrimage, Clusters of Eschol, Way Marks, Glimpses of the Land, the Passage, Recognition of Friends, the Heavenly Banquet, Children in Heaven, Society of Angels, Society of the Saviour, Heavenly Honor and Riches, No Tears in Heaven, Holiness of Heaven, Activity in Heaven, Resurrection Body, Perpetuity of Bliss in Heaven. There is little connection between these various chapters, apart from the fact that they relate to the same thing. This little volume will be especially comforting to those who have lost Christian friends.

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*The Religious Denominations in the United States.* By JOSEPH BELCHER, D. D. (Philadelphia: J. E. Porter. 1854. Imperial 8vo, pp. 1084.) This compilation, though somewhat miscellaneous, contains a vast amount of information respecting the religious organizations of this country. So far as we have found time to examine its contents, we think it is valuable. It furnishes compends of the history, constitution, doctrines and orders of the different religious sects in this country. It also contains a synopsis of the leading institutions of religious benevolence, such as Missionary, Bible and Sunday School organizations.

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*Campbellism Examined.* By JEREMIAH B. JETER, of Richmond, Va. (New York: Sheldon, Lamport & Blakeman. 1855. 12mo, pp. 369.) This is a timely publication. It is not only a statement of what Campbellism is, in its inception, growth, doctrines, discipline and tendencies, but it is also a clear and able examination of its unscriptural dogmas. Its title well indicates its character. We have long felt the need of some authentic and compendious exhibition of the movement which Mr. Campbell originated, but we have hitherto been able to find nothing of the kind. We are happy to be able to say that Dr. Jeter has furnished the very thing which was needed. He has made himself thoroughly acquainted with the system of the Bethany Reformer, and he has proved himself fully able to expose and refute his unscriptural assumptions. His style is terse, clear and compact. His work appears to be characterized by a spirit of liberality and Christian candor. We think that it leaves nothing further to be desired, either for the unfolding or the refutation of Campbellism.

We propose to give Dr. Jeter's summary of Mr. Campbell's leading principles. And we will say here that every statement which our author makes is abundantly sustained by quotations from Mr. Campbell's writings. Touching the Spirit's agency in the work of conversion, after several pages of quotations from Mr. Campbell, Dr. Jeter says:

"It would be easy to multiply quotations of this kind; but the above will suffice to give clear and just views of Mr. Campbell's theory of the influence of the Holy Spirit in the conversion and sanctification of men. There can be no mistake in reducing the system to the following propositions:

"A moral change is essential to the salvation of men. This change can be effected only by the moral power. All moral power is in arguments, or truth, addressed to the mind by words, or other signs, equivalent to words. All the converting power of the Holy Spirit is in the words which he addresses to men in the Scriptures. Men need no divine or supernatural aid to exercise saving faith in Christ; but can believe in him as easily as they can believe the well attested history of General Washington. This faith does not imply the existence of love, but brings a person to remission, or a good conscience, through baptism; to a good conscience succeeds a pure heart; and from a pure heart flows love. And, finally, to be filled with the Spirit is equivalent to being filled with the word." P. 121.

On the subject of regeneration or conversion, Dr. Jeter claims to find some degree of confusion in the statements of Mr. Campbell, but regards it as clear that he "insists frequently and in a variety of forms, on the perfect *identity of Regeneration, Conversion and Baptism.*" We quote from Dr. Jeter:

"The substance of the Reformation, on this point, as developed in the Millennial Harbinger Extra, and perpetuated in the Christian System, is this—*Converts made to Jesus Christ by the apostles were taught to consider themselves pardoned, justified, sanctified, reconciled, adopted, and saved. These terms are expressive, not of any moral quality, but of a state or condition. This change of state is effected, not by any change of views or of feelings, nor by faith, but by an act resulting from faith—and this act is IMMERSION, called with equal propriety, CONVERSION or REGENERATION.* But let us listen to the highest authority on this point. 'Whatever the act of faith may be, it necessarily becomes the line of discrimination between the two states before described. On this side, and on that, mankind are in quite different states. On the one side, they are pardoned, justified, sanctified, reconciled, adopted and saved; on the other, they are in a state of condemnation. This act is sometimes called immersion, regeneration, conversion.' Chn. Sys., p. 193. 'These expressions,' (immersed, converted, regenerated,) 'in the apostle's style, denote the same act,' p. 203. 'For if immersion be equivalent to regeneration, and regeneration be of the same import with being born again, then being born again and being immersed, are the same thing.' P. 196.

In this connection, as closely connected with what is set forth on the identity of regeneration and baptism, we will quote what is said concerning Mr. Campbell's dogma of *Baptismal Remission*:

"Mr. Campbell maintains that penitent believers are forgiven, not before, but in the act of immersion. 'Peter,' he says, 'to whom was committed the keys, opened the kingdom of heaven in this manner, and made *repentance, or reformation, and immersion, equally necessary to forgiveness.* . . . When a person is immersed for the remission of sins, it is just the same as if expressed, in order to obtain the remission of sins. . . . I am bold, therefore, to affirm,

that every one of them who, in the belief of what the apostle spoke, was immersed, did, *in the very instant in which he was put under water, receive the forgiveness of his sins, and the gift of the Holy Spirit.*" Chn. Bap., p. 416, 417. I have italicised some clauses in the above sentences to draw particular attention to their meaning. The believer in Christ, however sincere, and whatever may be his moral state, is condemned, exposed to all the dreadful consequences of disobedience, until the *very instant when he is put under water.* Mr. Campbell teaches that baptism is perfectly useless, 'as empty as a blasted nut,' to all who are pardoned. 'If men,' he says, 'are conscious that their sins are forgiven, and that they are pardoned before they are immersed; I advise them not to go into the water, for they have no need of it.' Chn. Bap., vol. 6, p. 160." P. 222.

Mr. Campbell also denies that it is the duty of the unbaptized to pray or perform any other act of devotion. Dr. Jeter quotes his words taken from the *Christian Baptist*, (p. 439,) on this point, as follows:

"No man can have a holy spirit otherwise than as he possesses a spirit of love, of meekness, of humility; but this he can not have unless he feel himself pardoned and accepted. Therefore the promise of such a gift wisely makes the reception of it posterior to the forgiveness of sins. Hence in the moral fitness of things in the evangelical economy, baptism or immersion is made the first act of a Christian's life, or rather the regenerating act itself; in which the person is properly born again—'born of water and spirit'—without which into the kingdom of Jesus he can not enter. No prayers, songs of praise, no acts of devotion in the new economy, are enjoined on the *unbaptized.*" P. 216.

These are the leading peculiarities of Mr. Campbell's system. On many points he is in agreement with the great body of evangelical Christians. In his debate with Mr. Owen, on the inspiration and authority of the Scriptures, he defended principles dear to the Christian world, and entitled himself to the gratitude of Christians for his masterly defense of the Bible. But when he comes to the exposition of Christianity itself, his defection is so radical, that it is difficult to see how he can enjoy the confidence, fellowship and coöperation of evangelical Christians. We have heard, and some passages of Dr. Jeter's excellent work seem to justify the statement, that there is a gradual improvement going on in the views of Mr. Campbell and his friends, which promises a return to the communion from which they have so widely departed. All good men will rejoice in such a reunion if it can be effected without a sacrifice of Scriptural truth on the part of our churches.

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*The Westminster Shorter Catechism.* With Analysis, Scriptural Proofs, Explanatory and Practical Inferences and Illustrative Anecdotes. By Rev. JAMES R. BOYD. (New York: M. W. Dodd. 1854. 16mo, pp. 264.) This is a very useful arrangement of the celebrated "Shorter Catechism." We think Mr. Boyd ought to have known better than to have quoted Origen in favor of infant baptism. We apprehend that if he will take the pains to read the article on this subject, in the number of this journal for April, 1854, he will at least repeat the statement which he makes in this work, with less confidence.

*The Works of Philo Judæus*, the cotemporary of Josephus. Translated from the Greek by O. D. YONGE. Vol. I. (London: H. G. Bohn. New York: Bangs, Brother & Co. 1854. 12mo, pp. 515.) Philo the Jew, was born not far from the commencement of the Christian era. He was the greatest philosopher of his nation in ancient times. Josephus speaks of him as "a man of great distinction and skill in philosophy." He was a Platonist. He attempted to modify historical Judaism, and superinduce upon it the classical philosophy. Though the traces of Platonism are so marked in his system that no one can doubt but Plato furnished the basis of it, yet it is equally apparent that he was largely indebted to Pythagoras. Clement of Alexandria, even calls him a Pythagorean. The truth is, however, that after the manner of the Eclectics, he mingled the doctrines of various other schools with his Platonism. He was well versed in the literature of classical paganism, and is reported to have been a proficient in geometry, astronomy and music. The study of his works is indispensable to an understanding of ancient philosophy, and we rejoice to see that Mr. Bohn has undertaken their publication in an accurate and elegant English translation.

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*General History of the Christian Religion and Church*. From the German of Dr. AUGUSTUS NEANDER, by JOSEPH TORREY, Professor in the University of Vermont. Vol. V., comprising the sixth volume of the original. (Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1854. 8vo, pp. 415.) This volume of Neander's great work is arranged from his posthumous papers, and edited by Prof. Schneider of Berlin. These papers were left in an incomplete state by Neander, and the editor must have found it no easy task to arrange them in the form which they have finally assumed. This volume, so far as Neander is concerned, concludes the great work to which it belongs. Whether any one possessing a share of his attainments, and gifted with his genius, will soon arise to carry it forward, according to his original plan, is very doubtful. While we can not but regret that he was taken away ere it was completed, it is surely a matter of devout gratitude to God that he was able to pursue his plan to the extent that he did. His history, as it stands, is a monument to his learning, genius, candor and piety, such as few men have been able to rear for themselves. The volume before us brings the history down to the early part of the fifteenth century. It contains his estimates of Wicliffe, John Huss, Jerome of Prague, and other stars which heralded the dawn of the Reformation. The work of which the volume before us is the concluding one, ought to be in the library of every clergyman.

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*History of the Jesuits; their Origin, Progress, Doctrines, and Designs*. By G. B. NICOLINI, of Rome. (London: H. G. Bohn. New York: Bangs, Brother & Co. 1854. 12mo, pp. 514.) This is a popular, and we think, reliable history of the Jesuits. The design of the author is to present a view of the order, both in its relation to the Papacy, and its influence on the cause of civil and religious freedom. His volume sounds a note of warning in the

ears of England. He insists that the prevalence of Jesuitism is incompatible with the loyalty of the citizen and the stability of government. He writes with great earnestness and considerable ability. He has produced a good popular history of the celebrated Society of Jesus. The volume is embellished with very finely executed portraits of Loyola and other generals of the order.

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We have received from Bangs, Brother & Co., New York, the third volume of *The Ecclesiastical History of England and Normandy*. By **ORDERICUS VITALIS**. Translated with Notes. By **THOMAS FORESTER, M. A.** (London: H. G. Bohn. 1854. 12mo, pp. 492.) We have before indicated the character of this work. The author, though somewhat credulous, and given to relating marvels, is yet considered reliable in the main thread of his history. This volume covers a period of twenty-six years; that is, from 1093 to 1119. Another volume, we should judge, will complete the work.

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*Matthew Paris' English History, from the year 1235 to 1273.* Translated from the Latin, by **Rev. J. A. GILES, D. C. L.** Vol. III. (London: H. G. Bohn. New York: Bangs, Brother & Co. 1854. 12mo, pp. 516.) This is the concluding volume of Matthew Paris' history. It contains not only the text of the concluding portion of his history, but the more important documents and notes contained in his appendix. It also has a copious index to the entire work, including Roger of Wendover's Chronicle, which some have supposed was written by the same author. There is certainly propriety in thus connecting them; for Matthew Paris begins his history at the period where Roger's terminates.

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*The World in the Middle Ages: An Historical Geography.* By **ADOLPHUS LOUIS KEPPEN**. In two volumes. (New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1854. 12mo, pp. 851.) These volumes contain summary accounts of the origin and growth of the different nations in Europe, western Asia and northern Africa, between the fifth and sixteenth centuries. The design of the author has been to take a rapid survey of the topography, the institutions, the literature, the science, the manners and customs of the civilized world, during the period of which he treats. He has condensed a vast amount of information concerning these topics, into small space. His work supplies a want which has long been felt. We think it must be invaluable as a class-book and book of reference. We have had occasion to refer to it for information on sundry questions of mediæval history, and our references have not been fruitless. We can cordially recommend this work to those who wish a compendious view of the Middle Ages. The work of reference is facilitated by an ample alphabetical index.

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*Lives of the Queens of England before the Norman Conquest.* By **Mrs. MATTHEW HALL**. (Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea. 1854. Crown 8vo, pp.

469.) The preparation of this volume was suggested by the histories of Miss Strickland, whose labors commenced with the memoir of Matilda, the wife of William the Conqueror. The investigations of the author have been conducted in a region of historic fable. Macaulay has dismissed the period of which she writes, as filled up with mythical personages and imaginary events. He classes the former, not without reason, with Hercules and Romulus. The only reliance of the historian of those early times, is on legendary lays and chronicles, which the most learned antiquarians have agreed in rejecting, as untrustworthy. Yet there may be a substratum of truth running through them. Undoubtedly the greater number of the persons whose histories are recorded in this volume really lived, and moved in the spheres, and performed the acts here ascribed to them. The work evinces considerable research, and is well digested. The style is straightforward and clear. Those who have Miss Strickland's work should by all means possess this.

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Bangs, Brother & Co. have sent us the fourth volume of Mr. Bohn's new edition of Gibbon's *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. This edition, edited by "an English Churchman," is very copiously annotated, and is published in a very convenient form.

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*The History of Russia from the Earliest Period to the Present Time.* Compiled from the most authentic sources, including the works of Karamsin, Tooke, and Ségur. By WALTER K. KELLY. In two volumes. Vol. I. (London: H. G. Bohn. New York: Bangs, Brother & Co. 1854. Pp. 502.) Comparatively little has been written in the English Language concerning the early history of Russia. To the apprehension of the great majority of English readers, that history is enveloped in fable. This work of Mr. Kelly will therefore be hailed with satisfaction. Especially at this time, when Russia is occupying so conspicuous a stand in the eyes of the world, will it meet with a cordial welcome. Mr. Kelly is well known as a patient and accomplished collector and translator of various works, and it would be safe to assume that his work in the volume before us is well done. The examination we have been able to give it has satisfied us that it is entitled to confidence.

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*History of Louisiana.* The Spanish Dominion. By CHARLES GAYARRE. (New York: Redfield. 1854. 8vo, pp. 649.) This volume is, in fact, the third of the author's history of Louisiana. The preceding volumes relate the history of the French rule in Louisiana, and conclude with an account of the cession of that colony to Spain in 1762, and the insurrections and commotions consequent upon the attempt to establish the sway of its new masters. In the present volume, the author pursues the history from the period of the trial and execution of the leading insurgents, and the complete establishment of the Spanish rule in 1769, until 1803, when the colony was ceded to the United States. The work is characterized by great research, and by a

degree of candor which is as commendable as it is rare. The following passage is worthy of remark :

"With all the foul abuses and tyrannical practices with which it has been so long the general custom to reproach the government of Spain everywhere, her administration in Louisiana was as popular as any that existed in any part of the world, and I am persuaded that I can rely on the unanimous support of my contemporaries when I declare, that they scarcely ever met in Louisiana an individual old enough to have lived under the Spanish government in the colony and judged of its bearing on the happiness of the people, who did not speak of it with affectionate respect, and describe those days of colonial rule as the golden age, which, with many, was the object of secret, and with others, of open regrets. Such a government would, of course, have been insupportable to us, but it is not hence to be inferred that it did not suit the tastes and feelings, and deserve the gratitude of our ancestors." P. 627.

Mr. Gayarré has taken pains to fortify his statements by the free use of various public documents. These he has for the most part, embodied in his text, instead of giving them in his appendix. The work would doubtless have been more symmetrical had he adopted a different course. Still, we are not disposed to find fault with the mere form of a work which possesses so many excellencies. We will merely add that it is beautifully printed and makes a very substantial looking volume.

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*History of the Origin, Formation and Adoption of the Constitution of the United States; with notices of its principal Framers.* By GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS. In two volumes. Vol. I. (New York : Harper & Brothers. 1854. 8vo, pp. 518.) The work which Hallam has so ably performed for the English Constitution, is similar to that which Mr. Curtis has undertaken for the American Constitution, in the volume before us, only in name. In all their processes and details they are essentially different. The development of the English Constitution, like the development of English nationality, has been gradual. It consists of the slow accumulations of ages. The origin of the constitution of this country, like the birth of its nationality, was more rapid and homogeneous. Consequently, while the student of English constitutional history is under the necessity of exploring past ages, of ransacking the incongruous edicts of various kings, and the conflicting statutes of successive parliaments, the American historiographer is enabled to confine his view to a single period, and to events which occurred in quick succession. Though the Constitution of England has a substantial existence, it is destitute of any consistency of form, having its only embodiment in statutes which extend through hundreds of years; while the Constitution of this country is condensed, fixed and definite, having consistency of form, as well as vitality and spirit. The task of writing the history of the latter, therefore, is much the less complex. Still, it is a task which requires the possession of rare qualities and the exercise of no stinted measure of patience. The man who writes the history of our Constitution must comprehend the general drift of our Revolutionary age, with the peculiar modifications arising from our local and comparatively insulated position; the events which preceded, and the necessities which demanded it; the

condition of the several states which were parties to it, with the varying tastes, interests, prejudices and passions of their respective populations; the character of the men who were engaged in its construction; the principles which underlie it; and the great and beneficent aims which it proposes. We think that Mr. Curtis possesses these qualifications in a high degree. His work is entitled to confidence, and we think it will live. We trust it may be extensively read, and that it will conduce to a clearer knowledge of, and a deeper reverence for, the Constitution of our country.

This volume is issued in the same generous manner in which the Harpers have issued the historical works of Prescott. We infer that the second volume is soon to follow the one before us. This volume embraces the history of the Constitution from the commencement of the Revolution to the assembling of the Convention in 1787. The forthcoming volume will describe the process of forming the Constitution. Of course this will aid us in a fuller understanding of what the Constitution really is, and what were the intentions of its framers.

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*Sketches of the Lives and Judicial Services of the Chief Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.* By GEORGE VAN SANTVOORD. (New York: C. Scribner. 1854. 8vo, pp. 533.) No country is happier in the character of its highest judicial officers for learning, ability, and moral worth, than the United States. The men who have presided over our highest judicial tribunal, have been eminent for their patriotism, their legal acumen, and their uncorrupted integrity. Such men as Jay, Ellsworth, and Marshall, would adorn any judicial station, and it is not without reason that we boast of their attainments and their virtues. We are glad to see an attempt made to perpetuate the remembrance of their excellence. If it had no other merit, the work of Mr. Van Santvoord would be welcome on this account. But it is not only commendable in design; it is also more than respectable in execution. It gives very succinct, yet quite ample histories of Jay, Rutledge, Ellsworth, Marshall, and Taney. It also presents a summary view of the more important cases decided by the Supreme Court during the service of each of them. The sketches are well written, and the volume is sent forth in the elegant style of typography for which Mr. Scribner has become so justly distinguished.

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*The Autobiography of the Rev. William Jay.* Edited by GEORGE REDFORD, D. D., LL. D., and JOHN ANGELL JAMES. In two volumes. (New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1855. 12mo, pp. 413, 336.) We have looked through these pages with real pleasure and profit. We do not think that the work is the best specimen of a biography, and we are surprised that its editors should have allowed it to appear in its present form. Yet we assure our readers it is full of entertainment. In our next number we shall speak more fully of the work and of its distinguished subject.

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We have another work from the pen of Lamartine: *Memoirs of Celebrated*

*Characters.* In two volumes. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1854. 12mo, pp. 437, 406.) These volumes contain sketches of Nelson, Columbus, Cicero, Homer, Fenelon, Socrates, Cromwell, and others. These sketches are touched with the warm poetic coloring for which their celebrated author is renowned. Some of those which we have read are intensely interesting.

*Hungary and its Revolutions, from its Earliest Period to the Nineteenth Century.* With a memoir of Louis Kossuth. By E. O. S. (London: H. G. Bohn. New York: Bangs, Brother & Co. 1854. 12mo, pp. 556.) This is in fact a memoir of Kossuth, with a preliminary historical sketch of Hungary. It seems to have been put forth under auspices which entitle it to be considered as authentic. It will tend to awaken deeper sympathy for oppressed Hungary, and a profounder veneration for her exiled but unconquered hero. Kossuth stands before the world as a man of transcendent abilities, and a patriot of unwavering devotion. The country which can boast of such a son as Louis Kossuth must have a future. We can not help thinking that providence has raised him up for something more than a glorious spectacle to mankind, though that were much. It should seem that he must be destined to achieve things for his country in which future ages will rejoice. May God hasten the time.

*You have heard of them.* By Q. (New York: Redfield. 1854. 12mo, pp. 353.) The persons alluded to in this rather queer title, are artists of various branches and different countries. Painters, sculptors, composers, vocalists, tragedians, &c., are here briefly commemorated. The volume contains sketches of the leading names in the various departments of art. These sketches do not appear to be fulsome. On the whole, we think they are characterized by good taste, and are very well executed. The reader will find this a very pleasing companion for broken hours.

*The Youth of Madame De Longueville, or New Revelations of Court and Convent in the Seventeenth Century.* From the French of VICTOR COUSIN. By F. W. RICORD. (New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1854. 12mo, pp. 403.) This volume presents Cousin to us in a new guise. Leaving philosophy for a season, he has come down to life; and that the artificial and vitiated life of the French court of the seventeenth century. Yet we are able to distinguish here the subtle spirit, the intense appreciation of the beautiful, and those high æsthetic qualities, which are so conspicuous in his philosophical works. M. Cousin divides the life of the Duchess De Longueville into three periods: the period of innocence, embracing her infancy, childhood and youth, and extending from 1619 to 1648; the period of dissipation and vice, beginning in 1648 and closing in 1654; and the period of penitence and atonement, extending from 1654 to her death in 1679. The volume before us covers only the first of these periods. We presume that it is the intention of M. Cousin to resume the narrative. We need not say that it is both interesting and instructive.

*The Life of P. T. Barnum.* Written by himself. (New York: Redfield. 1855. 12mo, pp. 404.) We have heard a story of a pickpocket who, having been induced, for a consideration, to return a valuable watch of which he had incontinently relieved its owner, was asked by his victim to explain how it had been extracted from his pocket. The nimble-fingered gentleman, tapping the other lightly on the shoulder, asked if he remembered on a certain time to have felt similar impressions. On receiving an affirmative answer, he replied, "I took it then." With his curiosity duly gratified in this particular, the owner of the watch went his way. But the next time he had occasion to refer to his watch, he was astonished to find it missing again. The pickpocket's illustration of his art had been too practical, and his knowledge had been too dearly bought. We would not compare Mr. Barnum to a pickpocket: this would be almost too literal. But his book might well remind one of the above incident. The idea haunts one like a presence, that having sold the public in so many nice tricks, he may have sold it again in explaining how they were done. Our suspicion, in this respect, is rather strengthened by the remembrance of having been taken in, during a recent visit to his hospitable villa, by a former volume issued by him, entitled "Constitution and By-Laws of the Know Nothings." But however this may be, we are prepared to pronounce this one of the most amusing volumes we have ever read. Its predicaments are equal to those of *Gil Blas*, and we have the assurance that *here* the actors, at least, are real. Incidents like the visit to the field of Waterloo, and the adventure of poor Stratton with the Belgian barber, are irresistible. Mr. Barnum possesses a most exuberant love of fun. Indeed, he seems to have inherited the character of a joker from his maternal grandfather. The only improvement he has made upon the special proclivity of his ancestor, seems to be in the intensely practical turn which he has given to his jokes.

Undoubtedly many of the tricks which he has played upon the public, had their origin in this inherent propensity for gulling his friends. He certainly is not so oblivious of moral distinctions as he sometimes represents himself. We are glad to see that in this volume he has made a public acknowledgment of his profound reverence for the Bible as the word of God. We believe that he cherishes a sincere respect for sacred things. He is moreover, an earnest and efficient laborer in the cause of temperance. In this respect he has contributed much to the real prosperity of his fellows. By his merry-making disposition he provokes laughter, and so induces health. In so far he is a benefactor of his kind. When he shall become as devout as he is humane, he will prove a benefactor in a better sense and a far higher degree.

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*Homes of American Statesmen: with Anecdotal, Personal and Descriptive Sketches.* By various writers. Illustrated by engravings and fac-similes of autograph letters. (Hartford: O. D. Case & Co. 1855. 8vo, pp. 487.) This is a beautiful book for the present gift season. It is one of the

finest specimens, mechanically, of American book-making. The engravings are of a superior cast, the printing is in the best style of the art, and the binding is superb. Aside from all this, the contents of the work are intrinsically excellent. The subjects of which it treats are the men whose wisdom has enlightened the age, whose deeds have blessed their country, and whose characters are held in the veneration of mankind. It contains sketches of Washington, Franklin, Jefferson, the two Adamses, Madison, Jay, Hamilton, Jackson, Clay, Calhoun, Webster, and others, equally deserving of remembrance by the country and their kind. These sketches, from the pens of such writers as Richard Hildreth, Parke Godwin, Charles King, and Horace Greeley, are well written of course, and possess a real historic value. We cordially commend this attractive volume to our readers.

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The Appletons have issued, in two good sized octavo volumes, the *Memoirs of Napoleon, his Court and Family*. By the Duchess D'ABRANTES, (Madame Junot.) These memoirs of Napoleon, by one who enjoyed his intimacy, as well as that of his family, and who possessed withal, the keen insight and ready tact for which her countrywomen are somewhat distinguished, have long enjoyed great popularity. They afford us a very interesting view of Napoleon's character as illustrated in his more private life. Madame Junot was an admirer of the Great Captain, but even she does not, like Mr. Abbott, make him quite a saint. She finds faults and errors enough in his character and life to invest him with something like a human interest.

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Messrs. Little, Brown & Co., of Boston, are issuing a complete collection of the British Poets, from Chaucer to Wordsworth; embracing the entire works of the most distinguished authors, with copious selections from the minor poets. The poems are to be accompanied with biographical, historical and critical notices, under the editorial supervision of F. J. Child, Boylston Professor of Rhetoric in Harvard University. The size and style of the volumes of this collection are the same as those of Pickering's Aldine edition of the British Poets. We have received four of these beautiful volumes, containing the poems of Gay, Akenside, Parnell and Tickell. It is difficult to conceive of an improvement in the general style of these elegant volumes. In size they are the most convenient for use, and in style they are all that the eye craves. Unquestionably, this is to be the best edition of the British Poets extant. (New York: Evans & Dickerson.)

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*Poems by William Cullen Bryant.* Collected and arranged by the author. In two volumes. (New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1855. 12mo, pp. 296, 286.) We are informed in the brief preface to this new and convenient edition of our best poet, that it "has been carefully revised by the author, and some faults of diction and versification corrected." When we read this statement we did not believe that it was possible to improve the exquisite versification of these poems, with which we have long been familiar; and

now, after a patient though pleasant survey of these charming pages, we are able to detect not more than one alteration from former editions. The volumes before us are worthy of the poetic beauty of their contents. They certainly are as conspicuous for the purity of their moral and religious sentiments as they are for their classic grace. Every one ought to read Bryant's poems.

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*The Works of Beaumont and Fletcher*; the text formed from a new collation of the early editions. With Notes and a Biographical Memoir, by Rev. ALEXANDER DYCE. In two volumes. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1854. Imperial 8vo, pp. 952, 978.) These works, though containing many things which the public taste of the present day would condemn, are yet important as illustrating the manners, tastes, and moral tendencies of English society during the greater part of the seventeenth century. The fact that the plays contained in these volumes were performed on the English stage during that period, suggests the pleasing inference that society has made a material advance in purity and good taste within the last two hundred years. Some of them would not now be tolerated on the boards of the lowest English or American theater. In spite of the drawback which we have suggested, many of the dramas contained in these portly volumes are of a high order, and deserve to be perpetuated as belonging to the noble literature of the age in which they were produced. This is a reprint of the fine edition of Mr. Dyce.

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C. S. Francis & Co., New York, have issued a [new edition of Longfellow's *Poets and Poetry of Europe*. It is a stout imperial octavo volume of 779 pages. It is made up of translations from the best sources, from the Anglo-Saxon, Icelandic, Danish, Swedish, German, Dutch, French, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese languages. In some cases, Mr. Longfellow, under whose editorial supervision the work is published, has furnished the translations, though the great bulk of them have been borrowed from others. The volume is of real value to those who have no other means of becoming acquainted with the poetic literature of the continent.

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*The Works of William Cowper*. Comprising his Poems, Correspondence and Translations. With a Life of the author, by ROBERT SOUTHEY, LL. D. In eight volumes. (London: H. G. Bohn. New York: Bangs, Brother & Co. 1854.) We have before us the fifth and sixth volumes of this fine edition of Cowper's life and works by Southey. They contain his original poems, with his translations from Vincent Bourne, Madame Guion, and various Greek poems; and also his translations of the Latin poems of Milton. The engravings in these volumes, of which there are eight in each, are exquisite. There is no better edition of Cowper than this, and we are happy to commend it to our readers.

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Mr. Bohn's edition of *The Novels and Miscellaneous Works of De Foe*, has reached its second volume. This volume contains the "Memoirs of a Cava-

lier," "Memoirs of Captain Carleton," "The Dumb Philosopher," and "Everybody's Business is Nobody's Business." These volumes belong to Mr. Bohn's new series, entitled "British Classics." (New York: Bangs, Brother & Co.)

*Alone.* By MARION HARLAND. Sixth edition. (Richmond: A. Morris. 1854.) "Alone," is a work of fiction by a young lady of Virginia. It has had quite an extensive circulation, and has been highly approved both by the press and by the reading public. The plot is simple, yet artistic; the characters are generally well drawn and natural. It abounds in sprightly dialogue, and striking and pleasant episodes. The style is agreeable; the moral excellent. It has faults; but they are inconsiderable in themselves, besides being outweighed by positive merits. The mechanical execution of this volume is superior, reflecting credit upon the publisher, and speaking well for the abilities of southern publishers. \*

*Ida Norman; or Trials and their Uses.* By MRS. LINCOLN PHELPS. New York: Sheldon, Lampert & Blakeman. 1854. 12mo, pp. 460.) We have read this volume and desire to commend it to our readers. Judged by the rules of art, it must be deemed somewhat faulty in construction. The characters are not remarkably well drawn; the incidents are not always well managed, and the second volume should have been omitted entirely. But when tried by the purest moral sentiments, and the best feelings of the heart, it stands the test, and is found worthy. We have rarely read a work of this description with a higher degree of satisfaction. No young person can read it without deriving advantage from it. It blends the highest lessons of morality, and the holiest sentiments of religion with the excitements and amusement of romance. It is something better than a story; it is a mentor.

*Ida May; a Story of Things Actual and Possible.* By MARY LANDON. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1854. 12mo, pp. 478.) It is understood that "Mary Landon" is simply a *nom du plume*. We have heard various conjectures as to the real name of the author of this book. We never should have suspected Mrs. Stowe of its authorship; and we are sure that this Ida does not belong to the same family with Mrs. Lincoln Phelps's. The author may be a woman; but she possesses an uncommon degree of masculine power, and is familiar with the special department of authorcraft upon which she has entered. In many respects, Ida May is superior to "Uncle Tom's Cabin." The plot of the story is better constructed, and there is a clearer insight of southern character, and a better delineation of the minor features of southern life. As a story it is better constructed than Mrs. Stowe's romance, but it has less passion, and is less stirring. This book will fare better at the hands of critics, but that will still retain the sympathies and hearts of the masses.

We have received two additional volumes of the new edition of Mr. Simms

Revolutionary Romances, just issued from the press of Redfield: "Woodcraft" and "The Scout." Simms is a writer of acknowledged genius, and withal, a veteran novelist. We are glad to see this substantial edition of his tales. They not only afford amusement to the reader, but what is much more important, afford a true reflection of the spirit of southern partisans, and relate many thrilling incidents connected with their struggles in behalf of freedom.

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*Wisdom, Wit, and Whims of Distinguished Ancient Philosophers.* By JOSEPH BANVARD, A. M. (New York: Sheldon, Lamport & Blakeman. 1855. 16mo, pp. 408.) Mr. Banvard has taken Diogenes Laertius' "Lives of the Philosophers," (the greater number of whose articles he has adopted, with only trifling alterations,) as the basis of this volume. To these he has added some things gathered from other sources; so that his work is more extended than that of Diogenes. It is a well executed compilation, and may afford both entertainment and instruction to the reader.

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*Shakespeare's Scholar:* being historical and critical studies of his Text, characters, and commentators, with an examination of Mr. Collier's Folio of 1632. By RICHARD GRANT WHITE, A. M. (New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1854. 8vo, pp. xliii., 504.) Five hundred octavo pages added to the already enormous accumulation of notes, comments and criticisms on Shakespeare! The announcement strikes one as forbidding. Yet we can assure our readers that the man who should treat Mr. White's book as he was wont, till recently, to treat Shakespearean commentators, would be the loser. He has evidently been a very thorough scholar of his great master. If any one can claim to understand Shakespeare, we think Mr. White is the man. His examination of the emendations of the various editions of the great bard, and especially of Mr. Collier's amended folio of 1632, is most searching and able. Every lover of Shakespeare should read this book. We will add that it is issued in the usually elegant style of the Appletons.

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BAYARD TAYLOR is, by way of eminence, *the American Traveler*. He has a taste for roaming, possesses quick observation, and describes what he sees with vividness and graphic power. His recent tour through portions of Africa and Asia, has furnished the matter for two books already published, and a third which we believe is in press. The first volume of this series, which is before us, is *A Journey to Central Africa; or Life and Landscapes from Egypt to the Negro Kingdoms of the White Nile*. Though this volume contains much that has been given to the public before, it contains more that is fresh. Mr. Taylor's object was not to investigate the antiquities of Egypt and Ethiopia, but rather to view life as it now is. Yet he has not entirely overlooked the former; though he has depended on Lepsius, Wilkinson and others, for the greater portion of what he has presented on such topics, rather than his own investigations. His descriptions of the scenery of the Nile, and of the mode of life displayed near its sources, are deeply interesting.

Just as we were sending the above lines to the printer, we received the second work in the series above alluded to: *The Lands of the Saracen*. This volume contains pleasant pictures of Palestine, Asia Minor, Sicily and Spain. We have been pleased with the general tone of the author's observations, though we can not sympathize fully with his visions of Christ, as recorded at page 84. We have long thought that Christians are apt to make too little of the Manhood of Christ; but it seems strange to us that an intelligent Christian traveler, standing where He had stood, and following the identical paths which He had trod, should have thought of this alone, with scarcely an impression of the awful and glorious contrast of His Divinity. It should seem that the soul of the pilgrim would have been inspired with visions of the God-Man, whose presence once irradiated, and ever after hallowed, the scenes amid which he stood. Still, we do not believe that what we must regard as strange, is to be attributed to unbelief of the mystery of the Incarnation. There is enough in other parts of the author's descriptions of scenes and localities in the Holy Land, to save him from such an imputation. (New York: G. P. Putnam & Co. 1855. 12mo, pp. 522, 451.)

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We have received the fifth, sixth, and seventh numbers of *Harper's Gazetteer of the World*. The seventh number brings the work down to "New." Three more numbers will complete it. It is the latest and best popular work of its kind.

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The Magnetic Telegraph is one of the wonders of the present age. Everything relating to it is necessarily invested with peculiar interest. To one who has heard and read much rodomontade about it in lectures, sermons, &c., it is refreshing to find a calm and sensible exposition of its principles and operation. Those who desire a thorough scientific treatise on this subject, yet presented in a popular form, have only to procure a volume entitled *Lectures on the Electro-Magnetic Telegraph*. By LAURENCE TURNBULL, M. D. Second edition. (Philadelphia: R. W. Barnard. 1854. 8vo, pp. 186.) Dr. Turnbull has given us a concise history of the Telegraph, an exposition of its principles, and an account of the different lines in the world. The whole is illustrated with numerous cuts and copper-plate engravings.

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*The Illustrated Natural History*. By Rev. J. G. Wood, M. A. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1854. 12mo, pp. 524.) This book is a model of its kind. It contains four hundred and fifty illustrations, which are executed in beautiful style. These are accompanied with brief descriptions, which give all the information needed in an elementary work without being prolix. The work is accompanied with a copious analytic index.

[We regret that we are compelled to omit several book notices, and the summary of Literary Intelligence prepared for this number of the Review.]